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Abstract
Armed forces play an instrumental role in maintaining stability in West Africa, yet they
have also been a major destabilizing actor due to their role in frequent coup d’états and
human rights abuses. Ghana’s armed forces in particular, has a colonial and authoritarian
history. It therefore requires change to align with the political transition of the country. The
thesis seeks to answers to the question; has Ghana’s processes of defence transformation
contributed to healthier civil-military relations and consolidation of democracy in the
Fourth Republic? David Chuter’s Guide to Defence Transformation and Rebecca Schiff’s
Concordance Theory of civil-military relations provide a dual framework of analyses of
developments in Ghana’s defence sector since 1992. A qualitative approach to research
design, data gathering and analysis was used to establish that Ghana’s defence sector has
undergone transformational change which has been organically driven by the political,
socio-economic and security conditions of the country.
Ghana Armed Forces in particular, has gradually undergone cultural, human, organizational
and political transformation. These relative changes have contributed to a politico-military
concordance that has helped sustain the Fourth Republic. Successes or otherwise of the
reforms are very much dependent on commitment to change by both political authorities
and the military hierarchy. There is agreement between military and political elites on key
variables: social composition of the officer corps, recruitment, political decision- making
process and military style. There have been some changes where the state and its security
and defence institutions are no longer seen as agents of fear and repression. Nonetheless,
the citizenry are not factored into the defence decision making process. The opening up of
the political space has provided opportunities for civil society actors and media to begin to
show interest in engaging the military. Ghana has made satisfactory progress in bringing
the defence sector in time with the current democratic dispensation. Yet, there is the need
for the Ghana to do more by initiating a more holistic defence transformation process to
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CHAPTER ONE
1. 1 Background to the study
West Africa comprises fifteen countries with varying levels of political and socio-economic
developments.1 Economic mismanagement and political authoritarianism sowed the seeds
for the devastating problems in the region.2 Since the 1990s, there have been some positive
developments in promoting democracy in Africa generally. This is in response to the post-
Cold War international and domestic clamour for democratization. The region’s politico-
security environment seems to be in constant flux with political systems ranging from
entrenched authoritarianism to democracy.
The transition processes have varied across the region, taking place in each state within its
own unique context and at its own pace.3 Countries such as Ghana, Benin, Senegal, Cape
Verde and Nigeria have made significant progress. Despite these developments, the
dividends of democratic peace and socio-economic development are mixed and yet to be
fully realized in West Africa. Specifically, the democratic deficit, referring to lack of good
governance has resulted in political violence often ending in military interventions and
violent intra-state conflicts.4
The literature on African civil military relations, especially those dating from the 1960s and
1970s, has focused primarily on motivations of military intervention in politics and how to
keep the military out of politics. A variety of reasons for the frequency of military
interventions into African politics have been cited: ethnicity, weak state institutions, abuse
of power, dictatorship, economic mismanagement, human rights abuse, and politicization of
national armies, military centrality, and external aid.5 Claude Welch categorized these
reasons into three broad factors namely: 1) intra-military factors, 2) domestic factors, and
3) external factors.6
Table 1-1: Causes of Military Interventions in Politics

















This is partly attributed to the high incidence of coups in West Africa. From 1963 to 2015,
the region recorded about 46 successful coups d’état accounting for half the number of
coups in the entire African continent. The majority of the coups d’état occurred in 7
countries: Nigeria (6), Ghana (5), Burkina Faso (6), Niger (4) Guinea Bissau (4), Benin (5),
and Sierra Leone (5). Other countries with fewer instances of coups were: Mali (3), Togo
(3), Guinea (2), Liberia (1), Gambia (1) and Cote d’Ivoire (1).7 Cape Verde and Senegal
have remained coup free. The most recent coups in the region occurred in Guinea (2008),
Niger (2010), Mali and Guinea Bissau (2012), Burkina Faso (2014) and (2015).
Jimmy Kandeh rightly notes two waves of military interventions in West Africa. The first
wave occurred in the first two decades of independence; from the 1960s to 1970s, when
mostly senior officers masterminded coups d’état. In contrast, during the second wave from
the 1980s to 1990s were mainly orchestrated by junior officers or rank and file of
militaries.8 However, this distinction between the first and second waves is not precise, as
in both periods coups d’états were conducted by both junior ranks and senior officers. For
example, the first coup d’état in Africa occurred in the West African country of Togo in
1963, when non-commissioned officers returning from the French army after service in
Vietnam and Algeria seized power from first President, Sylvanus Olympio. The coup was
led by a former Master-Sergeant in the French army, Emmanuel Bodjolle.9 Moreover, the
recent cases of coups d’état in the 2000s appeared to be a mixture of both. For instance, the
putsches in Niger (2010) and Guinea Bissau (2012) were led by senior officers while a
recent coup in Mali 2012 was led by junior officers.
Before the advent of coups d’états in West Africa, militarism, defined as the pervasive
influence of military principles and ideas in society10 played a significant role in African
affairs. This was prevalent in the historical and political evolutionary processes before the
encounter with the Europeans.11 Several examples point to the existence of indigenous
armies in kingdoms such as the Zulu of South Africa, Dahomey (Benin), and Ashanti of
Gold Coast (Ghana).12 For example, there were wars involving these armies and the British
in the then Gold Coast. Nonetheless, the patterns of civil-military relations of contemporary
West African countries are influenced by their historical, colonial and post-independence
experiences. Historically rooted pathologies about the role of the security and defence
forces in society have resulted in deep cleavages between state, security sector, particularly
the military, and citizens in many contemporary African settings.13 These can be traced
back to the inception of colonial security institutions and their relations to political
authority on the one hand, and the society on the other. 14 Colonial rule made little
distinction between civilian and military administrations. 15 African troops were mainly
recruited and trained to serve the political interest of the colonial powers to quell
indigenous resistance and maintain a local version of pax Britannica or pax Gallica.16
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Besides dealing with internal security problems, there were other principal motives behind
the building of large armies by colonial powers. They provided colonial masters with
greater strategic mobility, and facilitated the safeguarding of capital investments of the
colonial powers and their nationals and provided a useful manpower reserve of
mobilization in times of war.17 Militaries were structured to suit these external requirements
rather than the interests of the indigenous people.18 Therefore, armies were seen as ‘armies
of Africa, rather than African armies’ as they existed to serve colonial objectives, usually
outside the societies they were drawn from.19 The use of the colonial armies as agents of
suppression caused fear and even dislike for the colonial military, and this colonial legacy
has indeed influenced civil-military relations in the post-independence era. 20 It is argued
that the use of African armies for political purposes during the colonial era is an important
factor in determining the behaviour of African armies after independence and the extent to
which they acquired legitimacy and prestige among the population. In most African
societies, the army was regarded with fear and hostility and often linked with low societal
status. 21 This is partly attributed to the calibre of people recruited into the colonial armies.
Transformation of colonial regiments into national armies of newly independent states
posed challenges in terms of establishing legitimacy and effectiveness. As noted by
William Gutteridge, “substantial number of senior soldiers in African armies were recruited
to meet the needs of imperial powers and, therefore, on assumptions that were not ideally
suited to the needs of a new nationalist state.”22 However, the status quo was maintained by
most post-independence African leaders who appeared more interested in building large
armies for the purposes of regime stability. Most African leaders in the immediate post-
independence era adopted one-party political systems, often built around strong charismatic
rulers. The prevailing trend in the region especially in the immediate post-independence era
has been the tendency of successive political leaders to resort to deleterious devices such as
patron-client systems, ethnic manipulation, and politicization of the military. 23 These
created divided militaries and undermined professionalism of the security apparatus. In
most cases, there was little or no attempt to articulate and codify defence policies in West
African states.24 In this milieu, coups d’états started as newly trained African officers
became very politically conscious. 25 These military interventions often came with
destabilizing consequences such as devastating military rules, intra-military conflicts,
insurgencies and even civil wars. Even in those African states where civil wars did not
occur, the security sector, especially the military, are influential in the political landscape,
where autocratic regimes ruled with iron hands, often using the military to inflict severe
hardships on the citizens. Such acts included extra-judicial arrests, assassinations, false
imprisonment, brutality against opponents, and exhibited a culture of impunity. The
military remains an important force in the very existence of the state as well as political
governance processes.
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The post-Cold War era of democratization has witnessed a relative decline in coups in West
Africa. Although no country in West Africa is currently under military rule, lingering
effects from the past continue to exert a negative influence on civil management, control
and oversight of the military and security sector in the region’s current democratizing
dispensation.26 Recent events in West Africa have demonstrated both negative and positive
signs. Even during the periods of civilian rule, there have been allegations and reports of
plots and failed attempts at coups d’états across the region. The coups in Niger (February
2010), Mali (March 2012), Guinea-Bissau (April 2012), Burkina Faso (2014) could be
described as a return to the days of coups. The events in these countries highlight the
impact of external forces on fragile and weak African political systems with poorly trained
and equipped militaries.27 West African states, due to their mixed history of civil-military
relations have benefited from the international development agenda of security and defence
sector reform which started in the late 1990s, to promote sustainable peace and
development in societies in transition from conflict or long-term authoritarian rule.28 The
drive for security and defence sector reforms in major national and international policy
agenda is informed by the general understanding that an unreformed security sector
presents major obstacles to the promotion of sustainable development, democracy and
peace.29 Such reform agenda was borne out of several reasons including the recognition that
the majority of the countries that have undergone civil war in the past 30 years are in Africa
and about half of them relapsed into political violence within a few years of peace.30 The
security and defence sectors, particularly the military have been a double-edged sword in
the governance processes of most West African countries. On the one hand, the security
sector has helped maintain both regime and state stability. On the other hand, the propensity
to intervene in politics and the attendant misrule and human rights abuses have been a
major cause of political instability and human insecurity in most parts of the continent. A
primary aim of security and defence sector reforms has been to ensure that the military
observes the supremacy of democratic institutions and respect civilians and their human
rights.31
In this regard, defence and security sector reform initiatives have been undertaken in almost
all democratizing West African countries as part of public sector reform processes though
with mixed outcomes.32 Some analysts have observed that countries such as Liberia and
Sierra Leone which have witnessed the complete collapse of security due to conflicts
provide a more permissive and enabling environment for SSR than non-conflict contexts
like Ghana.33 The African civil-military relations context differs significantly from that of
advanced western democracies. Rocky Williams for instance, argues that despite formal
mechanisms and institutions of civil control which are largely influenced by Anglo-Saxon
or Western ideas, the reality underpinning African civil-military relations is the fact that the
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subordination of the armed forces to civil control in most countries, when this occurs, has
been as a result of complex systems of processes and interfaces of a non-institutional
nature.34 Hence, in most cases, real control of the armed forces by civil authorities whether
they are democratically elected or not, is exercised by a range of subjective interfaces and
partnerships which may include informal mechanisms or merely the formal expression of
power relations.35 Thus civilian control of the armed forces is often achieved based on
some established principles of civil and democratic controls, as well as existing societal
relationships.
In Ghana, which is the case study for the thesis, several years of militarization of politics
and society engendered a volatile political environment.36 By way of history, Ghana gained
independence in 1957 amidst high hopes of socio-economic and political developments.
However, the realization of these aspirations was soon truncated as the country suffered a
succession of military coups and periods of military rule, interspersed with short-lived
returns to civilian rule.37The country has been ruled by four different military governments.
This began with the 1966 coup d’état when the National Liberation Council (NLC)
overthrew the first post-independence government of Kwame Nkrumah. Since then, there
have been three successful coups orchestrated by the military in 1972, 1979 and 1981.38
Denis Austin posits that “if the first coup was an optimistic attempt by the army to break
the enforced monopoly of single party government and to restore competitive politics to a
disenfranchised electorate, the second coup marked the arrival of the army as one of the
permanent contenders for power.”39After the February coup of 1966,
“there began the search for a very different arrangement of
power at the national level – very different from the world of
the dominant party or the single party – a world in which Ghana
was now one of a number of states in which the army had taken
its place either in the council chamber or sufficiently close to its
doors to be able to impose its will from time to time on whoever
rules by its favour.”40
Military intervention in Ghanaian politics has been described as “the armed forces
constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the
recognized civilian authority.” 41 The frequent military interventions in politics resulted in
what Eboe Hutchful referred to as the “decomposition of the security sector.” 42 For
instance, coups d’états led to a rapid turnover in top command positions and thus decimated
the officer corps. This led to the deterioration of professionalism in the armed forces. In
addition, coups provided avenues for corruption by the armed forces. Other factors such as
increased polarization, class contradictions in the forces, erosions of internal cohesion and
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decline in the legitimacy of the entire hierarchy of the armed forces.43 But since the return
to constitutional rule in 1992, Ghana has been generally perceived as a stable and peaceful
nation with relatively professionalized armed forces in a sub-region plagued by protracted
conflicts and political instability. The fundamental issue is the role of the defence sector in
ensuring the continuity of the democratic process. Writing in 1975, Austin correctly
predicted the pattern of governance mechanisms in Ghana for decades to come, the pattern
of frequent military incursion into politics. Yet, while this pattern continued for more than
three decades after independence military intrusion into Ghanaian politics has significantly
reduced since 1992. As in many states, the military has indeed reached a watershed and
have actually metamorphosed into a credible national force.44 Indeed, Ghana’s military has
evolved to such an extent that from the 1960s it has been at the forefront in efforts to
restore peace and security to several countries in Africa and abroad,45 while Ghana has
become signatory to several protocols and agreements barring the military from political
power. These include the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and
Democracy (2001), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in
Africa (2007). The 1992 Fourth Republic constitution of Ghana, Under Article 3(3),
specifically states that any unlawful overthrow of the Constitution constitutes high treason,
which is punishable by death.46
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The defence sector has been a primary source of insecurity and political instability in
Ghana. Therefore reforms aimed at restoring its professionalism and efficiency to ensure
the credibility of the state as the primary source of security for its citizenry has been a
major desire in the country.47 Reform of the defence sector has been at the centre of
Ghana’s remarkable democratic transformation, especially for ensuring regime survival and
providing the stable environment necessary for policy reform. 48 The emphasis on the
political roles of militaries in the dominant literature has led to a lack of detailed analysis
on how African militaries are being transformed to carry out their defence and security
functions efficiently and effectively, rather than viewed solely as internal political actors.49
Even though Ghana’s defence sector has an authoritarian past, and thus requires some level
of change to ensure that it conforms to the democratic principles that Ghana has acceded to,
it has not undergone any coordinated transformation of the type alluded to by Chuter.50
According to Chuter, defence transformation encompasses four major clusters, which are
cultural transformation, entailing the transformation of the culture of the institution; human
transformation, entailing the transformation of the composition of the institution with
regard to its racial, ethnic, regional and gender composition; political transformation, which
strives to ensure the conduct and character of the institution conforms to the political
features of the democracy within which it is located; and organizational transformation,
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constitutes a more technocratic process within which relevant organizations are right-sized.
51
Indeed, there have been some changes within Ghana’s defence sector, but these changes
have happened in piecemeal fashion. However, some aspects of the changes which have, or
seem to have taken place in Ghana do fall within the four broad clusters mentioned above.
These changes have taken place in the absence of a well-articulated national security
strategy and a defence policy. Thus, reforms have been ad hoc and incoherent and therefore
very difficult to identify or measure. In addition, reform of the defence sector in Ghana has
focused on developing institutional frameworks to promote increased democratic
governance of the security sector. However, there are certain constraints such as the
politicization of institutions of formal oversight functions like parliaments, and their lack of
technical expertise to perform their functions.52 Besides, the excessive influence of the
military in both politics and society are barriers to enhancing democratic oversight.53
Several analyses have been done of security sector reform in post-conflict countries such as
Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Liberia. However, there are gaps in the analysis of defence
sector governance in non-post-conflict contexts like Ghana. It is argued that policy choices
about management and control of the military and the security sector during the times of
crises, transition or in peace times, and the “democratic strategies” toward them, are indeed
decisive for consolidation of democracy, conflict prevention and building of sustainable
peace.54 Nonetheless, most of the existing literature on civil-military relations in emerging
democracies is preoccupied with issues of preventing coups: civil or democratic control of
armed forces. Therefore, there are no exhaustive analyses of the role of armed forces in the
consolidation of democracy, especially in relations to the efficiency and effectiveness of the
security sector, and the implications of their roles and missions for democracy. 55 For
example, one analyst argues that “for democracy to sink deep roots on the continent, the
security sector needs to be a willing partner in the process of democratic consolidation.”56
While Ghana’s military has not officially intruded into politics since the last coup of
December 1981, the armed forces need transformation. This is because countries that were
hitherto on a similar course of democratic consolidation, have seen a democratic reversal
because the armed forces have not been entirely transformed.
One of the great historical obstacles to the stability of democracy in developing countries
has been subordinating the military to civilian rule or control. 57This has arguably led to the
stagnation and regression in democratic consolidation and sometimes, complete breakdown
of democratic processes. 58 The cases of recent military interventions in West African
politics make it clear that the military coup is not just a problem of the political past, but a
continuing danger, even for electoral democracies that have persisted for over a decade.59
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Eboe Hutchful noted that civil control of the military in the independent state has
historically been a myth. 60 Particularly, the existence of a civilian regime does not
necessarily suggest civil control of the military. The above observation is particularly true
during a certain period of Ghana’s political history. There have been some changes in this
regard. The study therefore examines the change in Ghana’s defence sector since the return
to constitutional democracy in 1992. Specifically, it investigates how the transformation




Has Ghana’s processes of defence transformation contributed to healthier civil-military
relations and consolidation of democracy in the Fourth Republic?
1.4 Goal and Objectives of the study
The overall aim of the study is to undertake an enquiry into the processes of defence
transformation in Ghana. Specifically, the study seeks to achieve the following objectives:
a) Investigate Ghana’s processes at transforming her defence sector in line with
democratic principles;
b) Relate the theories and concepts of civil-military relations and defence
transformation to the Ghanaian case;
c) Examine the contribution of Ghana’s defence sector towards the consolidation of
democracy; and;
d) Identify the lessons other countries in the sub-region and the continent could draw
from Ghana.
1.5 Methodology
The study is based on a qualitative approach to design, data gathering and analyses.
Qualitative method is best suited for addressing research questions that require explanation
of social phenomena and their contexts. This approach is preferred for the purpose of this
study due to the emphasis it places on social and political processes and institutions. The
key issues of this study-civil-military relations and defence transformation can be best
studied qualitatively to illuminate how patterns of events unfold over time. Although other
qualitative and even quantitative research designs such as surveys, experiments and
historical analysis could be employed, the epistemological position of the researcher and
the aims and needs of the research rule them out. The qualitative research design selected
for this study is a single-case study. The study aims at deeper understanding of a complex
social phenomenon of defence transformation processes in Ghana, rather than
measurements, this therefore rules out the use of other strategies like experiments or
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surveys. Therefore, the research design for the study is a single-case on Ghana's defence
sector.
A single-case study design is most preferred as it allows a “thick description” and deeper
understanding of processes.61 Thick description is an interpretative practice which traces
how meanings are made by focusing on the accounts of local informants on the flow of
social discourses at the microscopic level.62 The case study on Ghana explores deeply how
defence transformation process could contribute to improved civil-military relations needed
for the consolidation of democracy. The case selection is informed by several factors and
primary among them is that most analysis on defence and security sector reform in West
Africa has focused extensively on post-conflict environments which are deemed permissive
of reforms. While Ghana is not a post-conflict country, the military has a mixed history.
Interestingly, the country has remained relatively stable since the return to constitutional
democracy in 1992 in the absence of a well-articulated defence transformation process.
This requires a systematic investigation to actually establish the real changes or non-
changes in the defence sector. By focusing on Ghana, the findings and policy
recommendations that arise from the case study could have relevance for other West
African countries in need of holistic transformation of their defence sector.
Furthermore, a single-case study is compelling because there is no exhaustive study on
Ghana or any other West African country through the dual lenses of Schiff’s Concordance
theory of civil-military relations and Chuter's framework for defence transformation. In this
regard, a single-case study represents the critical case for testing the theoretical and
conceptual frameworks upon which the study is hinged. Rebecca Schiff considers the
unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and moves beyond institutional
analysis of civil military relations by arguing that in order to prevent the military from
interfering in domestic politics, three societal institutions: the military, political elites and
citizenry must work and maintain cooperation or partnership agreement in four areas; the
social composition of the officer corps; political decision-making process; method of
recruitment of personnel and style of the military. 63 In addition, analyzing Ghana's
contemporary civil-military relations from Schiff’s theoretical proposition, there is a
general view that since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1992 something has changed
within the Ghana Armed Forces and Ghanaian society that needs to be studied. Therefore,
the research examines what exactly has changed in Ghana’s defence sector using Chuter’s
conceptual framework. Chuter conceptualizes defence transformation to encompass four
major clusters, namely: 1) cultural transformation, which entails the transformation of the
culture of the institution, 2) human transformation, the transformation of the composition of
the institution with regard to its racial, ethnic, regional and gender composition, etc.; 3)
political transformation, which strives to ensure the conduct and character of the institution
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conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is located; and 4)
organizational transformation, which constitutes a more technocratic process within which
the organization is right-sized, among other factors.64
A case study employs a plethora of data collection and analysis tools depending on the
needs of the research at a point in time. One of the primary research methods used was field
research through the use of semi-structured interviews with a sample size of 72 people.
This population was purposively drawn from members of the Ghana Armed Forces; both in
active service and retired, technocrats, politicians and ordinary citizenry to support the
theoretical and conceptual frameworks. This method was preferred because the focus of the
research, defence transformation processes in Ghana is largely un-documented and thus
requires qualitative interviews with the relevant stakeholders to generate data. The study
made use of a broad review of the secondary data from existing literature on civil military
relations and democratic governance of security and defence sector in West Africa, in
general, and Ghana, in particular.
For the case study, qualitative content analysis of primary and secondary data was used to
identify and analyse issues that are of theoretical importance and relate meaningfully to the
central research question.65 The data was therefore clustered and analysed into four broad
themes of defence transformation proposed by Chuter. These approaches also enabled the
researcher to examine the role Ghana’s defence sector in the consolidation of democracy.
Furthermore, data gathered on civil-military relations in Ghana was analysed using the
theoretical lens of Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory of civil-military relations to
explore how the theories and principles of civil-military relations apply in the Ghanaian
context. The findings and conclusions of the study are therefore based on subjective
interpretations of the available data informed by the evidence from the literature review and
interviews.
1.6 Scope of the study
The DAC/OEDC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, outline the core
actors of the security and defence sectors to include the armed forces; police; gendarmeries;
paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military
and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security
units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).66However, this study is selectively
focused on Ghana’s defence sector. The key actors here include Ghana Armed Forces (the
army, air force and the navy) and defence management institutions and oversight bodies
such as Ministry of Defence and Parliament respectively. The study focuses on various
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reform processes in Ghana’s defence sector since the return of the country to democratic
rule in 1992. Specifically it highlights the various initiatives implemented by successive
governments since the inception of the Fourth Republic to transform the defence sector. For
comparative purposes, the study takes a panoramic look at the armed forces and the
political development processes since independence to highlight the consistencies or
otherwise of the current situation. For the purpose of the study, analysis of developments
in the defence sector is limited to periods from 1992 to 2016.
1.7 Limitations of the study
Research on the military has a set of practical challenges for civilian researchers especially.
These often relate to issues of access to spaces and research participants, classified
documents, gatekeeper relations and the often gendered military hierarchical culture.67 One
major limitation of the research is the challenge of gaining access to the defence sector in
Ghana; as such matters are usually regarded as sensitive and confidential. To overcome this
challenge requires practical approaches to negotiating one’s relationship to the military
establishment. The researcher had to rely on her professional experience as staff of the Kofi
Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), an institution affiliated to
the Ministry of Defence, Ghana to obtain access to key informants and documents from the
Ghana Armed Forces. In this regard, valuable data was secured through formal and
informal contacts with serving and retired officials of the Ghana Armed Forces. Another
limitation was sensitivity and confidentiality of defence and military issues in Ghana. To
overcome this challenge, the research objectives and purpose of the study were clearly
stated and shared with relevant informants. Findings and conclusions of the research are
therefore informed by the qualitative analysis of the available primary and secondary
information.
1.8 Rationale and Originality of the study
In most African countries, the security and defence sectors have played a dual role in
maintaining state stability, while at the same time being a major destabilizing factor. Some
recent analyses have pointed to the problematic issue that military acceptance of civilian
authority remains a missing piece of Africa’s democratic transition puzzle. 68 At the same
time, the competence and knowledge of civilian authorities about military affairs is also
lacking. Particularly, application of principles of good governance to the defence sector
though not impossible appears daunting for African democracies. Accordingly, the process
of defence transformation can be considered as essential to the process of democratic
consolidation. The study seeks to contribute to the growing literature on transformation
processes of the security and defence sectors in Ghana through a deeper examination of the
processes so far, as well as the application of some of the theoretical and conceptual
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constructs on civil-military relations and defence transformation to the Ghanaian
experience. A lot of work has been done on defence reforms in post-conflict societies in
Africa. However, there exist only a few analyses in the area of defence transformation in
transitional democracies like Ghana, that are perceived to be doing well in terms of its
democratic governance process. This study therefore, seeks to address that gap in literature
by conducting a detailed study of Ghana’s defence transformation processes. The study
could serve to inform defence and security policy in Ghana, especially as the country is yet
to adopt a comprehensive national security framework and defence policy. Lessons learnt
from the Ghana case could potentially be applied in other West African countries which
have similar socio-political histories and face common challenges in terms of defence
reform.
1.9 Organization of the study
The study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter one constitutes the background to the
problem and research objectives. The second chapter reviews some of the scholarly works
on civil-military relations and defence transformation. It seeks to identify the gaps in the
existing literature and set out the theoretical and conceptual framework upon which the
study is hinged. In doing this, the chapter navigates through the literature of civil-military
relations, generally and the military in African politics, in particular. Some of the prevailing
analysis of the challenges of military disengagement in politics were explored to set the
tone to holistic transformation of defence in the region as means of enhancing efficiency
and effectiveness of the armed forces vis–a-vis their evolving role in the contemporary
governance and development process. The review of literature in the field of civil-military
relations and African militaries establishes the knowledge gap on how defence
transformation could contribute to healthy civil-military relations which is deemed essential
for democratic consolidation and political stability in emerging democracies. In this regard,
chapter three explains the research methodology employed to answer the research
questions. This chapter therefore reflects on some of the key research paradigms and
philosophies that inform the research design, methods of data collection and analysis of
results.
Chapter four provides the background to Ghana’s current political dispensation. It situates
the discussion within the paradigm and normative shifts in civil-military relations following
the advent of the post-Cold War international system. To place the Ghana Armed Forces
within this context, the chapter traces the post-independence political trajectory of Ghana
during which the country witnessed musical chairs of military and civilians in politics from
1959 to 1979. This is followed by a discussion on the PNDC regime and democratic
transition from 1981-1992. Against this background, the chapter then examines the place of
the Ghana Armed Forces in the emerging democratic dispensation under the Fourth
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Republic (1992-2016). It also analyses the constitutional and institutional mechanisms that
exist for managing civil-military relations and the role of armed forces in the current
democratic dispensation. Essentially, the chapter argues that post-Cold War international
system has necessitated a rethink in entire defence set up in most countries around the
globe. In the case of countries that transition from authoritarian military regimes to
democracies as Ghana, it is more imperative to clearly situate the armed forces, as an
important state institution in the democratic process.
Having established the place of the Ghana Armed Forces in the “new” democracy, the next
chapter takes a critical look at the defence sector in its present state through the lens of the
defence transformation process as posited by Chuter, in order to gauge the extent of change
within Ghana’s defence sector. The chapter attempts to examine those changes or non-
changes which have taken place within Ghana’s defence sector in terms of cultural, human,
organizational and political transformation. The chapter argues that, the defence sector in
Ghana has seen some changes. Particularly, the Ghana Armed Forces, as an institution has
seen some changes with regards to human, cultural, political and organizational setup.
However, these transformations have not been comprehensive and a well-coordinated
national process. This sets the pace to examine how the changes in the defence sector have
contributed to the current state of civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic.
Based on the analysis of the preceding chapters, chapter six looks at the state of civil-
military relations in the Fourth Republic through the concordance theoretical framework.
The chapter basically argues that civil-military relations in Ghana’s Fourth Republic
despite its chequered history is experiencing some relative improvement and thus
contributed to the country's growing democratic credentials. It is gradually moving from
frostiness to relative thawing of relations. Particularly, there has not been any overt attempt
at overthrowing a government since 1992. This state of affairs, however, has been achieved
by partnership or concordance between two actors- the political elites and military on some
of the variables of concordance proffered by Schiff- the social composition of the officer
corps, political-decision-making process and the recruitment method and military style.
There is the realization among these actors that their mutual interests would be best served
within a democracy, notwithstanding the challenges.69 The citizenry, the third partner, is
not essentially part of the equation.70 The chapter takes the discussion further to examine
the current state of the relationship between the military and key civil society groups and
the media. A changing relationship is seen as the GAF is becoming increasingly receptive
to civil society and media. Nonetheless, there remains mutual mistrust between the military
and CSOs and media due to difference in organizational cultures and approaches to
business.
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The concluding chapter seven reflects on the research question and objectives of the study
and declares the key findings, and possibilities that exist for effectively transforming the
defence sector in Ghana. The strengths and weaknesses of the work are also noted with
some recommendations made on future areas for research.
1.10 Summary
The defence sectors, particularly the armed forces, are considered essential agents for the
consolidation of new democracies in West Africa. Ghana in particular has made relative
gains in reversing the endemic militarization of politics especially from the 1960s through
to the 1980s. The country has since 1992 evolved into a relatively stable democracy. Efforts
at defence and security sector governance contributed significantly to this achievement in a
troubled sub region prone to coups and political instability. The study undertakes a deeper
examination into the transformation processes taking place in the GAF to make it play an
efficient and effective role in the process of consolidation of the country’s relatively young
democracy. The subject area, especially the essence of management of the defence sector
in nurturing democracy and the approach taken in this work are key factors that help
convey the novelty of the study. The subject area of defence sector transformation, remains
largely understudied in most non-post conflict but post-authoritarian West African states. A
review of the literature is required to identify the knowledge gap which this study could
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CHAPTER TWO
A Review of the Civil-Military Relations Problem and Defence Transformation in
Africa
2.0 Introduction
The armed forces as an institution of the state occupy a unique role in any society. In most
cases, the operations of the armed forces are linked to the existence of the state. Tasked
with ensuring the defence of the state, armed forces are closely related to the larger society.
For example, military expenditure has significant bearing on the national economy, while
its human resource requirement has implications for able-bodied citizenry. The way armed
forces operate and are managed sets them apart from other institutions of the state and their
relationship with the society as a whole. Besides the traditional protective role of the
military against external enemies, the institution has evolved over the years to serve a
number of societal goods. As Giuseppe Caforio notes that ‘the state is the sole client of the
military and no other client is permitted.1 Rocky Williams adds, that
“The control of state over the military and the context within which
the military practice their profession is not only economic, but
comprehensive. Accession, promotion, training, missions, force
structure, etcetera are all determined directly or indirectly by the
state. The state control over the military as institution is not
transitory, but continuous. Therefore, considerations of the state and
its impact on the state are often in the foreground of any discussion
of civil-military relations.”2
Martin Edmonds argues that the study of the relations between the armed forces and the
society is a relatively new field of enquiry. Its emergence and expansion like other fields of
inquiry is a product of its social and political relevance on one hand, and the development
of new theories and analytical approaches on the other. 3 Civil-military relations have
received a great deal of scholarly attention in the field of social sciences, particularly from
political scientists, historians and sociologists. Gregory Foster, for example adds that civil-
military relations have become issues of universal concern in the post-modern world. In this
regard, it must be defined by four imperatives: globalization, global democratization, the
continued viability of the state and the performance and legitimacy of the military, acting as
both organ of the state and an important institution of the state.4 The role of the military in
nation- building and consolidation of nascent democracies compels a deeper study of civil-
military relations. In essence, civil-military relations are concerned with the interfaces
between the military sector and the different segments of the society in which the military
exists and operates. The focus of these important relations is especially on processes,
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institutions and mechanisms by which the military sector is brought under constitutional
civil authority. These therefore, include how the military interfaces with state institutions,
civil society, media, and social groupings such as ethnic and religious groups within the
society.5
This chapter reviews some of the scholarly works on civil-military relations and defence
transformation. It seeks to identify the gaps in the existing literature and set out the
theoretical and conceptual framework upon which the study is hinged.
2.1.1 Clarification of Key Concepts
The traditional concern with civil-military relations has been the political role of militaries,
motivations and causes of military intervention in politics,6 and how to manage civil-
military relations to curb coups d’état.7Other related concerns have been the nature of
military governments.8 However, with the transition to democratic rule in most coups d’état
prone continents like Africa, Latin America and to some extent the Middle East, coupled
with the obvious limitation of the traditional approaches, some civil-military relations
analysts have proposed a more holistic approach to the governance of the security and
defence sectors. In this milieu, terms such as civilian and civil control, democratic control
and oversight have been at the crux of the civil-military relations debate. A brief
clarification of these concepts might be useful for this study. Civil control has been defined
by Chuter as the obedience owed to the state (civis) by the military.9 This implies the
allegiance of the armed forces to the larger civil society and not only the government.
Chuter argues that in reality, civil control is only a technicality, but the important issue is
for the military to accept that it is the servant of the nation of which the state is the agent.10
While it is incumbent on the military to adhere to that principle, the politicians and civil
servants are expected to believe in this same principle.11 In addition, the term, civilian
control, often seen as the critical component of democratic and civil control rather than an
independent variable, is achieved through the appointment of civilian political officials to
positions of responsibility over the armed forces. It also requires granting of decision
making powers to civil servants. Nonetheless, actions of both politicians and civil servants
must be guided by a constitutional order or framework subject to the rule of law.12 Civilians
(politicians and technocrats) must also have the competence to engage the military in the
governance process. However, this is most lacking in most African countries.13
Democratic control has been defined as the subordination of the armed forces to
democratically elected political authorities, who are responsible for taking decisions that
concern the defence of country.14 Robin Luckham argues that the concept of democratic
control recognizes that civilian governments are not necessarily democratic.15 Further, he
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adds that democratic control can be seen as a contested process, not as a fixed attribute of
existing democracies. This is because, first, democracy itself has a contested nature, and
second, some of the largest democratic deficits can be found in the security sector.
Arguably, even some democratic governments have the tendency to halt democracy at the
barracks doors or in the corridors of the secret state.16 Therefore the concept requires a
more nuanced understanding of political governance, including the fact that even
democratic governments may abuse their national security powers and misuse their military
forces. Democratic deficits in the security sector manifest themselves in the form of
pervasive secrecy, lack of accountability, corruption, human rights abuses, over reliance on
coercion, political militaries etcetera, and thus present different challenges to policy.17
Democratic control needs to be buttressed by principles and supported by certain activities.
For instance, civilian authorities should have effective control over the military’s missions,
force composition, and budget and procurement policies. Defence and military policies
must be defined or approved by the civilian leadership, but the military must enjoy a
substantial operational autonomy in determining which operations are required to achieve
the policy objectives defined by the civilian authority. 18 Other conditions like democratic
parliamentary oversight institutions, a strong civil society and an independent media should
watch over the activities of the military. This would help ensure transparency and
accountability to both the population and the government.
In addition, the term control in the civil-military relations discourse presents some
challenges. To some analysts, it implies a relationship of power and superiority, and evokes
a scenario of an uncompromising military desperate to grab power, which needs to be
constrained by clearly defined constitutional provisions. 19 The term also implies a
pejorative meaning in some languages. 20 In the view of other analysts, it implies a
dictatorial approach, even though it actually seeks to prescribe a more collaborative
relationship.21 To this end, a more sensitive term management is being proposed by some
analysts. This term implies the generation of capability through careful planning and
efficient and effective use of resources.22 It has been noted that the doctrine of democratic
civilian control of the military boosts the legitimacy, capabilities, and performance of the
armed forces.23 However, it is illustrative to note that achieving this principle in emerging
democracies is not devoid of challenges. In most instances in emerging democracies, the
assertion of civilian control has been problematic, because it has not been linked to a
broader policy framework or initiatives. 24
2.1.2 Exploring the Civil-Military Relations Problem
The literature in the field has largely focused on the control of the armed forces by the
highest political or civilian authority. Prominent among the wide range of issues is whether
civil-military relations are conflictual or cooperative, reflecting the balance of power
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between civilians and the military. Other concerns of the debates include direct and indirect
interaction among ordinary people, institutions and the military. Matters of legislative
wrangling, funding, regulation and the use of the military; as well as the complex
bargaining between civilians and military elites in the definition and implementation of
national security policy are essential to the debate.25
It is widely held by theorists that the civil-military problem lies in the notion that the very
institution created to protect the polity can become a threat to the polity.26 The problem is
therefore balancing the somewhat uneasy relationship between the military and civis: the
state, civilian political authority and the society in general. It is argued that on the one hand,
the military must be strong enough to prevail in war as the main purpose of establishing it
is the need or perceived need to protect the state by either attacking other groups or to ward
off attack by others. Therefore, the military must be strong enough to squarely meet the
threats confronting the state. To this end, it should not be vitiated to make it weak to
protect. On the other hand, just as the military protect the state against perceived or real
enemies or external attacks, it must conduct its affairs in ways that do not destroy or prey
on the society it is intended to protect.27 Therefore, the military’s monopoly over coercive
force must not be directed at the very society it is meant to protect. The direct seizure of
political power by the military has been the traditional concern of civil-military relations
theory.28 The phenomenon of coups has been the traditional worry because it significantly
shows the crux of the problem of the military exploiting their coercive powers to displace
civilian authorities.29 Under the broad issue of coup d’états, various political scientists have
offered a two-pronged interpretation: a) frequency of coup d’états, b) the likelihood of
success of coups.30 Nonetheless, other issues of how a parasitic military could destroy the
society by draining it of the resources needed for other socio-economic developments in a
quest for a strong military to ward off real or imagined external enemies of the state has
been worthy of scholarly and policy debates. Another key concern of civil-military
discourse has been the issue of obedience: whether the military will obey their civilian
masters, or will use their monopoly of coercive power to resist civilian authority. 31
Rahbek-Clemmensen et al argue that different scholars mean different things when they
refer to the civil-military gap.32 They succinctly conceptualize these varied gaps into four
distinct (though not mutually exhaustive) types: cultural, demographic, policy preference
and institutional. First, the cultural gap refers to whether the attitude and values of civilian
and military populations differ. Second, the demographic gap is whether or not the military
represents the population in its partisan and socio-economic makeup. Third, the policy
preference gap separates the military and civilian elites based on agreement or
disagreements on a range of public policy issues. Fourth, the institutional gap relates to
whether the relationship between military and civilian institution is in harmony or
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conflictual. While recognizing the ever-increasing need of the civil-military relations
debates, they advocate for a clarification of frameworks from which debates are
constructed. In this regard they rightly argue that a specification of distinct
conceptualizations of the gap could improve the literature.
Analysts through several generations have offered different points of view on the civil-
military problem and how to resolve it. Early political thinkers such as Plato in The
Republic, Nicolo Machiavelli in The Prince, Clausewitz in On War, have all attempted to
provide theoretical explanation of the problem. While Machiavelli calls for close attention
to military affairs if one wants to remain in power, Clausewitz, points to central role of the
military in achieving policy objectives of the state through war. However, recent debates
have dwelt mainly on the works of Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Samuel Finer,
Peter Feaver, among others, who belong to the institutional-separation approach.33 These
works provide useful analytical frameworks for contemporary debates on civil-military
relations. This school of thought is based on descriptive generalization of conditions in the
post-World War and Cold War eras of the 1950s, and 1960s. It emphasizes control of the
armed services as precondition to safeguarding state sovereignty and national interest. This
includes issues such as preventing armed forces from interfering in political systems they
are created to defend and ensuring that armed forces serve the interest of their civilian
masters; whether in preserving territorial integrity or in defence of the national interest
abroad. This school is also concerned with separation of civil and military spheres. In other
words, the focus is on institutional structures and interactions between civilians and
military officers within decision making structures. Samuel Huntington’s seminal work,
The Soldier and the State, provides a classical explanation of the above mentioned
approach to maintaining civil-military relations. In the words of Huntington,
“the military institutions of any society are shaped by two
forces; a functional imperative stemming from the threats to
the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from
the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant
within the society… military institutions which reflect only
social values may be incapable of performing effectively
their military function…It may be impossible to contain
within a society, military institutions shaped purely by
functional imperatives.”34
Therefore, interaction of these two forces is arguably the essence of the civil-military
problematic. He underlines that any system of civil-military relations involves a complex
equilibrium between authority, influence, ideology of the military on the one hand, and the
authority, influence ideology of non-military groups on the other. 35 Huntington rightly
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recognizes that there is tension between the desire for civilian control and the need for
military security. Huntington thus proposes two main principles: objective civilian control-
which entails maximizing military professionalism and subjective civilian control: which
refers to maximization of civilian power. In his view, the civil-military problem can be
resolved through a system of objective civilian control over the military, which involves
enhancing military security. From Huntington’s analysis, there is a form of civilian control
that enhances subordination of the military and military fighting power. The main crux of
Huntington’s objective control is professionalism of the military, particularly the officer
corps. In essence, he argues that it is professionalism, defined by expertise, responsibility
and corporate identity that distinguish the modern military officer from his peers in years
gone past. The specific skill or expertise of the military officer is the management of
violence which includes: 1) organizing, equipping and training of this force, 2) the planning
of its activities; and 3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat.36 The officer
corps as a professional body, specifically its nature also presents a unique cast to the
problem of civil-military relations. Objective civilian control recognizes the existence of
autonomous professional military establishment and respect for an independent sphere of
military action. This proscribes political interference in affairs of the military in order not to
undermine its professionalism. In addition, objective civilian control seeks to minimize
military power by rendering it politically sterile and neutral; without necessarily weakening
the ability of the military. By this assertion, Huntington anticipates the existence of a highly
professional officer corps ready to carry out the wishes of the legitimate political authority
of the state. He did not however elaborate on the knowledge on military issues required of
political authority.
By subjective control, Huntington refers to maximizing civilian power. This involves
strengthening the power of civilian groups in relation to the military. Under this principle,
civilian political leaders determine what the military does, but allow military professionals
the autonomy to determine how best to do it. To establish this system successfully requires
that civilians adopt a more conservative ideology that is more supportive of the military as
a social institution. Minimizing military power requires maximizing the power of civilian
groups in relation to the military, through civilian control by governmental institutions, like
parliament, civilian control by social class, and civilian control by constitutional form. In
this context, civilian control is exercised through several institutional arrangements aimed
at limiting the capacity of the military to act autonomously in certain critical areas that have
political implications.37 These include military doctrine and policies, operational plans,
weapons systems, organization, recruitment and promotion of officers. Civilian control is
therefore effective when civilian authorities or institutions, especially the executive and
legislative arms of government can delimit the military sphere of action in accordance with
the political objectives that autonomously influence politicians and the military abiding by
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these civilian directives.38 The critical issue is how to prevent interference in government
and policy-making by the military, as well as to ensure the supremacy of civilians in
military affairs.39
As argued by Yagil Levy control over the military operates mainly through institutional
mechanisms that have an effect on the manner in which policy makers activate the military.
In addition to monitoring of the military by elected civilians, collective actors working
outside the formal institutions, mainly social movements and interest groups, can influence
institutional policy making through diverse ways such as lobbying, protests, court appeals,
and the media.40 Parliamentary control in particular, aims at curtailing the power of the
executive. It aims at increasing the oversight role of parliament on the armed forces rather
than civilian control in general. This may often result in a struggle between the legislature
and the executive, by default the presidency. For example, in the United States the
executive identifies civilian control with presidential control because it believes Congress is
too large and poorly organized to effectively control the military forces. In brief, both the
executive and legislature are concerned with their power distribution rather than between
the civilian and the military. This phenomenon can be found in other political systems like
Ghana, where issues of national security and defence is often vested in the executive
presidency with little or no input from parliament even though the latter has an oversight
role over such national issues as defence budget.41 Most often the institutional capacity and
knowledge base of parliament on defence issues are limited thereby undermining effective
oversight.
In addition, Huntington emphasizes civilian control by constitutional form and believes that
only democratic governments can ensure civilian control. This is based on the assumption
that policy in a democracy is determined by persuasion and compromise, rather than force,
or threat of it as happens in totalitarian societies. Therefore, the military who wield the
most powerful instruments of force are more powerful in totalitarian states than in
democracies.42 However, he notes that this is not always the case, because in democracies
the military undermines civilian control and acquires enormous power through legitimate
processes and institutions, albeit not clearly identified. While this assertion is rightly so,
democracy or a semblance of it in African societies does not necessarily result in civilian
control of the armed forces; some analysts claim that democracy itself has a contested
nature, and some of the largest democratic deficits can be found in the security sector.43
Arguably, even some democratic governments have the tendency to halt democracy at the
barracks doors or in the corridors of the secret state. Therefore the concept of civilian
control requires a more nuanced understanding of governance, including the fact that even
democratic governments may abuse their national security powers and misuse their military
forces.
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2.1.3 Critics of Huntington
Huntington’s thesis has been widely criticized by succeeding analysts.44 It is however
important to contextualize Huntington’s theory. His historical analysis and theorizing on
civil-military relations is largely influenced by Anglo-Saxon experiences especially the
experience of the US from World War II (WWII) to the Cold War era. It however, provides
a universalist prescription with little relevance to post-Cold War emerging democracies like
those in Africa.45 Rebecca Schiff argues that these ethnocentric prescriptions do not take
into account the local specificities in terms of political cultures of other societies. 46
Similarly, others such as Samuel Decalo, Thomas Bruneau, Zoltan Barany, argue that
Huntington’s framework could possibly be of utility for discussing civil-military relations
in advanced and stable democracies.47 However it is less useful for societies with turbulent
political landscape in transitioning democracies in Asia, South America and Africa facing
serious political and military problems with high levels of violence. Decalo, in particular,
questions the utility of Huntington’s paradigm to addressing civil military relations in
Africa. He argues that the subordination of the military as hypothesized by Huntington has
not worked very well in Africa because most of the states on the continent do not operate
within an established framework of viable and widely based institutions, even when they
have been legitimized. 48
Another critic of Huntington, James Burk, argued that Huntington’s analysis was based on
selective use of data and exclusive focus on civilian control of the armed forces.49 For
instance, the approach focuses on external guarantees, a range of institutional checks and
balances to ensuring a healthy civil-military relations. Such formal mechanisms of control
may include parliamentary oversight, civilian control of defence budget process, etcetera to
constrain military activities and pre-empt their involvement in politics. However, this
mechanism alone may not holistically explain stable civil-military relations in Africa.
Williams, for instance contended that despite the existence of formal mechanisms and
institutions of civil control which are largely influenced by Anglo-Saxon or Western ideas,
the reality underpinning African civil-military relations is the fact that the subordination of
the armed forces to civilian control in most countries, when this occurs, has been as a result
of complex systems of processes and interfaces of a non-institutional nature.50 Hence, in
most cases, real control of the armed forces by civil authorities, whether they are
democratically elected or not, is exercised by a range of subjective interfaces and
partnerships which may include informal mechanisms or merely the formal expression of
power relations.
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Furthermore, while Huntington’s rigid separation of purely military sphere and the civil
society appear logical, it is doubtful that this could actually play out in practical terms
considering the complexity of defence affairs and the ubiquity of the military. As such there
are either no purely military areas or purely civilian ones. For example, the role of the
military in providing military advice on force levels, weapon systems and expenditure, and
that of civilians; providing political advice, diplomacy, tax policy and political acceptance
is not always the case in practices.51 This is because no society including democratic ones
could possibly allow so much military influence in the sense posited by Huntington. There
is the likelihood of danger in discussing the relationship between politics and the military
without the experience of either.52 Similarly, Godfred Uzoigwe argues with demonstrated
cases that there is no state, traditional or modern, where the military is totally separated
from political structures even though the degree of integration of the military and politics
may vary from state to state.53 Therefore the military is a crucial political institution within
the state whether it is an industrialized or developing one.
In addition Burk contends that the liberal thought underlying Huntington’s work is
primarily concerned with civil-military relations that preserve the military’s ability to
protect democratic values by defeating external threats.54 This theory is not persuasive for
the post-world war II era. This is because Huntington’s proposition of a professional
military mastering the functional requirements for war, organization and training of the
military to meet these needs, and lead the military to fight on the orders of political
authorities is consistent with the military’s aim to protect democracies from external
enemies. However, this proposition is doubtful in an era of advanced technology beset by
weapons of mass destruction; there can be no clear distinctions between means and ends of
wars, or between the policy decisions of political leaders and the operational decisions of
the military. In practical terms, there is no clear distinction on political or military spheres
as the ends depends to a large extent on the means by which they are being pursued.
Moreover, Huntington’s objective control does not clearly indicate how democratic values
ought to be protected.
Peter Feaver also believes that objective and subjective civilian control are controversial in
practical terms; Huntington’s framework ought to have added assertive control that reflects
the existence of civilian meddling and military professionalism.55 For instance, he argued
that the US military, by Huntington’s measure of expertise, corporateness and
responsibility, has remained highly professional in spite of extensive civilian control or
even micromanagement by some civilian authorities. Some stern critics of Huntington’s
hypothesis that professionalism leads to subordination like Samuel Finer have argued, that
acceptance of civilian control does not necessarily prevent rejection of civilian control.56
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Indeed, some military with professional outlook by all standards have actually carried out
coups or even subverted civilian authorities. Besides the analytical flaws pointed out by
other writers, Huntington’s work despite its continued relevance to the civil-military
relations debate does not adequately explore the discourse beyond preventing military
intervention in national politics. Whilst some of Huntington’s prescription might have
contributed to curtailing the spectre of coups d’états in emerging democracies in Africa,
there is the need to explore how best these mechanisms could have contributed to building
effective and efficient military institutions needed for consolidation of democracy.
Unlike Huntington who focused on the state, scholars like Morris Janowitz and Martin
Edmond have emphasized the sociological angle to the analysis of civil-military relations.57
They rely mainly on the assumption that healthy civil-military relations depend on the
extent to which the military mirrors the society from which it is drawn. In Professional
Soldier, Janowitz challenged Huntington’s approach by arguing that technological
advancement, societal changes and missions had led to an increased inevitable political role
for the professional soldier.58 In other words, in the post-WWII era, the military ought to
move closer to society, embrace civilian values as much as practicable and avail itself to
professional reforms and new organizational techniques. He contends that a politicized
officer is actually a more adequate representation of civil-military relations in the
developing world. Janowitz contends that it is professional socialization of the military
through its relationship with and sympathy for values of the society it serves that ensures
civilian control of the armed forces. To him, military professionalism in the nuclear era
differs significantly from the early days of canons and muskets.59 In essence, a professional
conscripted military is different from military professionalism in an all-volunteer force. In
this regard, he departs from Huntington’s assertion that the key to civilian control is the
fusion of military and civilian values, because an apparent gap between the two could result
in the alienation of the military from civilian authority, making the military act in its own
interest. In Janowitz’s view, the military officer is required to have skills that can be
compared to those of civilian administrators and political authorities without necessarily
becoming politicized. He thus conceives of a dynamic military organization that changes
with different political conditions. Burk in his critique argues that Janowitz recognized the
blurring of military and political spheres and as a result some tension between civilian and
military elites in praxis.60 Nevertheless Janowitz did not adequately address the issue of
how to manage the tensions to sustain and not to undermine democratic values.
In the midst of the above mentioned criticisms, the study agrees with Donald Travis’
observation that the strategic and historical backdrop underpinning the emergence of
Huntington’s objective control paradigm might help reveal the original intentions and how
it can be applied to present circumstances.61
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2.1.4 Military Influence
In another stream, the civil-military relations literature, especially in advanced
democracies, has focused on a wide range of issues such as the influence of the military on
decision making; military public support for or opposition to an announced civilian policy;
compliance; degree to which the will of civilians always prevail over that of the military
command;62 and how the military sustains and protects democratic values.63 Feaver situates
the discourse on civil-military relations in post- 9/11 United States of America and argues
that the persistent dilemma facing democratic societies is that they require a strong military
to meet external security threats (the functional imperative), and at the same time, a strong
military may become an internal threat to the liberal values modern democracies attempt to
uphold (the societal imperative).64 The central thesis of Feaver’s work is how civil-military
relations in the US play out on a day-to-day basis through the principal-agent framework.
This theory specifies the conditions under which civilians would be expected to monitor the
military intrusively or non-intrusively and the conditions under which the military would be
expected to work or shirk its responsibilities.65 Feaver’s theoretical position views civil-
military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring
the actions of military agents, who he termed the armed servants of the state. The model
assumes that democracy requires civilian control of the military, even when civilians are
wrong. Civilians have the right to be wrong. Following this assumption, civilians are the
“principals” in the model who hire military professionals as their “agents” to prosecute
their military security policy.66 He thus argues that the essence of civil-military relations is
a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents. Military obedience is
not automatic but depends on strategic calculation of whether civilians in authority will
catch and punish behaviour.
Feaver’s analysis does not always make clear that his theory is that of a restricted control.
Though it fits within the domain of democratic civil-military relations it does not offer an
exhaustive framework for analysis. Burk, for instance argues that military obedience to
civilian masters is a necessary condition for democracy (as it may be for authoritarian
regimes as well).67 Democracy requires more from civil-military relations than military
obedience. In addition, Feaver’s agency model acknowledges the need for continued
theoretical development and empirical research into relations of control and into the
connections between effective civilian control and other aspects of civil-military relations.
The extensive focus on applying the model to the context of US civil-military relations
raises questions about the suitability of the model for transitional or yet to mature
democracies as in Africa. This limitation of the agency model is recognized by Feaver
himself, when he calls for a significant modification to the theory if it were to be applied to
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‘coup-prone’ countries such in Africa. He however, does not provide any hint of those
modifications.
In an attempt to test the applicability of Feaver’s model to the African context where there
is no established culture of submission to civilian authority among military forces, and
where coups d’état present a real danger, Deane Baker contends that, even under these
difficult situations, the Agency theory is an extremely important analytical tool.68 He is of
the opinion that regional organizations offer potential benefits to civilian principals in their
aim of ensuring military obedience, even in the absence of a well-established tradition of
military professionalism. Baker argues that in states where submission of the military to
civilian authorities is presumably absent and where civilian governments are faced with few
resources to coercively apply power over their military agents, these civilian governments
can still put in place both monitoring and punishment mechanisms, through their
membership of regional organizations. He makes reference to normative frameworks of
such regional organizations as the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act (2002), African
Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in Africa (2007), and Southern African
Development Commission (SADC) Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
(2001), as well as SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004)
which calls for zero tolerance for unconstitutional takeovers.69 In the case of Lesotho,
SADC intervened in 1998 for a suspected coup and AU suspended Mauritania in 2005 as a
result of coup. SADC and AU, (ECOWAS in Sierra Leone) have respectively intervened to
oust usurpers of power, with varying degrees of success. In addition, these organizations
have several sanction mechanisms which they have applied to punish coup makers. One
may however argue that, the application of such scenarios and the mixed outcomes do not
provide strong arguments about the role of regional organizations in ensuring adherence to
the principle of civilian supremacy. In some cases, sanctions and expulsion have not been
effective deterrence against military intervention in politics.70
2.1.5 From Control to Partnership and Shared Responsibility
As a point of departure from earlier analysis on civilian control, some scholars provide
other framework of analysis. Dale Herspring also argues for a shared relationship between
senior civilian officials and the military officer corp. He departs from the prevalent analysis
on political control, the idea that unless strong controls are placed on the uniformed
military, it will have an unhealthy impact on policy and may even seize control of it. In his
view, political control is a given in most advanced democracies, as officers took oaths
recognizing civilian supremacy. This is also true for coup prone states. The question is why
do officers in such states fail to abide by their oath and heed to the code of service. He
therefore proposes an approach of shared responsibility.71 The term shared responsibility is
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borrowed from Douglas Bland, who argues that civil control of the military is managed and
maintained through sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and
military officers.72 In this regard, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some
aspects of control, while military leaders are also responsible and accountable for others.
This relationship and management of responsibilities are subject to national regimes of
principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes around which expectations of actors
may converge in matters of civil-military relations. Herspring lists some eight indicators of
shared responsibility. These include respect for military symbols, non-interference in
promotion process by civilian authorities and efforts to induce civilian values or bring
about radical change, and toleration of dissent. In addition, the civilians should display
sound executive leadership, which believes in the necessity for a viable, strong military and
respects it.73
The shared responsibility approach also acknowledges that a conflictual relationship is not
only normal but can be positive and healthy, if it is regulated. Therefore, any attempt to
eliminate conflict will remove the needed “give and take” which is a critical part of shared
responsibility. This is because conflict is inherent or ubiquitous; it is the engine that drives
national security decision-making processes. He argues further that the biggest problem
with a focus on control is that while it distorts the process, it also gives little insight into the
nature of the relationship between the military and the civilian masters. In this regard, civil-
military relations should be about more than averting military coups. 74 Herspring’s
approach to the question of inevitability of conflict in civil-military relations, is how best to
manage it. While drawing inferences from Huntington, he argues that politicians should
determine the policy and goals of the country, while the military professionals implement
their orders. He, however, disagrees with Huntington that military influence is the critical
factor in civil-military relations; though he does view it as important. In essence, it is the
nature of the institutions that helps define healthy civil-military relations. For that matter, it
is important for civilians to understand and appreciate the military culture and for the
military to appreciate civilian culture. Accordingly, conflictual relations can be improved
depending on how civilian authorities treat the military and respect the military culture
among several attributes. Respect for the military culture could lead to attaining ‘shared
responsibility’. However, there is no guarantee that shared responsibility will necessarily
result in good military advice.75 This is perhaps due to the reason that humans including
generals and admirals are imperfect. Therefore, there could be ebb and flow in civil-
military relations. The goal is not to create a civilian authority that easily gives in to
demands of the military. Civilian authority can get the best of the military if they
understand the military from a cultural angle, and respect it but not adopt it. Respect for the
military culture does not lessen civilian control rather makes civil-military relations the act
of persuasion.
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Herspring’s piece however presents a narrow focus on attaining the “shared responsibility”
he advocates. While emphasis is what the civilian authority ought to do in its relations with
the military, there is not enough analysis on how the military ought to treat and understand
civilian authority. Again, the role of other state institutions in achieving the shared
responsibility is not well illuminated. At the same time the responsibility of the military and
political authority towards the general populace or society and vice versa is not covered in
the framework of Herspring’s analysis. He draws extensively on the experience of mature
democracies like the US and Canada, thus, it is imperative to test this framework in
emerging democracies characterized by conflictual civil-military relationship and see how
the shared responsibility could contribute to ensuring consolidation of democracy.
Levy argues that the prevalent discourse has neglected the power relations that form the
context for the interaction between the sides, and the power and resources that each side
brings to the interaction. He notes that effectiveness of civilian control of the military
depends on two relations of exchange: first, the republican exchange, where the state
provides its citizens with rights in exchange for their military sacrifice; and second, the
control exchange: in which the military subordinate itself to civilian rulers in exchange for
resources (material and symbolic) provided by the state. 76 At the same time, civilian
institutions deploy the military in accordance with the politically agreed goals, costs, and
rewards given to those sacrifices. Therefore, if there is equilibrium between these two
relations, civilian institutions can establish firm supremacy or control over the military, and
if there is no equilibrium, there is the likelihood of a challenge to civilian control. 77 Levy
notes the need for a balanced exchange while recognizing that relations of exchange
obviously represent a structural pattern rather than overt bargaining between civilian state
agencies, social groups and the military over terms of exchange. The interactions among
these actors bring about their willingness to ignore certain interests such as autonomy,
possession of free time, and money in return for structure-generated rewards like legitimacy
and protection. Therefore a balanced or imbalanced exchange is a subjective construct
depending on people’s subjective perceptions of the asymmetrical or symmetrical structure
of rewards and sacrifices (republican) or rewards and subordination (control exchange).
Hence, if both sides see themselves as similarly obligated in the exchange, then there is a
balanced exchange. When both relations are balanced, civilian institutions establish their
supremacy over the military and control it effectively. At the same time, these institutions
provide the military with a mutually agreed upon level of resources to maintain it, thereby
increasing the motivations to accept subordination to civilian authorities. Levy uses case
studies from the US’ Bush Surge strategy in Iraq, and Israel to illustrate how the balance or
imbalance of the two exchanges have produced firm civilian control of the armed forces or
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even otherwise prevented civil-military crisis. However, Levy acknowledges the need for
further research to test the validity of his model on other cases. Particularly, one could
argue that the model of civilian control could be best applicable to at least advanced
democracies; it does not explore its utility in complex civil-military dispensations like those
of Africa. It is simplistic to assume that a balance or imbalance of the republican and
control exchange could work in a typical African civil-military context.
Travis proffers the pragmatic civilian control which recognizes that there are innumerable
ways that military professionals and civilian political leaders can interact with one another
during times of peace (to prepare for crises) and war (to achieve peace). In his view
relationships between the many actors at play in the national security realm must adapt and
practice inclusion (provisional and participatory) to stay effective. 78 In this regard,
pragmatic control operates on the assertion that the methods used by civilians to control
the military, and the ways that civil-military relations are conducted, should be determined
by the kind of conflict being waged and the practical context of the environment. This is
because conflicts or wars vary in their character. Therefore waging different wars require
varied civil–military relationships. From the pragmatic control approach, civil–military
relationships are based on a threat, crisis, or mission, instead of position, profession, or
institution. This therefore requires an intellectually broadened military culture which is
capable of partnering with the broader national security establishment to set the conditions
that will identify the most acceptable and suitable options for as many political actors as
possible.79 Pragmatic control might be useful to the African context whose civil-military
relations appears in constant flux and require pragmatism in the way political actors set the
military to action. However, the model will require some modifications because of the lack
of an intellectually broadened military culture and political actors also lack the requisite
knowledge on how to relate and control the military effectively.
2.2 The African Military and the Coup Interregnum
During the 1960s and 1970s, three overlapping issues dominated the literature on the
military in developing countries. These revolved around the conditions of democracy and
civilian control. As armies moved into politics, the focus then shifted to the role of the
military in development or modernization. This was followed by the focus on political
order precipitated by deep hegemonic crises that engulfed developing countries and in their
relations with the West.80 Military intervention in politics has been at the heart of the civil-
military relations debate especially in the developing countries of Africa and Asia. The
extensive scholarly attention has focused on the political as well as socio-economic factors
underpinning the spectre of coups in politics and the performance of military governments.
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Samuel Finer, provides an insightful perspective of the global phenomenon of military
intervention in politics. He examines the motives that may stimulate or preclude such
interventions.81 Finer uses a variety of case studies from different parts of the world to
illustrate several factors such as strong, weak, and divided civilian organization, little or no
civilian governmental and political structures, as catalysts of military intervention in
politics. Finer defines military interventions in politics as the armed forces constrained
substitution of their own policies and/or their person for those of recognized civilian
authorities.82 According to him, for the military to intervene, it must have the occasion and
disposition to do so, that being the combination of a conscious motive and a desire to act.83
He approached the issues by identifying the military against the politics of the day; their
political strengths and weakness, their disposition and opportunities for intervention, and
levels, modes and results of intervention. The armed forces as an institution is created to
achieve specific objectives; primarily to fight and win wars, in addition to assisting civil
power. To do this, it is well structured in terms of organization and coherence often
characterized by certain features as centralized command, hierarchy, discipline,
intercommunication, espirit de corp and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.84
Further, the central and often contentious question of civil-military relations was elucidated
by Finer. In contrast to the widely held assumption that it is natural for the military to obey
civilian authority, Finer argues that civilian control of the military is not natural. The issue
is how civilians exert control. Where there are strong civilian institutions, the likelihood of
military intervention is rare. In this regard, Finer is of the opinion that instead of inquiring
why the military engages in politics, it should rather be why they ever do otherwise. He
identifies three major advantages of the military: 1) superiority in organization, 2) highly
emotionalized symbolic status, and 3) a monopoly of arms or force.85 Based on these
advantages, Finer throughout his analysis, seeks answers to why military intervention in
politics or military government is the exception rather than the rule? And how and why do
civilian rules persist. His central response to the above questions is based on the political
weakness of the armed forces, i.e. the lack of technical ability to administer and the lack of
legitimacy to do so. Finer posits that in less developed economies it is easier for the
military to function as administrators in the provision of law and order; all that is required
is communication. Nonetheless, as societies become more sophisticated, with an expanded
economy and increased division of labour, the technical skills of the military are often very
low. Drawing from the backdrop of political weakness of military forces on one hand, and
the potential for intervention on the other hand, Finer proffers a theoretical paradigm of
four levels of continuum of countries as the core of his thesis. Finer recognizes the distinct
categories of countries in which governments have been repeatedly subjected to
interference by their armed forces. He reckons that despite the pattern, the military work
with governments usually from the behind the scenes. He indeed argues that, even in cases
35
of successful military intervention there is the high tendency for the military to resort to
some quasi-civilian façade of government behind which they would retire as quickly as
possible. However, Finer’s thesis did not provide a context-specific or distinct explanation
of military intervention in politics. In addition, although, Finer wrote the piece in an era
where there was less emphasis on democratization in the Third World, his analysis was
oblivious of the need to transform militaries in Africa and elsewhere where the
phenomenon of coups remain a major stumbling block to the consolidation of democratic
rule.
In his criticism of propositions by theorists like Huntington and Finer, Chuter highlighted
the inherent danger of the prevalent thesis of civil-military relations that projects the
military institution as hungry for political power and thus must be controlled and
minimized.86 He believes such a problem does not necessarily exist because this is not the
case of all military interventions. He argues that the relations between the military and the
civil power are often highly complex and dependent both on personalities and cultural and
historical factors. Besides, the military does not often act as a unified body hungry for
power. Rather, it is often groups within them that act in concert with some parts of the
political systems, and against other parts. This is especially so when a part or all of the
officer corps of the military act collectively to take over political power. The reasons
behind such actions are often complex and confused. Different segments of the military or
individuals may have different agendas. Again, the appearance of a particular military
leader does not necessarily represent that of the military institution. Chuter however, agrees
with Finer that civilian politicians also benefit from military rule and there could be many
segments of the society that believe in the policies carried out by the military. In this regard
Chuter argues that the central problem of civil-military relations as perceived by earlier
theorists may not exist at all. 87 However, this does not mean civil-military relations are
excellent everywhere or the management of defence does not present challenges. There is
always a struggle for power and influence in almost all governments or large bureaucracies.
Indeed controversies in defence between military and elected political authorities may
happen in diverse forms including decisions on forces levels, equipment and even peace
missions. It is noteworthy that the military does not always form a unified bloc. There may
indeed be internal organizational politics within the military. Conversely, civilians in
defence may also tend to agree more with military colleagues than other civilian politicians
or technocrats in government. These internal bureaucratic battles are not a zero-sum game,
the outcomes are contingent on the particular circumstances, issues and the side parties find
themselves.
The prevalence of military regimes and authoritarian civilian government in Africa in the
1960s up to the late 1980s saw an attendant militarization of politics and society on the
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continent. This was manifested by the excessive influence of military organization and
values on social structures.88 As emphasized by Luckham, the difference between military
and civilian governments in most African states is increasingly blurred. 89 This is because
in most military and civilian governments alike, power is most often distributed and held on
to through the control of the state security apparatus and organized military force. In post-
military societies, Shaw argues that the military as an institution exists on the margin of
such societies. The irony is that while armed forces may sap large economic resources of
the state and constitute an extremely dangerous means of violence, they only constitute a
smaller and at times isolated section of the societies they find themselves in. 90
2.2.1 The Colonial Legacy
Much has been written on coups in Africa from various perspectives; among most analysis
is the role of colonialism and its aftermath on political challenges in Africa. Welch argues
that until African armies became politically active in the immediate post-independence era,
scholarship on African political change had paid little attention to the role of the military.
Armed forces were not considered as a potential significant independent political actor.91 In
his view two main factors account for this: the manner in which colonial territories gained
independence and the historical colonial heritage of African armies. The armies were
largely a colonial creation for the sole purpose of curtailing internal resistance to colonial
rule.92 It is been argued that the colonial patterns of recruitment exploited existing group
rivalries in African societies, to the extent that certain groups were not represented in the
colonial regiments. Therefore, at independence, the same colonial armies formed the
nucleus of the formed militaries of the newly independent states. As the military became
the most visible expression of sovereignty, underrepresented groups could not identify with
this national symbol.93
Moreover, the colonial legacy permeated into the post-independence makeup of the military
where people from certain relatively deprived regions in terms of economic and educational
opportunities opted for military service. For example in Ghana, many men from the north,
the military offered opportunities for wages, and a more attractive form of labour to that
offered in mines or farms in the south.94The colonial authorities did not prioritize the
indigenization of the officer corps. Similarly, post-independence African nationalist leaders
were much more concerned with tackling the immediate challenges of nation building and
state building and thus paid little attention to the military. Partly due to the lack of local
expertise, many of them maintained the pre-independence status quo with European
officers in command of most post-independence armies. As noted by Baynham, the
principal change from Gold Coast Military Forces to Ghana Military Forces in March 1957
was one of nomenclature. The continuation of expatriates in the key military postings, and
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the early uninterrupted dependence on Britain for equipment and officer training, ensured
that continuity was maintained. In British eyes, it had ensured that the Ghana army
inherited a spirit and tradition of professionalism and political impartiality. It also ensured
that black officers were properly qualified and competent to carry out their duties, and
issues of commissions, promotions, and postings were based on considerations of
suitability and merit.95 The organizational structures and outward similarities derived from
the colonial forces were also accompanied by continuity in the officially perceived function
of the military. Therefore at independence, the job envisaged for the army was essentially
the same as before to continue to have an efficient function of maintaining internal security
and frontier defence. The dignified role of providing a vivid expression of the state's
sovereignty with guards of honour, parades, and Independence Day marches was
maintained. 96
Unlike in other sectors like the civil service, there was a snail pace towards the
indigenization or Africanization of the officer corps in some African countries.97 There was
also little spending on the military in some post-colonial governments like Ghana. Kwame
Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government were preoccupied with
other matters of state and thus took little interest in the army it had acquired almost intact
from Britain. There was no immediate attempt made to redefine the role of the armed
forces, nor were there demands for increases in military expenditure. 98 Major-General
Alexander,99 captured this succinctly that,
“For most of the new African leaders the problem of the armed
forces was unexpected and unwelcome. Unexpected, because in
their pursuit for power they had assumed that after having attained
independence neither internal security nor external defence would
not constitute a grave threat; and unwelcome because they would
have preferred to devote resources to economic and social ends. But
in some cases, the threats were soon found to be more serious than
foreseen, and moreover, armed forces became a status symbol.”100
Direct military involvement in African politics started through mutinies over internal issues
such as promotions and wages. Subsequent military interventions arose as a result of a
combination of many factors namely economic, cultural and political, the declining prestige
of political parties and strong leaders as well as the growing consciousness on the part of
the military of their powers. Baynham argues that institutional instability within the armed
forces was created by the progressive and rapid Africanization of the officer corps in the
immediate post-independence era. In most cases, this was pursued for political rather than
military imperatives. 101 The indigenization process led to erosion of skill and in most
instances the breakdown of discipline. He notes that the rapid promotion of relatively
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inexperienced officers to high executive positions created unrealistic career ambitions in
junior officers. Therefore lack of proper regulation of recruitment and progression coupled
with promotional bottlenecks provided a breeding ground for discontent and conspiracy
among the military. These among other factors led to the preponderance of the “Men on
horseback” syndrome in Africa. Naison Ngoma notes that with particular reference to
Africa, civil-military relations has been heavily influenced by the colonial history which
caused fear and even dislike for the colonial army, and this still impacts on relations in the
post-cold war era.102
This is compounded by the fact that most of the successor post-independence elites missed
the opportunity to seize the transitional moment to transform the basis for security delivery
and governance through a participatory conversation about a national vision of security to
include citizens’ security needs and protection. Rather, the security establishments were
mobilized in large part for regime security, whether under direct military rule or civilian
authoritarian systems.103
Robinowitz and Jargowksy argue that the persistence of ethnic ties in the military is in large
part a vestige of colonial administrative policies when, commonly, the military rank and
file were recruited from relatively disadvantaged regions. For example in West Africa, the
dominant pattern was for colonial administrations to recruit soldiers from the so-called
martial tribes in the relatively impoverished Northern Sahel. The officer corps, in contrast,
was recruited from the better-privileged, wealthier southern ethnic groups.104 Similarly,
Bagayoko et al argued that “state security elites have never been purely passive players in
the games of political patronage and identity politics. Since colonial times many have
instrumentalized ethnic, religious and other identities to cement their grip on power, to
ensure the loyalty of their military and security establishments, to divide their opponents, to
map threats, to marginalize dissenting voices and generally to manage the complex security
problems of multi-ethnic states.”105 In order to consolidate their power and to keep security
institutions loyal, post-independence African leaders employed a variety of mechanisms
such as recruitment and promotion policies which favour particular clans, localities or
ethnic groups. Others also introduced mechanisms of political patronage and influence-
buying inside security institutions themselves; or establish parallel security structures
including presidential guards, paramilitaries and militias linked by particularistic ties to the
regime. 106 Some security services continue to operate with obsolete legal frameworks
governing them.
Even though the armed forces played a minimal role in the independence struggles across
the continent; some were indeed instrumental in the independence struggles of a number of
African states and thus influence civil-military relations in the post-independence era.107
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Koonings and Kruijt aptly note that in countries like Algeria, Eritrea (and Zimbabwe)
where the armed forces (and/or armed groups) played a decisive role in the independence
struggle and the founding of independent state, the result has been a strong identification of
the military and the nation. This phenomenon they referred to as the birth right principle by
which the armed forces consider themselves as guardians of a nation’s core principles and
basic values.108 For example, the armed forces of Guinea Bissau continue to lay claim to
their historical legitimacy from the liberation war, as the primary reason for the frequent
intervention in politics. Elements within the army and veterans often use their positions for
personal gains at the expense of advancing democracy and national interests.109 Hutchful
also observes that the civil-military trajectories of African states are indeed varied. He notes
that in countries that gained independence through armed struggle, the emerging regimes
were able to organize or create their own armed forces and were more successful in
imposing control than those that did not.110 Countries that were confronted with initial
challenges by the armed forces in the early days of independence like Senegal, Tanzania
and Kenya, were able to reorganize and institutionalize their civil-military relations to
sustain civil rule. While others like Ghana and Uganda were unable to do so and thus
became enmeshed in a cycle of coups and counter-coups.
2.2.2 Causes of Military Intervention in African Politics
Decalo contends that two schools of thought have provided varied explanation on causes of
coups in Africa. The first one relates to the social, economic and political problems and
weaknesses that pull the military into a power and legitimacy vacuum. The second strand
of analysis relates to organizational theory that attributes to African military certain traits of
professionalism, nationalism, cohesion and austerity; all of which pushes the armed forces
into the political arena to save the state from the scourge of inept, corrupt and self-seeking
politicians.111 Decalo sees these strands of analysis as broadly two sides of the same coin.
He argues that while several factors account for military interventions in African politics,
the core analytical flaw lies in the confusion of real systemic tensions, which are the
backdrop of politics in all African states.112 In his words, ‘it is simplistic, ethnocentric and
empirically erroneous to relegate coups in Africa to the status of a dependent variable, a
function of the political weakness and structural fragility of the African states and failings
of civilians elites, thus ignoring fundamental behavioural dynamics and motivations
granted their full role in triggering coups.113He reckons that coups in Africa are often the
result of complex idiosyncratic and power motivations purely from the perspective of
socioeconomic structural or systemic insights, particularly from the empirical vacuum on
the internal dynamics of little-studied African armed forces. Most especially, covert
ambition, fear, greed and vanity have propelled the military into politics. 114
40
In most instances, the official justifications provided by the coup makers and taken on face
value by the larger society are the systemic problems confronting the country and corporate
motives of the military. For instance, Colonel Akwasi Afrifa in his account of the first
coup in Ghana notes that
“… with the vastness of the problems facing Ghana, a military
coup was the only open course to rescue our people from
tyranny and alien ideologies. A coup in itself is not a good
thing; but it is one of the most effective methods of restoring
the constitutional rights of the people when they have been
deprived of the constitutional means for changing a corrupt and
tyrannical government.”115
In reality, once in power, the military leaders fared no better than the toppled civilians in
dealing with the socio-economic and political problems that confronted them. Decalo also
asserts that the motivations for coups directly reflected on the nature of military regimes
they set up; its primary characteristics, governing style and pre-occupation. 116 In this
regard, he identifies four typologies of military rule: a) radical military rule, where Marxist
ideology has been fused into authoritarianism to produce a semblance of populist
developmental models for Africa, for example in Congo and Benin; b) personal
dictatorships in which military despots monopolize all power and society for their personal
aggrandizement, such as Uganda under Idi Amin, and Central African Republic under
Bokassa; c) managerial brokerage, where a flexible military junta attempts to perform the
brokerage role noted of political elites, in order to secure systemic legitimacy, for example
Togo; and, d) the holding-operation modality, which is an all-encompassing term that
accommodates the short-term goal of early stages of military rule, where the military junta
carry out a ‘time and task-limited function’, for example Niger.117 Decalo based his
analysis on empirical cases of five Francophone African countries and Uganda, nonetheless
his generalizations arguably hold true for most African states have experienced military
rule under any one of the above-mentioned modalities.
Akwasi Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh, in addition to providing various reasons for coups
in Africa underline the ideological reasons and foreign actor interests behind coups in
Africa.118 Most coups occurred in the Cold War period of heightened super power rivalry.
They therefore argue that in the quest for ideological allies, the then super powers, US and
Soviet Union, were behind the ouster of regimes that were deemed unsympathetic to their
respective camps. For instance the 1966 coup in Ghana against Nkrumah’s government is
alleged to have been orchestrated by local actors in the armed forces, police and even the
civil service with the tacit support of western powers, namely US, Britain and West
Germany.119Antony Clayton encapsulates a much broader perspective of the extent of
external ideological reasons behind military interventions in African politics in the Cold
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War era, including all overt and covert forms including formal military intrusion, invited or
uninvited; clandestine operations, provisions of training, equipment, intelligence and
defence pacts.120 He argues that in addition to often cited reason of political motives and
ideological motives of the external powers; there were purely economic and strategic
reasons, such as for sources of energy, markets, raw materials, investments and military
base facilities, which Africa presents to these powers. 121
2.2.3 Beyond Coups d’états: A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations?
The end of the Cold War and the wider acceptance of liberal democracy brought with it a
compelling global rethink of the role and mission of armed forces in democracies.
Alexander Lambert observes that the change in the post-Cold War security landscape from
an overly militaristic conception of national security to a more human security focus that
seeks a merger of security and development, has necessitated the evolution of a new
framework of analysis for civil-military relations and democratic civilian control of armed
and/or security forces.122 Among the notable shift in this era, is that civil-military relations
are increasingly viewed within the concept of security and defence reforms as new
paradigms of international security development.
Within the discourse are a flurry of concepts such as security sector reform, development,
management, reconstruction and transformation. Each of these emphasizes a particular type
of context or approach. Yet the dominant discourse in policy terms is undoubtedly that of
security sector reform (SSR). Since the inception of the concept, SSR has been considered
as a critical component of establishing a security environment conducive to long-term
sustainable development, especially in transitional societies. Notwithstanding the relative
scepticism that accompanied the first decade of the SSR debate and its governance and
development linkages, major international development partners and organizations continue
to assert the critical role of SSR processes in the long-term pursuit of both security and
development objectives.123 The main crux of this agenda is the need for the effective and
efficient provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic
governance. 124 The related concept of democratic civilian control also seeks to link
security with governance. This calls for further conceptualization beyond the
traditional/conventional concept of civilian control of the military and related issues of
preventing military praetorianism.125 In spite of the dominance of the SSR concept, some
African scholars and practitioners emphasize the need for transformation rather than reform
as a point of departure for positive change in relation to the security sector and its
governance in Africa.126 As argued by Bryden and Olonisakin the apparent rethink in the
evolving body of analysis on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in relation to Security Sector
Transformation (SST) is informed by two imperatives. The first is derived from a seeming
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interchangeable use of terms without due consideration of differences in meaning, inference
and resonance. The second is found in an apparently reflexive juxtaposition of SSR and
SST in terms of the legitimacy and sustainability (and therefore utility) of the two
approaches. One argument that has been consistently made, even if sometimes relegated to
the background in relation to other explanations, is that SSR is conceptually flawed and
thus of limited relevance to Africa. SSR is portrayed as a piecemeal and narrow approach to
changing the security establishment, thus making the case for a wholesale and complete
transformation of the security sector. SST according to this narrative is taken to mean a
complete change in the system that governs the security establishment rather than a more
gradual reform process, which presumably still leaves the form and function of the sector
largely intact. SST is therefore set to address the structural change(s) required to make SSR
efforts effective and result in greater impact on the ground. 127 Security sector
transformation concerns the need for comprehensive change that radically alters the status
quo of power relations in terms of the provision, management and oversight of security in
Africa. Transformation seeks change in the organizational character of the security sector;
its cultural make-up; human resource practices; political relationships with elected
authorities and the civil power.128
This shift has also necessitated a move in focus from civilian supremacy to other issues
such as military effectiveness and efficiency and the role of the military in the consolidation
of democracy. For instance, Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei advance the argument
beyond the issue of control to include two important elements: effectiveness and
efficiency.129 Other analysts such as Lisa Brooks,130 Stephen Biddle Long, and Deborah
Avant have also explored the relationship between military effectiveness and civil-military
relations.131 Avant, particularly, argues that, there are ambiguities and contradictions in the
current conceptualization of what constitutes good civil-military relations. She asserts that,
any analysis of a good civil-military relationship should rely on a balance between an
efficient and an accountable military. 132 Cottey et al also call for a reconceptualization of
civil-military relations from the first generation debate that focused on the threat of
praetorian military intervention in domestic politics and the resultant need for enforcement
of civilian control, to the second generation debate on the relationship between democracy
and civil-military relations in terms of democratic governance of the security and defence
sector.133 They contend that this re-conceptualization with particular reference to emerging
democracies would lead to a shift from the earlier question of reforming core institutions
for political control of the armed forces to the second generation problem of establishing
effective structures for democratic management of defence and security. However, they
reckon that the issue of establishing effective control of the defence and security sector will
remain a challenge for emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe (and Africa),
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largely as a result of limited state capacity.134 Three key challenges are central to this: i)
development of effective structures for planning and implementation of defence policies; ii)
development of effective systems of parliamentary oversight of civil-military relations and
defence policy; iii) engagement of civil society as a core component of oversight and
accountability in defence and security matters.135
Furthermore, Bruneau and Matei contend that the excessive focus on civilian control in the
literature presents a stumbling block to understanding the larger and more complex
relationship between democracy and security forces, particularly with regards to roles and
missions.136 As far as Bruneau and Matei are concerned, the presence of unquestioned
civilian control is no guarantee that civilian policy makers will make good decisions or
implement policy to achieve military success. They argue that the challenge today is not
only in asserting and maintaining control, rather, it is developing effective militaries and
other security instruments to execute a range of roles and missions, such as: 1) fight and be
prepared to fight external wars; 2) fight and be prepared to fight internal wars or
insurgencies; 3) fight global terrorism; 4) fight crime; 5) provide support for humanitarian
assistance and civic duties and, 6) prepare for and execute peace support operations.137
Apart from the issue of control, analysis must consider the effectiveness of security forces
and the cost of achieving it as essential factors to understanding the relationship between
elected leaders and security forces in a democracy. They note for the security forces to be
effective in fulfilling any of the above mentioned six roles and missions, there should be
three basic requirements. Firstly, plans should be put in place, which may take the form of a
strategy or even a doctrine. Example: national security strategies, national military
strategies, strategies for disaster relief, doctrine on intelligence, counter-terrorism doctrine.
Secondly, there must be structures and processes for the formulation and implementation of
the plans. These may include ministries of defence, national security councils or other
means of inter-agency coordination. Third, a country must commit resources, such as
political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure equipment sufficiency, trained forces and
other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions. Therefore the absence of
any one of these three components makes it difficult to imagine how any state would
effectively implement any of these roles and missions. 138 In essence, they argue that
“civilian control is basic and fundamental, but is irrelevant unless the instruments for
achieving security can effectively fulfil their roles and missions. Moreover, both control
and effectiveness must be implemented at an affordable cost or they will vitiate other
national priorities.”139 Bruneau and Matei’s piece is doubtlessly a significant contribution to
the civil-military relations debate and might have a considerable influence on future
research, however, there is need to test the utility of such a framework on emerging
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democracies like Ghana where most often issues of defence are often not in the public
domain and institutions of oversight are overly weak.
Closely related to issues of efficiency and effectiveness of the military is the conceptual
shift from mere civilian control to democratic control. Luckham argues that the concept of
democratic control recognizes that civilian governments are not necessarily democratic.140
Democratic control has been defined as the subordination of the armed forces to
democratically elected political authorities, who are responsible for taking decisions that
concern the defence of the country.141 Nonetheless, Lambert underlines that democratic
and civilian control are not necessarily means of establishing effectiveness and
professionalism in the provision of security, rather it also requires efficiency and
accountability in the use of public means and the provision of public services.142 He further
contends that democratic accountability, transparency and public access to information on
issues relating to defence and security are particularly challenging due to their often
classified nature. In this regard, in democratic societies, especially those emerging ones,
democratic control, public oversight and good governance play a particularly vital role in
the security sector. More essentially, effective implementation of democratic civilian
control should not only be concerned with sound civil-military relations and security
policies supported by the public. As a matter of necessity, it should be seen as contributing
an essential element to healthy societal and political relations, as well as national cohesion
and solidarity. 143
Lambert claims that democratic civilian control can only work in practice, provided there is
an effective separation of constitutional powers among the key organs of government- the
legislature and judiciary must have a clear operational independence from the executive and
the head of state. 144 While this appears theoretically appropriate, in most African states,
achieving this is often difficult because in most cases issues of defence and security are
mostly concentrated with the executive and shrouded in secrecy. Weak parliaments do not
offer effective oversight due to several reasons. For instance, Aning and Lartey argue that
the highly complex nature of the security sector environment presents a particularly
difficult challenge for effective exercise of oversight. 145This is partly due to the fact that
some of the issues involved in performing oversight functions of this sector are often too
technical for members of parliament or politicians who do not have the requisite technical
experience or any specific training in issues dealing with security and/or defence issues.146
Aning and Lartey adopts a triple A's (Authority, Ability, Altitude) approach to review the
functionality and effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of security sector, in general.147
Generally, the authority of parliament over defence is derived from the legal frameworks
that governs this sector. These include constitutions, Standing Orders of Parliament and
other legislations.148 The ability of parliament has been conceptualized as “the capacity of
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parliament to hold government accountable over the security sector and is a function of the
resources (human, financial and technical expertise) available to the parliament”. 149
Attitude used here refers to “the political will, of parliament towards the whole idea of
oversight of the security sector.” If parliamentarians lack the will to exercise their oversight
functions, then they will bring neither their authority nor their ability to bear.150 Therefore,
these three facets must be viewed in parallel. However, some essential elements of attitude
such as integrity, courage, and vision; values difficult to quantify, especially in a
consolidating democratic process like that of Ghana.151
2.2.4 The Challenge of Disengagement
Since the Third Wave of democratization began in Africa form the late 1980s, it was much
anticipated by many pundits that political militaries would be history. Koonings and Kruijt
conceptualize political armies as those “military institutions that see involvement in/or
control over-domestic politics and government business as core part of their legitimate
function,”152 They contend correctly that while there has been a decline in authoritarian
regimes, the process of democratic consolidation has not been without challenges. Issues of
poverty, social exclusion, governability problems, globalization and conflicts of diverse
character continue to put democratic governance under pressure in Africa and elsewhere.153
Therefore the issue of political armies is still an important area of scholarly and policy-
oriented analysis.
Koonings and Kruijt offer three compelling frameworks for further analysis. First, they
claim that there is sufficient evidence in several countries that the military as a class or as
an institution still remains influential in national politics. They still hold onto their self-
acclaimed long-term role of shaping the fate of the nation. This emanates from long history
of military dominance in politics especially in countries where the military still wield a
considerable guardian role in civilian politics. Second is the fact that in countries where the
military have supposedly handed over the political mantle as part of the reassertion of
civilian politics, ongoing societal problems present uncertainty for consolidation of
democratic governance. Third is what they term the long-term analytical consideration.154
They argue that it is of essence for a continuous examination of political armies from both
historical and comparative perspectives because in recent decades, the roles or terms of
reference of militaries has evolved dramatically. In this regard, there is a need to investigate
the ongoing preoccupation of the military with nation building, the real or imagined threat
to this project, and above all, the remoulding of political armies in the globalizing post-
Cold War era. 155 Furthermore, Koonings and Kruijt note that the current understanding of
political armies should not be limited to the classical relationship of military intervention
(and the attendant dictatorship) and civil supremacy. 156 This is because the current picture
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is a more complex one of the military adhering to democratic principles, but in an uneasy
posture toward civilian politics. Likewise, Sagaren Naidoo notes that in almost all African
countries, the military’s institutional footing is unlikely to disappear or cannot be brought
to an end. In this regard, the institutionalization of civil-military relations provides the
fundamental basis for legitimization of the military as an important actor and promoter of
democratic governance.157
Earlier on, Hutchful argued that, the militarization of politics in Africa goes beyond
situations of overt military intervention in politics.158 For instance, in apartheid South
Africa, the government has remained formally civilian, but politics and the economy
became heavily militarized, with the overly institutionalized influence of security and
intelligence agencies, in a way typical of most military regimes. In addition, authoritarian
civilian regimes for reasons of regime security depend heavily on the illegal use of the
armed forces and other specialized security units as agents of repression. In countries like
Guinea under Lansana Conte, and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, civil-military relations
were excessively personalized. 159 So a comprehensive grasp of the civil-military
problematic in Africa encompasses the age-old question of governmental control of the
armed forces which was increasingly displaced by the issues of whether the state could
maintain its monopoly over the use of violence in the face of challenges by other actors
than the state and official armies, especially in the 1980s and 90s. These entrepreneurs of
violence were mostly splinter groups from official militaries and other informal armed
bodies like rebels, guerrillas, and etcetera. These events undermined both state and armed
forces and intensified the interlocking crisis of civil and military authority.160 Hutchful
argues that without an end to militarization, no solutions to Africa’s problems are possible.
He thus contends that among the key institutional and political issues that need to be
addressed but are often neglected is the question of the democratic subordination of the
armed forces and security agencies.161
Luckham focuses on the political and policy problem associated with efforts at bringing the
military under democratic control in Africa. The path to democracy has varied among
African countries; while some transitioned through scenarios such as reforms of existing
constitutional arrangements to allow for multiparty elections others transited through
negotiated pacts extricating the military from power. In countries like Ghana such
arrangements led to the preservation of military interests and shaped the political character
of the transition process often the former military regime becoming a key political actor.162
He argues that in many African states, the door to democracy was opened not only by
donor pressures or by policy choices of the military and political elites, but through
‘demilitarization by default’; reduction in militaries due to state failure induced declining
economies and post-Cold War withdrawal of foreign support. This weakened the resolve of
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the authoritarian regime to hold on to power in the face of widespread domestic
resistance.163 In addition, a notable feature of developments that propelled the transition to
democratic governance did not only arise from civil and political society, in some cases it
came from within the ranks of the state’s own military and security establishments, for
example Mali and Malawi. In Mali in particular, a coup in 1991 by military reformers
opened the political space for democratization. 164 Nonetheless, the military is key
contributing factor in the on-going political crises which was exacerbated by the coup in
March 2012. These developments also pose several policy dilemmas for many enthusiasts
of democracy and the donor community making efforts to tame African militaries to ensure
their respect of democratic rules and principles. These problems include the a)
disengagement- how to persuade the military and security establishments to accept long-
term and unconditional military withdrawal from power; and b) the classic problem of
control-preventing intervention or re-intervention of the military against established
democratic institutions. This point is also reiterated by Pita Agbese that, in spite of the
relative successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy in many African states,
establishment of effective strategies of civilian control over the military is one of the
primary challenges to the transition process.165
As enumerated by Ebere Onwudiwe, strategies that have been proffered for democratically
controlling the armed forces in Africa include reduction in the size of the armed forces;
redesigning of their missions, and in some cases transforming the military into a
developmental armed forces and entrenchment of constitutional clauses that abolish
coups.166 Luckham particularly notes that, the most prescribed solution by Western donors
has been the professionalism of the military. 167 He argues that unlike advanced
democracies, not all forms of professionalism of African armies, especially those that focus
on internal security and intra-state conflicts are non-political. He reckons that while African
militaries may want to establish their autonomy in resistance to efforts at making them
more democratically accountable, they are at the same time reluctant to relinquish those
habits of power they acquired in the years of political involvement. Some African countries
provide useful lessons on how some civilian governments though not always democratic
have employed varied mechanisms to keep the military out of politics. They include
incorporating military elites in patronage networks of the governments, ethnic manipulation
and penetration of the armed forces by state intelligence service and use of foreign patrons,
usually through defence pact with former colonial masters and western nations.168 Some of
these have a damaging effect on professionalism in the armed forces and have also not
necessarily resulted in effective democratic control.
Luckham’s position was reiterated by other analysts such as Hutchful that attempts at
fostering democratic control must take into account a comprehensive review of the role and
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mission of the armed forces, doctrine, institutional structures, budgetary sustainability,
equipment and force levels necessary for restoring military efficiency and internal functions
under democratic dispensations.169 Luckham notes that there are varied steps that can be
taken to promote military reforms in Africa; however, there is the need to identify and
avoid forms of support that have the likelihood of aggravating the underlying political
conflicts and inappropriate professional models and powerful, but unaccountable and
unsustainable security bureaucracies.170 While Luckham rightly recounts the problems of
military disengagement and democratization in Africa, his analysis did not venture into a
deeper enquiry into the process of transforming African armies into effective state
institutions needed for democratic growth.
In another work on military forces in African states, Herbert Howe highlighted the problem
of the military in Africa’s path to democratization. Howe’s central thesis examines how
African states may prevent the menace of conflicts and achieve greater security through the
development of highly professional militaries. The central focus of Howe’s work is on
military capabilities and the armed forces’ political responsibility, primarily in relation to
military operations and their conduct toward the civilian population.171 In seeking answers
to the above issue, Howe explores the practical or psychological problems which constitute
obstacles to democratization in African states especially during the first four decades of
independence. He analyses the peculiar security and military tensions facing contemporary
African governments and thus identifies unprofessional militaries, irrelevant or dangerous
military solutions as among the major contributory factors to Africa’s ongoing security
predicament. On the essential issue of military professionalism, he notes that the political
nature of the state strongly influences military professionalism-a concept that includes both
military capabilities and political responsibility to the state as well as competent and loyal
militaries that can contribute to safeguarding political and economic development.172 Howe
argues forcefully that, the most critical security dilemma is the tension between military
capabilities and military loyalty. In Africa, many governments in their quest for political
survival or regime stability have paid attention to military loyalty at the expense of
capability. He thus believes that, personal rule which has dominated Africa’s governance
landscape since independence has often weakened military professionalism. There has been
a breach of the civil-military divide by civilians attempting to manipulate military affairs on
the one hand, and by military officers pursuing political control of the state on the other. In
the ensuing milieu, the resultant weaker militaries have increasingly become a threat to
legitimacy of the state in the post-Cold War era.
He identifies three strategies employed by African states to address the security threats
since the early 1990s. These include regional intervention forces like the Economic
Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), private security companies
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(Executive Outcomes) and Western-sponsored capacity building initiatives to upgrade state
militaries such as the US-sponsored African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Howe
argues that these strategies have very limited utility to African states, and thus likely to fail
unless African states explore and emphasize indigenous approaches to military
professionalism. He argues further that military professionalism requires an
institutionalized system of stable and widely accepted political values that exist
independent of a specific regime. Military professionalism is a parallel process in which
civilians and military officials agree to stay away from each other’s realm of affairs. 173
However, Howe did not offer a comprehensive approach to enhancing military
professionalism, one of the focuses of defence transformation. For instance, he provides the
rational for upgrading African military forces, but he does not sufficiently explain how the
forces would aid multiple institutional and capacity building needs of African states.174
Mathurin Hougnikpo also examines political militaries and their interventions in African
politics and their impact on democratic societies. He notes that the reoccurrence of coups in
African countries in recent years makes total military disengagement from politics a dream.
The phenomenon of coups in Africa has defied most theoretical explanations. However,
there is thin layer of hope as some African militaries have gradually metamorphosed from
enemies to promoters of democracies in countries like Benin.175 He argues that despite the
popular assertion on the issue of civilian control of the military would deny any political
role to the military as evidently exposed by the concept of ‘apolitical’ armed forces; the
typical African army is a direct political stakeholder. As African countries pursue the
democratic path, the issues of political role of the armed forces will linger on until there is
the consolidation of competitive systems, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities
between civilian and military. Therefore, only a redefinition of boundaries by a more astute
civilian management will prevent military intervention in political process.176
Most African states have gradually in principle accepted constitutional means to attaining
power. This view informed by a liberal model of civil-military relations has led many
African states to accept the concept of ‘apolitical’ professional armies subject to democratic
civil control, which should be legitimate. However, the chequered civil-military relations
history makes it imperative for the establishment of some form of contract between the
military and civilian elites, which includes a code of conduct for the armed forces and
security services, constitutional provisions. Hougnikpo observes that effective governance
of the security sector is a crucial issue globally, but more critical for emergent democracies
in Africa. As widely noted by other analysts that uncontrolled or undirected security sector
with the monopoly of violence can become a force unto itself, proper governance and
regulation that are based on informed and active legislation, clear governmental policy
framework and laws, effective civilian executive authorities and an active civil society to
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keep the security sector transparent, accountable and efficient is necessary in Africa. This is
to ensure that the security sector, particularly the armed forces are governed in accordance
with principles of democratic control and accountability.177 In addition, Hougnikpo calls for
restructuring of civil-military relations to give a genuine chance to democracy. In this
regard, Africa needs a positive, rather than a zero-sum approach to repair the state and
empower civil society and at the same time recognizing the contribution of the military in
the process. Tensions are inevitable in all institutions, both civilian and military. Following
the decades of mistrust, the military and civilian politicians have to redesign their
relationships to foster smooth political transition. It is important for African institutions and
leaders to work out a compromise that allows an appropriate dispensation of security. 178
Furthermore, Barany contends that, the transition literature has focused less on the military
as an important institution of the state. Barany defines a democratic army as a force that
does not support one political party or another rather the principle of good governance. He
offers a three-pronged contention that first, “democracy cannot be consolidated without
military elites committed to democratic rule and obedient to democratically elected political
elites”.179 Regimes that are in the process of systematic political transitions are susceptible
to domestic instability and external threats. They therefore need armed forces that obey the
commands of emerging civilian authority. Second, “building democratic armies are more
difficult to accomplish in some context than others.” This is because the political and
socioeconomic settings for building democratic armies vary and thus pose different
challenges to those states nurturing democratic armies and civil-military relations. Third,
“numerous generalizations can be made to help understand the transformation of military
politics in different environments.” 180 All the same, providing substantive and useful
explanations for civil-military relations in such varied political and socio-economic
environments is virtually impossible for a general theory. Barany provides a cross-continent
empirical analysis informed by methodological vigour on selected cases in a) post-war
states- total defeat in major wars like WWI or civil war; b) post-military regimes and c)
post-colonial states and post-unification and apartheid. His analysis of civil-military
relations in post-colonial African states like Ghana, Tanzania and Botswana highlighted the
different trajectories in the immediate post-independence era. Despite his clearly
articulated bias for democracy as a good and desirable objective, his analysis on Ghana for
example did not explore beyond the immediate post-independence period of rampant
military rule interspersed with short-lived civilian rule. Specifically, what has been done or
being done to build democratic armed forces as a stakeholder in consolidation of Ghana’s
democracy.
On the dilemma of the military and democratization in African politics, Esew also argues
from a power theory perspective that once the military had had a taste of power in countries
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like Ghana and Nigeria, there was a conflictual relationship between soldiers and political
elites resulting in a power game between the two.181 He adds that in Africa, political power
comes with the distribution of national wealth, and thus once the military have tasted
power, letting it go becomes difficult. He therefore sheds some insights into the nature and
patterns of military and political transition in Ghana and Nigeria by highlighting the socio-
political and economic factors which largely influenced the success or failure of political
transitions in these countries. In relation to Ghana, Esew examines the various transition
programmes from military to civil rule from the first coup in 1966 to the last coup in 1981.
He argues that the first military government, the National Liberation Council (NLC), set up
a transition programme to ensure a near swift return to civilian rule because it did not
intend to stay in power for too long and because there was an alternative political elite to
whom the military wished to hand over power. The second transition programme under the
National Redemption Council of General Kutu Acheampong was unexpectedly prolonged
because General Acheampong was not willing to hand over power.182 This coupled with the
looming national crisis indeed propelled a palace coup to remove him. Nonetheless, the
inconsistencies of the successive Supreme Military Council regime under Lieutenant
General Frederick William Akuffo provided the impetus to junior rank intervention of the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Jerry Rawlings. The AFRC did hand
over the mantle of leadership to a civilian government after four months of “house
cleaning”, only to return 27 months later. Since then the Provisional National Defence
Council (PNDC) held a strong hand on power with little tolerance for opposition. It later
metamorphosed into a political party and won the first elections following the opening up
of the political space in 1992.
2.3 A Conceptual Approach to Defence Transformation
Some strategic shifts in the post-Cold War international system brought about by the
emergence of transnational terrorism, proliferation of nuclear and weapons of mass
destruction, regional conflicts and the changing nature of warfare and crisis, peacekeeping,
technological advancement in weaponry, communication and logistics are some of the
important drivers of defence reform and transformation. There have been some shifts in
military posture, doctrines and defence policies in many countries.183 In addition, political,
economic and social changes have propelled countries to reconsider their defence
structures. For example, issues of gender, human rights and minorities are being
reconsidered to create opportunities for women and other minorities in the military, which
they have not traditionally enjoyed.184
The concept of defence transformation was originally conceived as the process by which
the information Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) would be achieved.185 This gained
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global attention following the appointment of Donald Rumsfeld for the second time, as
Defence Secretary of United States (US) in 2001. The concept was subsequently adapted by
advanced western countries. However, it is believed the events of 9/11 ended the apparent
“strategic pause”186in defence that began with the end of the Cold War. Rumsfeld defines
transformation as a “process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and
cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations
that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to
sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”187
Similarly, Kugler, defines military transformation “as a process of pursuing major changes
to military forces in order to greatly elevate their future combat capabilities for
information-age operations. The key terms of transformation and its principal determinants
are “process, change, and capability.” 188According to Kugler, transformation has three
main features; firstly, it aims at major changes and improvements, not just minor ones.
Secondly, it is a dynamic and ongoing process, not a static condition with a fixed end; and
thirdly, it is also a process of creative exploration and experimentation whose destination
will be determined only as it unfolds over a period of years. 189 Further, defence
transformation has been defined “as a continuous process that shapes the nature of military
competition and cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies,
streamlined organizational structures, innovative processes, and adaptive personnel
developments that exploit national advantages and protect against asymmetric
vulnerabilities.”190 In sum, defence transformation aims at total overhaul of the defence
sector of a state to meet the needs and features of the democracy in which the state finds
itself.
The concept of defence transformation is often used interchangeably with the term defence
reform. While the two terms may be interrelated, defence reforms, however, refer to series
of coordinated actions designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a state’s
armed forces. 191 The major difference is that, while reform is often a piecemeal and
incremental approach to state restructuring; transformation seeks a total overhaul of the
normative, organisational and cultural environment of defence in a democracy.192Although
the objectives for defence reform may depend on the peculiar circumstances of individual
countries, a core objective of defence reform is often is to ensure that the ministry or
department of defence and the military are effectively overseen and controlled.193
Chuter defines defence transformation to encompass four major clusters, which are
cultural transformation, entailing the transformation of the culture of the institution; human
transformation, entailing the transformation of the composition of the institution with
regard to its racial, ethnic, regional and gender composition, etc.; political transformation,
which strives to ensure the conduct and character of the institution conforms to the political
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features of the democracy within which it is located; and organizational transformation,
which constitutes a more technocratic process within which the organization is right-sized,
among other factors. 194 It is argued the only properly transformed armed forces can
effectively provide peace, security, and stability. Therefore, defence transformation
provides the only means to adapt in the constantly changing security environment, and as
well to retain the relevance of national armed forces, military advantage over asymmetric
and adaptive adversaries, and to improve military effectiveness.195
Many West African countries are faced with the challenge of defence sector transformation
to align their post-authoritarian defence forces with the demands of new democratic
societies.196In transitioning democracies, especially in post-conflict contexts, security and
defence sector transformation processes are often carried out for a total overhaul of the
security and defence architecture to align it to the prevailing democratic culture. This is
often followed by periodic strategic defence review processes. Both processes often
involved national consultative processes and internal debates involving all relevant
stakeholders including political leadership, government ministries and agencies, the people,
the military and other actors. During these processes, gamuts of issues are considered.
These include: threat assessment, defence choices and political consequences, the balance
between non-military and military means of addressing threats, resource allocation for
defence and security and non-military uses of the armed forces.197
It is argued that transformation of the defence and security sector could provide a
meaningful basis for addressing historically rooted pathologies that have resulted in deep
cleavages between state, security sector and citizens in many African countries. For
instance, it could be used to address the structural change(s) required to make SSR efforts
effective and result in greater impact on the ground.198 Williams writes that transformation
of the defence community is a concept that spans a wide variety of inter-related fields.
Defence transformation goes beyond the demand for a reduction in defence spending and
requires a fundamental change in defence policies, cultures, management and practises.199
The transformation processes, if pursued thoroughly, could have an impact on every aspects
of an organisation’s existence. This therefore requires astute management to ensure
success.200 Williams adds that for transformation processes to be successful, it is essential
for the following three factors to be acknowledged during the management stage. Firstly,
the importance of decisive and strategic leadership of the process itself. Secondly, the
importance of ensuring that the process enjoys high levels of legitimacy (buy-in); and
thirdly, the importance of determining the scope of the transformation process itself–such
as organisational culture, traditions, leadership style, and racial and gender composition.201
54
Transformation of defence or the military in particular, is often characterized by
interrelated variables. These may reside in diverse areas such as recruitment, organization,
equipment, training and sustenance of the military forces.202 Besides, transformation is not
confined to the military sphere but also requires considerable civil-military interactions.
These interactions may relate to tangible issues as the commitment of the societal wealth
and human resource to transformation efforts. There may be other intangible factors that
could affect civil-military relations. For instance, efforts at transforming the military may
be obstructed if deemed inconsistent with the societal norms, history and collective
memory.203 In this regard, striking a balance between these societal imperatives emanating
from civilian sphere and the functional imperatives from the military sphere could result in
considerable tension. There is therefore the need for strategic interaction between the
military and civilian elites to ameliorate these sources of tensions. This interaction often
involves an exchange of information relating to the costs and benefits of a particular
transformation programme.204
Le Roux notes that, very often discussions on defence transformation are often confined to
narrow or simplistic view that is synonymous with reduction in the size and budgets of
defence forces especially in post-conflict countries. However, the issue of defence
transformation is much more complex and multifaceted and goes beyond simply a cutback
exercise. It is more concerned with bringing defence in line with the principles of
democracy and responsible and accountable governance.205 It is needed in both countries
emerging out of conflict and those seen to be relatively stable though a generic model
cannot be applied to all countries without taking into account their specific circumstances
such as political, economic, social, security and institutional factors. He acknowledges that
the process in Africa including countries like South Africa that have seen relative gains in
transforming their defence forces is fraught with numerous challenges. Among the
challenges is that of transforming defence sectors to ensure appropriate, adequate,
accountable and affordable defence sector for both national and regional purposes. As
observed by Shelton and Alden, in the immediate post-apartheid South Africa, the
consolidation of civilian control remained an elusive goal to be accomplished in the short
term. The government was confronted with finding the balance between imperatives of
transformation and the development of an effective defence force appropriate to the needs
of the changing international environment.206
Particularly on the issue of the governance and management of defence in Africa, Le Roux,
like other analysts, argues that African militaries are generally a power unto themselves.
They are often not transparent to civil society and efficient. There is lack of transparency on
defence budgets and little control is exercised over defence expenditure. African
governments and defence establishments face multiple challenges including the
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establishment of good governance and adherence to constitutions; building democratic
civil-military relations; crafting defence policies that reflect the current national and
regional security needs. Other challenges relate to role definition for the armed forces;
improving efficiency in defence management; enhancing professionalism of the defence
sectors; regional security collaboration and institutionalization of good planning,
programming and budgeting practices in defence establishments.207
Therefore, the transformation process in Africa could benefit from the case specific
application of certain factors such as good governance, integration, demobilization and
reintegration processes, efficiency, determination and redefinition of functions and
structures, organizational culture and sustainability. These are common factors in all
transformational processes. While Le Roux’s generic model for security sector
transformation is rational it is drawn mainly from the South African experience that offers
valuable lessons for other African countries. However, practicalizing these propositions in
different counties might require remodelling of measures and techniques that take into
account the specificities and history of the country. Similarly, Luckham and Hutchful
argue that in reality, it is much easier for analysts to make proposals for security/defence
sector transformation in Africa than to have them operationalized by African states to make
their citizens more secure.208 Luckham and Hutchful also contend that such proposals will
become empirically flawed and of little use as guides to action if they do not reflect
Africa’s unique historical and developmental experiences.209 In this regard, they are of the
view that in order to consider how to properly transform security, “one must first
understand the sources of insecurity and bad governance including state failure, societal
militarism and political violence which have prevailed in many parts of the continent.”210
Luckham and Hutchful further note that the critical issue is how to transform security in a
political marketplace in which many of the most important actors who are self-interested
and predisposed to patrimonial politics, face international constraints and have little real
desire for change. Even in relatively consolidated democracies, like Ghana, reforms have
been selectively implemented with little real enthusiasm for democratic accountability on
the part of their governments and security institutions.211
For the study of defence transformation processes in Ghana, the discussion could equally be
situated within the newer defence transformation conceptual frameworks, as proposed by
Chuter. Defence transformation is a multifaceted process that concerns the structuring and
management of defence. The Ghana case finds itself straddling both the old civil-military
relations theory, and the new SSR frameworks, as there has not been any coordinated
approach towards changing/reforming the military to conform to democratic principles, or
to reducing the power of the military within society in order to ensure greater civilian
control. The process has been ad hoc, individualized and not institutionalized as would
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have been expected. However, there is a general view that in spite of this “something” has
changed within the Ghana armed forces and Ghanaian society that needs to be studied. The
question is what exactly has changed? Thus the thesis seeks to determine what has changed
and whether that change has made a meaningful contribution to civil-military relations and
political stability. In order to do this Chuter’s four clusters; cultural transformation, human
transformation, political transformation, and organizational transformation, are used as
frameworks for analysis. This has implications for the number of countries which had been
in a similar situation as Ghana – transitional democracies – which did not suffer civil wars,
but nonetheless require a coherent policy and practice towards transformation of their
defence sector. Ghana’s process at transforming the defence sector is analysed within the
above mentioned conceptual framework to observe how the theory and principles of civil-
military relations and defence transformation apply in the Ghanaian context.
2.3 Theoretical Framework: Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations
The preceding analyses do not provide an adequate theoretical and conceptual framework
for transforming civil-military relations in Ghana and thus propel the need to situate the
research into theoretical and conceptual tools of analysis. This section of the chapter
presents the theoretical and conceptual frameworks upon which the study is hinged.
Williams argues cogently that there exists no single template according to which the
African civil-military relations systems can be constructed.212 Despite the generic similarity
between the formal institutions of civil control, de facto control over the armed forces in
Africa is often maintained by a series of discourses that are country specific and thus not
easily transferrable to all countries. In this regard, the study situates the discussion within
theoretical and conceptual paradigms. First, it adopts Schiff’s Concordance Theory of civil-
military relations developed in the 1990s. Secondly, the conceptual tool employed by the
study is Chuter’s approach to defence transformation.
Schiff belongs to the non- institutional separatist school of thought on civil-military
relations discussed earlier in section 2.1.5. The Concordance Theory takes into account
both the institutional and cultural perspectives of individual context in explaining civil-
military relations. Schiff’s theory does not proffer a separation of civil and military sphere,
and issues of control, rather partnership or cooperation. According to Schiff, to prevent the
military from interfering in domestic politics, three societal institutions: the military,
political elites and citizenry must work and maintain cooperation or partnership agreement
in four areas; the social composition of the officer corps; political decision-making process;
method of recruitment of personnel and style of the military. Schiff argues that concordance
theory seeks to resolve two problems in the theory of separation. The first problem is that
the prevalent theories are largely drawn from the experiences of the US. This assumes that
57
in order to prevent domestic military intervention, the post-WW II US or Western-styled
institutional separation should be applied to all other nations. While the US example may
be well grounded in particular history and cultural experiences, it may not be applicable to
all contexts or nations. Secondly, the dominant theories focus on institutional analysis, and
thus argue for separation of civil-military institutions.213 Schiff notes that such method fails
to take into account the cultural and historical conditions that may promote or discourage
civil-military separation. Accordingly, concordance theory carries the issues beyond
institutional analysis to address pertinent issues of a nation’s culture. As captured by Schiff,
“concordance theory argues that the three partners... should aim for a cooperative
relationship that might involve separation but does not require it.”214 The theory seeks a
high level of integration between the military and other parts of the society as one of the
several types of civil-military relationships.
As noted above, within the concordance framework, the military, the political leadership
and citizenry are viewed as partners. The theory predicts that when these partners agree
about the role of the armed forces, it reduces the likelihood of military intervention in
domestic politics in a particular state. Schiff provides definitions of the three partners
involved in the concordance theory. She defines the first partner, the military as “the armed
forces and personnel who represent the military.” 215 This comprises the officers and
enlisted personnel. 216 The second partner, political leadership is defined in terms of
function. Schiff notes that the exact nature of government institutions and the method of
their selection are less important when determining concordance. What is more significant
is identifying the elites who represent the government and have direct influence over the
composition and support of the armed forces. These governmental elites include cabinets,
presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, and monarchs. The third partner the
citizenry is defined as “individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban
workers, and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers, those who may have the right to vote, or
other groups that may be disenfranchised.”217 She argues that the prevalent civil-military
theories tend to focus on the institutional civilian and military separations. The extensive
reliance on political institutions as the main civil component of analysis does not take the
citizenry into account. Schiff acknowledges that the relationship of civil institutions to the
military is important, but it is only a partial reflection of the dynamics of civil-military
relations. In this regard, concordance theory does not lump political and civil institutions
together. Rather, it considers the citizenry as an important partner distinct from military and
political elites. Therefore, incorporates additional elements of society that affect the role
and function of the armed forces.218
Schiff posits four primary indicators of concordance. The four indicators are: (1) the social
composition of the officer corps; (2) the political decision making process; (3) the military
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recruitment method; and (4) the military style. These four indicators are essential elements
of concordance because they show specific conditions that influence agreement or
disagreement among the three partners. The social composition of the officer corps is a
primary indicator because officers are usually career soldiers who help to define the
relationship between the military and society, and provide a linkage between the citizenry
and the military as well as the military and the government.219 The political decision
making process includes “the institutional organs of society that determine important
factors for the military such as budget, materiel, military size, and structure”. 220 The
military recruitment method is defined as the method for enlistment of soldiers into the
armed forces. Finally, military style is concerned with how people perceive the military and
what the ethos and appearance of the military is from both internal and external
perspectives. Military style refers to the general characteristics that differentiate the military
elites from other groups. As captured by Charles Moskos, the military style related directly
with human and cultural elements of the armed forces: its looks, overt and subtle signals it
conveys and its ritual- are all part of a deep and nuanced relationship among soldiers,
citizens and the polity.221 On hindsight, concordance theory seeks to expand the limited
scope of civil-military theory developed by traditional separation theorists such as
Huntington.222 The theory presents a direct relevance for both the study of civil-military
relations and its practical application in the developing world.223 Particularly, it takes into
cognizance the context specific societal factors and dynamic relationships that underpin
civil-military relations in different societies in developing democracies.
2. 3.1 Weaknesses of Concordance Theory
Like any theoretical framework, concordance theory has attracted some criticisms, for
example, Richard Wels argues that the theory lacks two essential elements which any new
theory in relation to an earlier one must contain.224 First, an accurate statement of the old
to-be-displaced theory, and second, a set of related conceptual statements that is different
from its counterpart in the existing theory. Wels argues that concordance does not
necessarily present a new theory rather; it provides a useful point for reconsideration of
trends in civil-military relations.225 Wels noted that concordance theory’s emphasis on
dialogue, accommodation and shared values among the military, political elites and the
citizenry on the role of the armed forces as necessary conditions for preventing military
intervention in politics. However, he believes this does not differ significantly from the
proposition of earlier theories, especially Huntington’s concept of fusion- that calls for
merger of political and military functions.226
In her critique, Avant argues that the problem with concordance theory is that, the military
may not need to intervene in politics if it can get what it wants without intervening.227
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Particularly the concordance model does not capture the phenomenon of an “agency
reversal” where agents by virtue of their specialization assume increasing control over an
issue and causes attention to shift to the agent as the principal’s preference becomes
unclear. Additionally, Schiff’s concordance theory might have limited utility in its
application in societies in Africa where the civil society is not seen as a significant factor in
the civil-military relations debate. Often the relationship between the two is characterized
by uneasiness and at times fear of the military arises from peoples’ experiences with the
military during times of armed conflict and military rule. This point is well illustrated by
Cleary that the attempt by the theory to draw the society as an important partner in the
debate does not always hold for some African and Latin American countries where “the
focus is on military-political/administration relations; society does not really factor into the
equation”. 228 In addition, ‘‘the military perceives the civilian politicians as ignorant,
uneducated and corrupt, while civil servants are seen as overly bureaucratic, incompetent
and inefficient.” In this milieu, the populace is largely seen as uninterested and ignorant of
security issues.229 It is therefore necessary for one to explore in detail the reasons why
citizens appear uninterested in the civil-military relations issues.
Schiff uses Pakistan as one of the cases to demonstrate how the lack of concordance
(discordance) among the three partners on the four indicators contributes to coups.
However, in his critique of the applicability of the concordance theory, Zulfiqar Ali
contends that in the case of Pakistan, it is rather concordance among two unequal partners
–the military and international actors, particularly the US, and not discordance that
accounts for military coups. 230 He notes that the 1958 coup especially points to the
marking influence of the military upon citizenry, political and juridical process and
decision making. Ali argues that abstract theoretical approach of the concordance theory
(three partners, partnership and four indicators) tend to overshadow the institutional and
cultural conditions of Pakistan irrespective of its multicultural and pluralist approach.231 He
considers the approach of concordance theory as simplistic which fails to recognize that the
judiciary, media, and international actors, especially the US, play an essential role in
domestic military intervention. Notwithstanding these criticisms, concordance theory
presents yet another analytical framework for the study of civil-military relations outside
the advanced democracies of the West.
2.4 Summary
The chapter has reviewed some of the pertinent literature in the field of civil-military
relations on African militaries, coups and defence transformation in Africa. The literature
reveals various theoretical and conceptual positions on civil-military relations. However,
the varied theoretical propositions provided by the likes of Huntington, Janowitz, and
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Feaver could possibly be of utility for discussing civil-military relations in advanced and
stable democracies. Indeed, most of the frameworks discussed above do not provide a
comprehensive framework for detailed analysis of the African civil-military landscape. The
repertoire of literature on African militaries and the issue of coups have highlighted the
various motives and dispositions of military interventions in politics. Nevertheless, beyond
the phenomenon of coups, most of the analyses do not to capture detailed examination of
how to transform African militaries into effective and efficient institutions to contribute to
the process of democratic consolidation and state building. Therefore, a major lacuna
clearly stands out in the literature and thus provides the basis for deeper enquiry towards a
more holistic approach to transforming civil-military relations and defence in Ghana.
Addressing these theoretical and analytical gaps in the literature therefore propels the need
to situate the research in the Schiff’s concordance theory and Chuter’s conceptual
framework of defence transformation.
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This chapter reflects on some of the key research paradigms and philosophies that inform
the research design, methods of data collection and analysis of results. The literature of
research methodology in the social sciences has centred mainly on the philosophical
contentions between quantitative and qualitative approaches to research. John Smith aptly
summarizes these debates as “in quantitative research facts are used to construct our beliefs,
while in interpretative or qualitative research, beliefs determine what should count as fact.”1
Kenneth Howe also argues that in practice, the difference between quantitative and
qualitative data, design, analysis, and interpretation depend largely on differences in
research interests and judgments about how best to pursue them.2 To navigate through this
methodological divergence the pragmatic or mixed approach recognizes and utilizes both
quantitative and qualitative approaches where appropriate.3 In this regard, Julia Brannen
asserts that the case for separate paradigms stems from the fact that qualitative and
quantitative researchers hold different epistemological assumptions. They belong to
different research cultures and have different researcher biographies that work against
convergence. Nonetheless she points out that there are more overlaps than differences in the
two approaches. For instance, she asserts that the widely held claim that qualitative
research uses words while quantitative research uses numbers is overly simplistic. 4
The debate on methodology is often resolved through a combination of the research needs
and the worldview of the researcher. This makes it necessary to establish the philosophical
position of the researcher and the philosophical needs of the study before an appropriate
research method is chosen. The study adopts a qualitative approach to research design, data
gathering and analysis as the researcher’s philosophical position is established in a social
constructivist or phenomenological orientation. 5 The basis of qualitative approach is
discovering meaning and involves both interpretation and a critical approach to social
reality.6 This approach is particularly well-suited for exploring complex issues whose study
processes occur over a period of time as it stresses the validity of multiple meaning,
structures, context and holistic analysis.7 The uniqueness of qualitative approach is that it is
primarily concerned with processes rather than outcomes. Researchers are interested in
understanding how things occur.8 Besides, qualitative research occurs in natural settings
where human behaviour and events occur. In addition, the qualitative researcher often aims
to gather in-depth understanding of social behaviour and the reasons underlying such
behaviour.9 Qualitative methods are often used to address research questions that require
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explanation of social phenomena and their contexts. This approach is preferred for the
purpose of this study due to the emphasis it places on social and political processes and
institutions. As such, the central focus of this study- civil-military relations and defence
transformation can be best studied through this approach to examine how relationships have
evolved over time.
3. 1 Philosophical Underpinnings of Qualitative Research
There is no single approach to any research paradigm in general and qualitative research, in
particular. Any approach taken may be underpinned by several factors including the
researcher’s ontological and epistemological beliefs. According to the theory of science,
relationships among these constructs are such that; “ontology defines epistemology, which
in turn defines methodology, which then determines applied methods.”10 On the one hand,
ontology refers to a theory of being. This relates to beliefs about the nature of the social
world and what can be known about it. In the social sciences, key ontological questions
include whether or not social reality exists independently of human conceptions and
interpretations; whether there is a common, shared, social reality or just multiple context
specific realities; and whether or not social behaviour is regulated by laws; that can be
considered as immutable or generalizable.11 These positions are often categorized broadly
into objectivism and constructivism. Objectivism as an ontological position asserts that
social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social
actors. 12 Constructionism also stress that social phenomena and their meaning are
continually being accomplished by social actors. Therefore social phenomena and
categories are not only produced through social interaction but they are in a constant state
of revision. 13
Epistemology, on the other hand, is a theory of knowledge that is concerned about the
nature of knowledge and how it can be acquired. An epistemological position lays the
foundation for the knowledge-building process.14 Some of the issues at the core of the
epistemological debate include how the relationship between the researcher and the
researched is understood.15 It is therefore necessary to explore briefly the ontological and
epistemological positions adopted within this study, to generate a better understanding of
methods of data collection and analysis.
Qualitative research finds resonance in both positivist and post-positivist positions.
Historically, it was defined within the positivist tradition, where qualitative researchers
attempted to do good positivist research with less rigorous methods and procedures.16
Nonetheless, qualitative method is most preferred by those coming from non-positivist or
interpretivist epistemological positions such as hermeneutics, phenomenology and social
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constructivism among others. Although these philosophies are related, they embrace
different perspectives on the aim and practice of understanding human action, different
ethical commitments, as well as different stance on methodological and epistemological
issues of representation, validity and objectivity.17
Generally, the post-positivists challenge the traditional notion of absolute truth or
knowledge and recognize that people cannot be entirely positive about their claims of
knowledge when studying the behaviour and actions of humans. 18 This worldview is
associated with the works of 19th century writers like Comte, Mill, Durkheim, Locke and
Newton. The post-positivists are also of the view that the social world is patterned and that
causal relationships can be discovered and tested through reliable strategies.19 In this sense,
they move away from the positivist idea of proving causal relationships that constitute the
social world, and rather build evidence to support a pre-existing theory.20 Flowing from the
post-positivist school of thought, interpretivism is generally based on the interpretation of
interactions and the social meaning that people assign to their interactions.21 In this regard,
the interpretivists believe in relative and multiple realities. Lincoln and Guba write that
these multiple meanings are very difficult to interpret as they depend on other systems for
meanings.22 Therefore, the knowledge generated from this discipline is perceived through
socially constructed and subjective interpretations.23 The methodological implication of
having multiple realities is that research questions cannot be definitively established before
the study begins; rather, they evolve and change as the study progresses especially through
the discovery of surprising findings.24
Similarly, the social constructivists basically assume that knowledge is socially constructed
by people active in the research process, and that researchers attempt to understand the
complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it.25 This
interpretive framework is very common in phenomenological research studies. The
phenomenologists are, as well, concerned with how individuals make sense of the world
around them and how in particular researchers or philosophers should bracket out
preconceptions in their grasp of that world. 26 This paradigm is often associated with works
of early writers like Alfred Schultz, Edmund Husserl, Max Weber, who recognize the
fundamental difference between the subject matter of the natural and social sciences and
the need for an epistemology that will reflect and capitalize on the differences.
Fundamentally, the difference lies in the fact that “social reality has a meaning for human
beings and therefore human action is meaningful-that is it has meaning for them and they
act on the basis of the meaning that they attribute to their acts and to the acts of others.”27 In
sum, the phenomenologist considers human behaviour as the product of peoples'
interpretation of the world. In this regard, they attempt to understand human behaviour
from the point of view of the people concerned.28
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Qualitative researchers often use a variety of epistemological positions and methods to
secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study. The researcher adopts an
interpretivist epistemological orientation. The study of people and their institutions in the
social world requires a different logic of research procedure, one that reflects the
distinctiveness of humans against the natural sciences. Based on a constructivist ontological
position, the researcher believes that social interaction is in constant state of revision, so
this study present a specific version of social reality rather than one that can be considered
as definitive. This study adopts a holistic approach to qualitative research that integrates
ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods.29 This approach brings out the linkages
between philosophical foundations and the research method or techniques employed based
on one’s epistemological and ontological orientations to understand and describe civil-
military relations and process of defence transformation in emerging democracies.
3.2 Research Design: Case Study
Although other qualitative and quantitative research designs such as surveys, experiments
and historical analysis are worthy of mention, the epistemological position of the researcher
and the aims and needs of this research rule them out. The qualitative research design
selected for this study is a single-case study. This is because the study aims at deeper and
insightful understanding of a complex social phenomenon of defence transformation
processes and civil-military relations in Ghana, rather than measurements; thus the use of
other strategies like experiments or surveys are not possible.
Table 2-3: Choice of Research Strategy
Source: Adopted from Yin, (2003)







Experiment How, why Yes Yes








History How, why No No
Case study How, why No Yes
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3.2.1 Case Study
Case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in detail
within its real-life context, and particularly when the boundaries between the phenomenon
and context are not clearly known.30 In other words, case study focuses on one or just a
few instances of a particular phenomenon with a view to providing an in-depth account of
events, experiences and relationships of a larger population.31 Robert Yin adds that “case
study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many
more variables of interest than data, and as one result relies on multiple sources of
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and
analysis.”32 It is most suitable for situation where the researcher has little control over
events. This is because, the main concern here is investigating contemporary phenomenon
as they occur in their natural setting, so there is no pressure on the researcher to impose
controls or change circumstances.33
There are several methods of conducting a case study research. These include multiple or
comparative, single, holistic or embedded case studies. The choice of a particular case
study research design may be guided by what Robert Yin terms as five component of
research design, namely 1) a study's question; 2) its propositions if any; 3) its units of
analysis; 4) the logic of linking data to the propositions; and 5) the criteria for interpreting
the findings.34 In most instances, social science analysts tend to favour multiple case studies
over single cases due to their varied advantages. For example, multiple case studies involve
extensive study of several instrumental cases to provide understanding and insights. This
provides improved ability to theorize over a broader context.35 Therefore a major strength
of a comparative case design is its ability to allow the distinguishing characteristics of two
or more cases to serve as a springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting
findings.36As argued by Robert Yin, evidence from multiple cases is often seen as more
compelling and thus can be regarded as more robust.37 Despite these advantages, multiple
case studies have some weaknesses. For instance, in comparative cases, researchers tend to
pay less attention to the specific context and more to the ways in which cases can be
contrasted.38 In addition, doing two or more case studies may require extensive resources
and time beyond the means of a single researcher.39 This study therefore rules out multiple
or comparative cases as the rationale for doing a single-case which is detailed below cannot
be satisfied by multiple cases.
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Figure 1-3: Case Study Design
Source: Author, adopted from Yin, (2003)
The choice of a single-case study design on Ghana is informed by a number of factors.
First, a single-case is most suitable for the key research question- how can defence
transformation contribute to healthy civil-military relations necessary for democratic
consolidation in emerging democracies such as Ghana? Case study research designs are
generally suitable to exploring ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions.40 This is because such
questions deal with operational links that need to be traced over time, rather than mere
frequencies or incidences. 41 This design could be effectively employed to test the
underlying research proposition/hypothesis-how does defence transformation contribute to
improved civil-military relations, which is deemed essential for consolidation of democracy
and political stability in emerging democracies.
In addition, a single-case study represents the critical case for testing the theoretical
framework-concordance theory of civil-military relations upon which the study is hinged.
Rebecca Schiff considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and
moves beyond institutional analysis of civil military relations by arguing that in order to
prevent the military from interfering in domestic politics, three societal institutions: the
military, political elites and citizenry must work and maintain cooperation or partnership
agreement in four areas; the social composition of the officer corps; political decision-
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making process; method of recruitment of personnel and style of the military.42Besides,
Schiff’s theoretical proposition, there is a general view that something has changed within
the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and Ghanaian society that needs to be studied. Therefore,
the research will examine what exactly has changed in Ghana’s defence sector through
Chuter’s conceptual framework on defence transformation. Chuter conceptualizes defence
transformation to encompass four major clusters, namely; cultural transformation, human
transformation, political transformation, and organizational transformation. 43 The above
theoretical and conceptual frameworks have specified a clear set of assumptions and
therefore a single case on Ghana could enable us to confirm, challenge or even extend the
theoretical and conceptual framework.44 Putting it succinctly, a single-case study is more
compelling because there exists no exhaustive study on Ghana or any other West African
country through the dual lenses of Schiff’s theory of civil-military relations and Chuter's
framework for defence transform
Moreover, single case is a representative case, as it captures the circumstances and
conditions of an everyday situation.45 Therefore a single case enables the study to capture
the circumstances and conditions of everyday situation as civil-military relations and
democratic consolidation in emerging democracies. More so, a single case is the
longitudinal case- studying the same single case over a period of time could help specify
how certain conditions change over time.46
A widely held criticism of single case study is that it provides little evidence for scientific
generalization. For instance, Arendt Lijphart argues that a single case study “can constitute
neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established
generalization.”47 Contrary to this criticism, single-case studies focus on circumstantial
uniqueness and not the obscurities of mass representation.48 It therefore allows for thick
description and deeper understanding of processes. 49 When a researcher strategically
concentrates efforts on a particular case, there is the obvious opportunity to delve much
deeper into issues and discover new things and complexities that might not have become
apparent through more superficial multiple-case research.50 This increases the accuracy of
findings in case study research.
3. 2.2 Case Selection
Case study research designs often employ an admixture of case selection strategies in order
to obtain validity and representativeness of their findings. For this study, the case-selection
approach is a typical case. This exemplifies what is often considered as a typical set of
values, based on some general understanding of phenomenon.51 Ghana presents a case for
an in-depth study because the GAF, despite their chequered history has gradually
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metamorphosed into a very professional and a reputable institution. Unlike the past, where
the military was seen as an employer of last resort for school dropouts, the Ghana Armed
Forces has become an attractive institution to the extent that, every year, thousands of
qualified young men and women and professionals apply and troop to screening centres for
enlistment.52 This is partly due to high levels of unemployment in the country. Nonetheless,
GAF now boast of a generation of highly educated and qualified officer corps who have
sound appreciation of the tenets of civil-military relations. The Armed Forces are also held
in high esteem by the population despite the seemingly uneasy relationship between the
armed forces and general populace. Various internal and external initiatives have been
made to reform this institution from its predatory nature to its present state. The study
therefore explores the factors that have contributed to the changing outlook of the Ghana
Armed Forces and overall effect of this on civil-military relations in Ghana. A single-case
study approach therefore has the advantage of enabling a detailed investigation and analysis
on how defence transformation could contribute to improved civil-military relations
essential for the consolidation of democracy in Ghana.
In addition, analyses on civil-military relations and defence transformation have been done
on advanced democracies. The very few analyses on emerging democracies in Africa have
concentrated on post-conflict security and defence sector reforms. Moreover, only a select
few African countries have actually embarked upon a holistic process of defence
transformation. Reforms of the security and defence sectors in Africa appear to be lagging
behind processes in other areas of public policy even in countries that have institutionalized
democratic governance.53 South Africa arguably presents a very well-articulated process of
transforming her defence sector following the end of apartheid and the accession of a new
democratic order in 1994. Therefore non-conflict countries such as Ghana which have
remained relatively stable since the return to constitutional democracy requires a systematic
investigation to actually establish the real changes in the defence sector. Ghana represents a
typical case for study, because the history of its civil-military relations does not differ
significantly from most West African countries. Therefore the findings and
recommendations that may arise from the case study could form the basis for further studies
and provide relevant lessons or policy recommendations for other West African countries in
need of holistic transformation of their defence sector.
Furthermore, the choice of Ghana as a single-case study is also informed by need for
readily available quality data from both primary and secondary sources to enable the
researcher to successfully address the key research questions. The selected case appears
challenging for practical reasons of gaining access to the military for information. Often,
negotiating access to case study settings like the military can be tasking in the research
process. In most instances, getting access to key informants, documents and even settings
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like the military can generate ethical issues of confidentiality. To overcome this challenge,
the researcher benefited mainly from her professional experience as a staff of an institution
affiliated to Ministry of Defence of Ghana. She made use of familiarity with the GAF
setting to establish formal and informal contacts with serving and retired officials of the
Ghana Armed Forces, to gather the necessary data. Findings of the case study are therefore
based on available primary and secondary sources of information.
3.3 Methods and Sources of Data Collection
Case studies often employ a number of data collection and analysis techniques across
multiple time periods depending on the specific needs of the situation under the study.
Researchers often rely on interviewing, observing and documentary methods of data
collection and analysis tools.54 The strength of this method is its ability to deal with a full
repertoire of evidence emanating from documents, interviews and observations.55 In case
study research, evidence is often built up from multiple sources and if possible shown to be
congruent with the conclusions.56 This strategy contributes to enhancing the credibility of
data. 57 As compared to other qualitative approaches, case study research, allows
investigators to collect and integrate quantitative survey data, which could help towards a
holistic understanding of the phenomenon under study.58
For this study, one of the primary methods of data collection is field research to support the
conceptual and theoretical claims through structured and semi-structured interviews with a
purposefully sampled population from Ghana’s defence sector and civilians. Interviews are
essential source of information for case studies because case studies usually concern human
affairs.59 The choice of semi-structured interview was deemed appropriate because the
topic of civil-military relations and the defence sector is highly sensitive. Therefore through
interviews, the researcher was able to focus her questions to selective subjects. In this
regard, a case study protocol/ interview questions was used to seek answers to the research
questions. This helped increase the reliability of the case study research and guide the
researcher in data collection.60 In addition, semi-structured and structured interviews were
conducted with a cross section of Ghanaian society as most of the time civil-military
relations are gauged through the interaction between society and the military.
Qualitative interviews are more suitable for research in social and political processes,
particularly for enquiring on how and why things change. 61 This method is preferred
because the focus of the research: civil-military relations and defence transformation
processes in Ghana are largely un-documented and thus require qualitative interviews with
the relevant stakeholders to obtain primary information. Generally, interviews provide
most favourable means of collecting data on personal perspectives, and experiences of
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individuals, particularly when sensitive topics are being explored. Interviews also provide
the researcher an opportunity to deeply uncover new clues, secure vivid and accurate
accounts of people's personal experiences.62 For this study, semi or unstructured, open-
ended questions, informal interviewing is preferred as it allows for more flexibility and
responsiveness to emerging themes for both the interviewer and respondents.63
The study makes use of primary and secondary sources and materials. This includes
relevant literature on civil-military relations, defence transformation, security sector reform
and democratization in West Africa, in general, and Ghana, in particular. A careful study
was done on policy-relevant materials relating to Ghana’s defence sector, official reports of
commissions that have been instituted in the past to review aspects of the defence sector, as
many of these commissions proposed particular changes within the GAF.
3.4 Sampling Technique and Sample Population
Due to the limitations of the research and resource constraints, it is imperative to select a
population and how to study them in relation to the theoretical context and the hypotheses
or aims of the research. 64 In this regard, sampling becomes an important element in
research planning and design. Sampling theory assumes that inferences or conclusions can
be drawn about the population from which the sample is taken.65 As the design for this
research is a case study, purposive sampling is most appropriate for selecting the unit of
analysis or population.
In purposive sampling which is a non-probability technique, subjects or respondents are
selected because they are likely to generate useful data for the study. In the words of Patton
the “logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for in-
depth study. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about
issues of central importance to the purpose of the research.”66 This approach is based on the
researcher's practical knowledge and pragmatic considerations of the research area, the
available literature and evidence from the study itself. 67 It takes into consideration
theoretical issues thorough the development of a framework of variables that could
influence the contribution of an individual. However, a major disadvantage of purposive
sampling is the subjectivity of the researcher's decision making. This could lead to bias and
a significant threat to the validity of the research conclusions. While bias in research is not
entirely negative, it can be seen in a neutral or even a positive sense as simply referring to
the fact that the researcher has adopted a particular angle or perspective.68 Nonetheless, the
negative effects can be minimized by ensuring that there is an internal consistency between
the aims and epistemological basis of the research, and the criteria used for selecting the
purposive sample.69 It is however comment worthy that findings based on limited sampling
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could be subject to possible biases such as respondent and selection bias along with the
inherent problems of trustworthiness and authenticity in self-reported data. For this study,
some efforts were made to limit this through a triangulation of methods. First, interview
questions were developed based on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks
underpinning the research. Different people were asked the same set of questions for their
response. Secondly, multiple respondents were interviewed. For instance, respondents from
the institution under study were selected across several generations of the GAF. Some
respondents were also selected outside the institutions for their views on the Ghanaian
military. In addition, accounts of these respondents were also crosschecked with the
available data from institutional reports and literature.
Qualitative research typically involves the use of small samples in order to extract rich and
thick data.70 Most importantly, the nature of data obtained determines the size. This is
unpredictable.71 The major limitation of this sampling technique is the subjective nature of
the process of choosing respondents. For a study of this nature, a number of subjects could
have been higher, however, it was limited people related to defence sector and purposefully
selected citizens of Ghana. For a single-case study on Ghana, a sample size of 72 people
was interviewed to gather rich and manageable data. The sample was selected based on
their representativeness to include people from Ghana’s defence sector such as officers and
men/women of GAF both retired and active, technocrats, academics and civilian authorities
and ordinary civilians. With regards to the ranks of members of the GAF, there is a sample
bias towards the officer ranks. People in this group represent views of leadership which
often shape organizational culture and developments within the armed forces. Nonetheless,
the views of a few personnel from the enlisted ranks were sought to capture varied opinions
on developments in the GAF.
Considering the challenges in accessing information from the military, interviews were
conducted with some identified retired and serving officers of the GAF. It was observed in
the course of the interviews that retired officers provided open and detailed responses than
some officers in active service. Some amount of snowballing was employed as some
respondents provided the researcher with links to additional respondents who provided
deeper insights on the issues under investigation. Interviews were also conducted with
persons such as a minister of defence, ranking member of Parliamentary Committee on
Defence and Interior who served during the period under study. The researcher also sought
the views of some experts of former members of the British Military Assistant Technical
Team (BMATT) in Ghana and foreign defence attaches in Accra. The interviews were
conducted in two phases. The first phase of the interviews took place from October 2014-
December2015. The second phase of the interviews was conducted between April-July
80
2016. Some follow-up interviews were conducted in 2017 to clarify earlier recorded
information.
Civil-military relations are often gauged through the relationship between the military and
political class. This thesis went further to look at the relationship between the military and
the general society. Some ordinary civilians were also sampled for interviews. Two
categories of respondents were studied. The first group comprises of civilian personnel of
the Ministry of Defence and affiliated institutions like the KAIPTC. This group of civilians
was considered because of their close proximity with the military makes them better placed
to share their experiences on the relationship between the military and society. In order to
gain some perspectives on the civil-military relations from the view of the ordinary citizens
in the society, about 45 people where sampled from cities in three regions in Ghana,
Greater Accra, Ashanti and Central Regions. These people from divergent backgrounds
both the formal and informal sectors were asked a series of open-ended questions. The
criteria for selection of participants included age, affiliation with the defence sector and
residency in Ghana. With regards to age, people from 18 years and above were considered
because this is the official age of maturity and consent in Ghana. The average age of
respondents interviewed was about 35. Some people within this age bracket have witnessed
developments during Ghana’s era of coup d’états and constitutional democracy.
Nonetheless some of respondents who were born during the era of coup d’états have not
actually experienced coups d’états as adults. They may have however come in contact with
members of the armed forces in the Ghanaian society. People from these regions,
particularly Accra and Kumasi were sampled because Accra is the national capital and
Kumasi is considered as the second business city. Each of these regions hosts a military
command. Accra hosts the Southern Command, while Kumasi formerly hosted the
Northern Command, now the Central Command. People from these two regions were
selected because of the visible presence of the military in these urban cities of Accra and
Kumasi. During the era of military rules in Ghana, some of the human rights abuses and
excesses of military personnel took place in Accra and Kumasi. Therefore people from this
town may have different perspectives on civil-military relations. The third town, Cape
Coast was selected because it is one of the three regions in Ghana which does not have a
visible military presence in the form of military based. In this regard, the people from this
region may also have varying views on the subject of civil-military relations.
The interview questions were first pre-tested on some respondents at the KAIPTC to ensure
that the questions were understood by the target respondents and could generate the
intended responses. Based on the initial responses and concerns of anonymity by some
respondents, the questions were subsequently revised. During administration of the
interview questions, the researcher took into account the varied educational background of
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the respondents. For respondents who could not read and understand the questions in
English, they were interviewed in the local language and responses were recorded in the
English language by the researcher. Efforts were made to minimize errors and biases of the
researcher in recording by reading out the recorded answers in the local language for the
interviewees to confirm whether their views were captured accurately by the researcher.
3.5 Data Analysis
Qualitative data analysis often involves a triangulation of a gamut of techniques for
interpreting data obtained for each study unit or research questions. Most often, the
researcher usually starts analysing during the process of data collection, so that questions
that remain unanswered (or new questions that come up) can be addressed before data
collection is over.72 Data analysis in qualitative studies can be described as a reflective
process which involves: 1) organizing raw data; 2) entering and coding data; 3) searching
for meaning through thematic analysis; 4) interpreting meaning; and 5) drawing
conclusions. All these are done while keeping in mind the bigger picture of the research
questions, aims and objectives, methodological constraints and theory. 73 The use of
thematic, rather than statistical analysis sets apart qualitative data analysis process from
quantitative ones. Qualitative analysis also demands a more organic process in which the
steps of data entry and coding, data analysis and interpretation are more closely entwined
rather than distinct.74 For the purpose of the case study research design, data is analysed
based on content analysis.
Content analysis is a useful method of assessing the relative importance of messages within
published documents. This method is often used in media research. However, the
researcher felt that content analysis of some key primary and secondary documents would
add a novel and useful level of insight. This also provides a useful way of analysing
comparative themes across an extended time period.75 Qualitative content analysis consists
of a bundle of techniques for systematic data analysis.76 In most cases, qualitative data will
be analysed in the following steps: a) ascertaining the units of analysis (example text,
interview transcripts or other forms of verbal communication); b) identifying and
evaluating the items that are of theoretical importance and relate meaningfully to the central
research questions.77
One of the commonly used strategies for analysing case study data is to follow the
theoretical positions that underpin the study.78 Data analysis was guided by the key themes
that were derived from the research objectives, and the theoretical and conceptual issues
from the literature. To achieve the stated objectives of the case study, data gathered on
civil-military relations and Ghana defence transformation process is analysed through the
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dual lens of Schiff’s concordance theory and defence transformation posited by Chuter. In
order to gauge the level and extent of change within Ghana’s defence sector, the data is
clustered and analysed into four broad themes of defence transformation proposed by
Chuter- human transformation; cultural transformation; political transformation and
organizational transformation. Interview notes and transcripts from the in-depth interviews
were coded under the four themes to facilitate the identification of similarities and 
differences in the responses. Under each theme, the researcher created categories of
responses to the interview questions. This method is generally considered to be the most
appropriate because it allows the data to direct the development of themes.79 Furthermore,
data gathered on civil-military relations in Ghana is analysed using the theoretical lens of
Schiff’s concordance theory of civil-military relations to explore how the theories and
principles of civil-military relations apply in the Ghanaian context. Responses gathered
from the questionnaires were categorized under the themes established from the theory.
The findings and conclusions of the study are based on interpretations of the available data
from the interviews and complemented with an analysis of literature and few official
documents. The study was designed to ensure objectivity, reliability and validity.
Objectivity was ensured through an unbiased analysis of interview notes coupled with the
fact that the assessments and conclusions were drawn from both primary data gathered and
available secondary data. In order to achieve validity, data and method triangulation were
employed in the study. For instance, during the second phase of interviews, some
respondents were asked again to clarify some of the earlier given responses in order to
ensure accuracy of the data gathered.
3.6 Ethical Considerations
Research ethics seeks to ensure that in addition to adopting an appropriate methodology, a
study or research is also conducted in a manner that is responsible and morally defensible.80
The practice of research ethics is guided by divergent theoretical frameworks, namely, the
normative/deontological and the consequential/teleological. On the one hand, the normative
ethics include the deontological perspective, which argues that ‘the end never justify the
means.” In this regard, ethical considerations should never be compromised.81 Two strands
of views emanates from the normative perspective- the Universalist and relativist. On the
other hand, consequential or teleological approach, proffers that “the morality of the means
can only be judged by the context of what is achieved.” These divergent views are
summarized in the table below. In essence the controversies around ethical issues have
arisen purely out practice, rather than in principle.
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Ethical principles should never
be compromised, breaking
these rules is both morally
wrong and damaging to social
research





Means do not overlap with
ends. However, following a set
of universal rules or practices
can often be relied on to
pursue ends.
Acts should be judges purely on
their possible outcomes-the end
justifies the means. That morally
questionable acts are justifiable if
they produce ‘good’
Source: Adopted from Gary, 2014
In line with the normative theoretical propositions, ethical principles were duly observed
during the data collection and analysis. Generally, the four main areas of ethical principles
include:
 Avoid or do no harm to participants;
 Ensure informed consent;
 Respect for the privacy of participants; and
 Avoid the use of deception.
As the study involves human subjects, the researcher sought ethical review and approval
from the Cranfield University School of Management Research Ethics Committee. The
research project was considered to constitute low risk to participants. Hence the Low Risk
Project Submission Form was submitted together with the research proposal and draft
interview questions. The approval was formally granted in writing. Respondents were
contacted by means of emails and telephone calls. They were provided with an introductory
letter from the researcher’s institution and brief overview of the research objectives.
Respondents provided emails and verbal acceptance to participate in the study.
Respondents were presented with consent form to sign, indicating informed consent. Some
respondents were initially reluctant to formally sign the consents for various reasons,
including anonymity. This challenge was however addressed when the researcher explained
the basis for the consent forms and gave them the highest assurances of anonymity. Issues
of confidentiality were explicitly assured as the consent forms enabled interviewees to
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indicate if they wish to remain anonymous or otherwise. It came out that most serving
personnel of the GAF interviewed requested for anonymity while retired personnel and
other civilians were not particularly keen on anonymity. The researcher secured permission
from respondents for audio recordings of the interviews. The recordings and interviews
notes therefore provided primary data for content analysis.
3. 7 Summary
The research set out to adopt a qualitative approach to research design, data collection and
analysis. This approach acknowledges the strength and limitations of qualitative research.
Particularly, for a subject area, as defence transformation in West Africa, where is the
limited literature, the focus on a single case study allows a deeper reflection on the political
process of the country and how it informs the organization of the defence sector. As the
study was interested in primary data that was not readily available, semi-structured
interviews allowed respondents to share their insights and allowed follow up questions on
emerging themes. Through this approach, the researcher was led to other respondents who
were not initially thought of, but offered rich and informative data. In order to be able to
contextualize the analysis that emerged from the methodology, the next section of the
research provides a semi-historical account of political transitions and civil-military
relations from independence in 1957 to 1992 when the Fourth Republic was inaugurated.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Setting the Historical Context: The Armed Forces and Democratic Developments in
Ghana
4.0 Introduction
In order to place the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) in context, the chapter traces the post-
independence political trajectory of Ghana during which the country witnessed musical
chairs of the military and civilians in politics. This is followed by a discussion on Ghana’s
return to democracy in 1992, and what has been done in reference to the defence sector.
Specifically, it seeks to examine the role of the GAF in the emerging democratic
dispensation under the Fourth Republic. It also analyses the constitutional mechanisms and
legal frameworks that exist for managing civil-military relations and the role of armed
forces in the current democratic dispensation. The chapter argues that the post-Cold War
international system has necessitated a rethink about the entire defence set up in most
developing countries around the globe. In the case of countries that transition from
authoritarian military regimes to democracies as has Ghana, it is important to clearly situate
the armed forces, as an important state institution in the democratic process.
4.1 The Military and Politics in Post-Independence Ghana: from 1957-1979
Colonial rule is formally dated from 24 July 1874, when the British colonial power issued a
Proclamation by which they established the Gold Coast Colony and Protectorate.1 Before
the British, other Europeans like the Dutch and Portuguese made contacts for trade and
other purposes with pre-colonial Gold Coast in the 17th century when the Gold Coast was
thus incorporated into the world capitalist system. Both labour and natural resources were
exploited; and its economic and social surplus was appropriated to the benefit of the
metropolitan powers in Western Europe.2 Colonialism also brought together people of
diverse ethnic or social groupings under a unified colonial state.3 The country’s colonial
experiences and politics in the immediate post-independence period have been well
documented and thus fall outside the purview of this chapter.4
At independence in 1957, Ghana attempted to practice multi-party democracy, at least in
formal constitutional terms.5 But the country’s high hopes of socio-economic and political
developments that came with attainment of political independence were soon truncated as
the country became enmeshed in successive periods of military rule, interspersed with
short-lived returns to constitutional rule. These years of military interventions engendered
an unstable political and socio-economic environment in Ghana.6 The 1956 independence
elections brought the Convention People’s Party (CPP) to power, with Kwame Nkrumah as
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the first Prime Minister.7 Nkrumah adopted a brand of African socialism that came with
elaborate programmes of national development such as the construction of state owned
industries and educational institutions, as well as key national assets like the Akosombo
Dam.8Subsequently on 1st July 1960, the First Republic came into being with the adoption
of the 1960 Republican Constitution. This was followed by a declaration of one-party
presidential system in 1964 by Nkrumah, with himself as President-for-life. Nkrumah and
his Convention People's Party (CPP) thus became the centre of all economic and political
activity in the country.9His government combined democratization with dictatorship to
ensure political stability. His domestic politics marred his socialist-developmental agenda
when existing structures were modified to suit his personal rule. For instance, the neutrality
of the civil service was destroyed by its politicization. Nkrumah tolerated little opposition
and imprisoned those who challenged his political supremacy by the introduction of the
Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in 1961.10 Nkrumah also became engrossed in his pan-
Africanist agenda as he saw Ghana's economic and political development as possible only
in conjunction with liberation of the rest of the continent.11 Nkrumah’s economic policies
were confronted with challenges. For instance, he had that strong belief that strong political
leadership was the main tool for pursing his economic agenda. To this end he appropriated
himself the key role in the process and listened less to his technical advisors and
appointees.12 He also paid little or no attention to the massive domestic corruption and
economic decline, including an increasing balance of payments deficit. The country’s
fragility as a neo-colonial state was also dramatically demonstrated when the price of
cocoa, the backbone of the economy, suffered sharp falls on the world market.13 These
factors among others led to the collapse of Nkrumah’s government when he was
overthrown on 24 February 1966 by the National Liberation Council (NLC) led by
Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Kotoka.14
While several reasons were given for Nkrumah’s overthrow including the involvement of
external actors,15 the corporate interest of the military and police has been given as the
primary reason for the first coup. It was argued that the military and the police had been
severely under-resourced during Nkrumah’s rule. Robert Dowse, for instance, argues that,
“the conspirators seemed primarily to have been moved by a combination of fear and
resentment. They feared the President’s Guard Unit, built by Nkrumah with Russian help,
might displace regular units of the army in presidential favour”.16 The First Republican
constitution did contain some provisions for civilian control of the armed forces.17 The first
president, as the Commander-in-Chief and the “Fount of Honour,” was vested with
extraordinary powers such as ruling by decrees and dissolving parliament at any time he
deemed necessary. With regards to the military, he had powers to commission officers into
the armed forces and order their engagement in various operations for the defence of
Ghana, preservation of public order, emergency relief and for any other purpose the
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Commander-in-Chief may consider as expedient”.18 The president also had powers “in a
case where it appears to him expedient to do so for the security of the State, to dismiss a
member of the Armed Forces or to order a member of the Armed Forces not to exercise any
authority vested in him as a member thereof until the Commander-in-Chief otherwise
directs.”19 There were allegations that Nkrumah abused his powers as the military resented
Nkrumah’s sporadic interference in the internal affairs of the military including promotions
and recruitment and the difficult peacekeeping missions such as the one Nkrumah had
ordered in Congo.20 There was also the firm belief that Nkrumah was planning to deploy
the army in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.21 As will be discussed later, governments
after Nkrumah were also not devoid of these issues.
At independence, Ghana, inherited an armed force that was made up of soldiers and few
Ghanaian officers.22 This is because the British colonial military system did not allow
indigenous officers, especially in the early days. The Gold Coast army was led by British
Officers and Non-Commissioned officers. It was only from 1947 that some attempts were
made to commission few African officers.23 Notably in 1957, the 28 Ghanaian officers
were mostly Southerners-Ga, Ewe, Akan, while the rank and file was dominated by people
from the northern parts of the country. As noted previously, people to the South had ready
access to secular educational system brought about by colonial rule, while the north
primarily served as labour reserve for the colonial economy. Even though, the most
educated Ghanaians at that time preferred jobs in the civil service than the military as
officers, the very few secondary schools graduates who joined the military were mostly
southerners.24 Nkrumah's defence policies necessitated rapid Ghanaianization of the officer
corps, accelerated promotions as well as the expansion of the armed forces in general.25
This corps of officers rose to senior officer ranks quickly. As the armed forces was not
balanced socially especially in terms of its ethnic and regional make up, existing ethno-
regional tensions found its way into the military.26 It is widely argued that for purposes of
personal and regime security, Nkrumah adopted varied mechanisms including divide and
rule tactics and the use of parallel security structures, the Soviet-trained and well-equipped
presidential guards.27 The paramilitary structures were led by his ethnic Nzima kinsmen
and northerners.28 Nkrumah’s actions and inactions, especially his perceived dislike for
Ewe and Ga officers contributed to the demise of the First Republic in February 1996.29
While ethnicity is not considered as a primary reason for the first coup in Ghana, events
leading to the coup point to an ethnic conspiracy in the armed forces against Nkrumah. For
instance, the key actors in the military-cum police junta that overthrew Nkrumah were
made up of Ewes.30 Nonetheless, the regime had a mixed ethnic makeup with Ga, Akan and
Northerner officers playing key roles.31The coup appeared to have been influenced by the
threats Nkrumah’s policies and actions posed to the corporate interests of the military and
its allied security services, the police, rather than particular officers from particular ethnic
91
groups seeking their ethno-regional and political interests.32 For instance, Afrifa wrote in
his justification for the coup that “the dismissal of two senior Generals by Kwame
Nkrumah was one of the major factors that led to the coup of the 24th February. As a result
of this action the Ghanaian officers and men felt that the profession of men-at-arms had
been disgraced and that their Generals as well as they themselves had been humiliated".33
However, ethnic conspiracy was an important reason behind the trust and solidarity behind
the coup and the disintegration of the ties also contributed to the demise of the National
Liberation Council (NLC).34
Some have observed that the army's acquisition of a new political role from 1966 onwards
exposed the soldiers to unaccustomed societal demands. To this end, latent divisions in the
military establishment especially those of an ethnic and regional character became more
acute after the violent seizure of office.35 This lends credence to Finer’s theoretical position
that military intervention fragments the security forces, encourages counter-coups and
ultimately forces the military's disengagement.36 Having seized power in the period of
heightened ideological rivalry of the Cold War era, the NLC laid claim of their right-wing
ideologies embarked on programmes to halt the economic decline and maintain political
stability.37 It banned the CPP and released all political prisoners held under Nkrumah’s
Preventive Detention Act (PDA). Political administrative structures were constituted across
all regions of the country. These bodies were made up of mixed membership of the army,
police and civil servants, with the senior military officer in a particular region as the final
authority.38 The economic policy of the NLC was a departure from the state-led or socialist
paradigm of Nkrumah. The NLC embraced the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
prescriptions of debt rescheduling, deflation, private enterprise and sale of state
enterprises.39
The NLC initially indicated that it would stay in power as a “holding operation,” after
which the country would return to civilian rule within three years.40 The regime initiated a
gradual transition process. A failed coup on 17 February 1967, in which Lieutenant Colonel
Kotoka was killed, brought about some changes in the political landscape as the NLC set a
firm date for restoration of civilian rule.41 Political committees were set up to supervise the
transition to civilian rule. Particularly, a campaign was launched to re-educate Ghanaians
on their civic rights and responsibilities. This was done through the Civic Education Forum
(CEF), a civil society forum led by Professor Kofi Abrefa Busia. 42 Members of the
erstwhile CPP regime were also barred from contesting elections by the passage of the
Election and Public Offices Disqualification Decree of January 1968 (NLC Decree 345).43
The NLC set up a constitutional commission in September 1966, seven months after the
coup to draft the Second Republican Constitution. Subsequently, a new constitution was
adopted in August 1969, few days to elections to return the country to constitutional rule.44
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The Progress Party (PP) won the August 1969 elections and formed a government led by
Prime Minister Busia. This gave birth to the Second Republic on October 2, 1969.
The 1969 Constitution, appeared as a departure from the enormous powers granted to
Nkrumah by the 1960 Constitution. It provided for a Westminster parliamentary system of
government with a prime minister as head of government and a non-executive president as
head of state. However, the framers of the constitution introduced the controversial
indemnity Clause that debarred any court action against the 24 February 1966 coupists and
their collaborators. 45 The Busia government was faced with a weak economy as the
preceding NLC regime could not effectively resuscitate the economy. The Busia
government instituted liberal economic policies to address Ghana’s chronic trade
imbalances, import cuts and foreign debts. For example in 1970, the government imposed
enormous surcharges on most imported goods, while loosening the import licensing system.
It also attempted to restrict the outflow of foreign exchange by eliminating most foreigners
from small scale and petty commerce. Further, there were increment in taxes and
imposition of a development levy on all salaries.46 Efforts were made to reduce public
expenditures by trimming military budgets and decreasing its subsidy of civil servants’
housing and other amenities. These produced mixed outcomes and contributed to the
untimely demise of the government. Even though Busia was elected for his charisma and
perceived democratic credentials, his respect for democratic principles became questionable
upon assumption of office as prime minister.47 His relationship with the military appeared
problematic. His approach at using ethnic manipulation to secure civilian control of the
military proved ineffective as his government succumbed to another coup d’état on January
13, 1972. 48
Under successive regimes issues such as generational differences between senior and junior
officers, negative effects of rapid promotion and ethno-regional tensions within the armed
forces in general, and the officer corps, in particular, continued and contributed to the fall
or otherwise of successive military and civilian governments. For example, during the
Second Republic, the Akan-Ewe uneasy relationship turned murkier when the most senior
Ewe officers in the armed forces were removed for various reasons.49 Busia was keenly
aware of the potential threat posed to his administration by Ewe officers in command of
troops. So his approach was to continue the ethnic manipulation initiated by Afrifa in1969
to fill the crucial commands with Akan officers who were seen as sympathetic to the PP
government.50 Ewe officers were incrementally shifted from significant command positions
to other jobs. As a result, only one Ewe officer, Colonel Tevie, remained in a senior
position by the end of the government in 1969.51 By the end of 1971, Ewe domination in
the military had been eroded significantly by Busia’s effort at redesigning ethnically the
senior profile of the security establishment including the police. 52 Busia believed any
attempt to overthrow him militarily could come from Ewes or non-Akans in the armed
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forces; paradoxically he was overthrown by a junta led by an Akan officer, Colonel
Ignatius Kutu Acheampong 53 under the National Redemption Council (NRC). Busia
contemptuously described the army's intervention as an “amenities coup.”54 The military, in
particular, felt slighted by the Busia regime as its economic policies affected officers
personally. For instance, due to budgetary cuts to the armed forces, some benefits like car
maintenance allowances were abolished, while rents were increased and officers were
asked to pay part of their utility bills for electricity and water which were previously
supplied free of charge by the government. 55 These developments point to a lack of
concordance between the government of the day and the military and possibly led to the
military’s intervention in politics.
Aside from the military grievances, Busia’s regime became unpopular at home as its
economic policies recorded abysmal results. For instance, a sharp drop in cocoa prices on
the world market, increasing unemployment, rise in prices of essential commodities,
coupled with high taxation and low performance of the commercial sector, made life
difficult for the ordinary Ghanaian. 56 The economic policies instituted by the Busia
government could not halt the crushing foreign debt and considerable internal economic
dislocation caused by previous regimes of the CPP and NLC. His foreign policies also
alienated Ghana from other African countries.57 However, the government had its merits.
For example, as argued by Le Vine,
“…it represented an attempt at democratic government on a
continent increasingly ruled by petty dictators, military juntas,
and authoritarian single-party regimes. It gave institutional
legitimacy to an articulate-if sometimes angry-but loyal
opposition…though admittedly moderate success, and tried to
live up to, a constitution expressly conceived to prevent the
political excesses of the Nkrumah period.”58
The NRC was comprised of military, police and civilians from all segments of society. In
his effort to salvage the worsening economy, General Acheampong reversed fiscal policies
of the previous regime and embarked on sweeping economic reforms including revaluation
of the national currency, the Cedi, and repudiated much of the foreign debt by his Yentua,
yentua (We won’t pay)59 mantra. Some initiatives were introduced aimed at making the
country self-sufficient. For example, “Operation Feed Yourself” was introduced to
encourage Ghanaians to go back to agriculture in order to achieve self-sufficiency in staple
food crops, such as rice and maize. Another “Operation Feed Your Industries” was
launched to boast production of raw materials such as cotton for the textile industries.60
Ghanaians were also encouraged to patronize locally-made goods. The cocoa industry was
also given a boast by the setting up of the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs and cocoa production
recorded a modest increase. 61 Although Acheampong’s pragmatic economic policies
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brought about some level of economic growth, (especially in its early years), high inflation
still aggravated the economic situation of ordinary Ghanaian.62
In October 1975, the NRC was renamed the Supreme Military Council (SMC). This move,
considered by some as a mini-coup d’état, reinforced the powers of Acheampong as
Chairman of the SMC and head of state. It also consolidated the position of the armed
forces as the SMC became the highest legislative and administrative authority in Ghana.63
General Acheampong mooted the idea of a “Union Government” (UNIGOV) as part of his
plans for transition to civilian rule in October 1976. The UNIGOV idea, though not very
clear in meaning, was supposed to abhor political party systems. The ad hoc committee set
up in January 1977 to study the proposed establishment of the Union government,
subsequently defined it as
“a form of government of the people, having its philosophical
foundation in the concepts of national unity and consensus, and
selecting its functionaries from all levels and sections of the
community on a basis other than membership of an institutionalized
political party or parties.”64
In essence, the proposed UNIGOV was to be based on an executive president nominated by
a presidential electoral college, to head a non-parliamentary cabinet, with a strong
representation from the armed forces, in most important advisory bodies like the council of
state, national defence and security councils. There was a proposal for a single chamber
legislature to be elected on a non-party basis.65 The UNIGOV idea was met with stiff
opposition by civil society even though the Ghanaians had supposedly voted for the idea in
a controversial referendum on 29th March 1978.66
The Acheampong regime was widely regarded as a failure due to numerous factors. The
primary reasons included the worsening economic conditions, endemic corruption and the
UNIGOV experiment. With regards to corruption, an informal practice called kalabule 67
became wide- spread in the society. This took multiple forms of bribing, hoarding,
profiteering, and smuggling, selling of import licenses, and the issue of tickets to young
women who paraded the corridors of power offering themselves for sexual pleasures in
return for favours.68 The regime also contributed to further deterioration of the economy, as
the policies introduced failed to address economic challenges facing the country. A
significant portion of the society was excluded by the systems of patronage created by the
regime and therefore increased state fragility.69 These developments led to opposition and
protest against the regime which were often met with repressive measures.70 In the midst of
the controversies, Acheampong was removed in a palace coup by his Chief of Defence
Staff, General FWK Akuffo, on July 5, 1978.71 This brought about the Supreme Military
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Council II, which was a “reformed” version of the same military government. General
Akuffo made some attempts at reforming the economy and succumbed to the growing
demands for a transition process to civilian rule. Subsequently, a transition timetable was
announced and a constituent assembly was convened to draft a new constitution. The ban
on party activity was lifted paving the way for election campaign in January 1979.
However, an atmosphere of growing economic insecurity and intense popular frustration
was widespread in the country.72 It was therefore not surprising that the regime did not
survive as the military lost credibility in the eyes of the public. A group of radical junior
officers and other ranks, under the umbrella of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council,
(AFRC), led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings toppled the SMC II on June 4, 1979.
The June 4 coup d’état was preceded by a failed attempt on 15 May 1979, in which
Rawlings and his men were arrested and put to a public trial.73 The successful coup d’état
was subsequently termed a “revolution” by Rawlings to cleanse the military and the general
society of its institutionalized corruption.74 In Rawlings’ own words
“…our immediate task was to cleanse the armed forces, which had
lost its bearings in the wilderness of indiscipline and unprofessional
behaviour. But our fundamental long term aim was to launch a
revolution which would cleanse the whole nation, turn the hearts
and minds of our people against social injustice.”75
It therefore, embarked on a violent “housecleaning” exercise during its brief three-month
stint in power. This was particularly targeted at the bureaucratic and military establishment,
leading to the arrest of scores of civil servants, senior officers, wealthy entrepreneurs and
traders. 76 Eight senior military officers, including three former heads of state were
executed. Several others were sentenced to death in absentia, and jailed a number of other
military officers and civilians. Personal properties and assets were also confiscated by
secret tribunals. 77 However, the execution of senior military officers coupled with the
resignation and flight of others from the barracks led to collapse of the command system.78
The ARFC allowed the transition process initiated by the erstwhile NRC/SMC II regime to
continue. Subsequently, after nearly eight years of military rule characterized by change of
guards, another attempt at constitutional rule brought the People's National Party (PNP), led
by Dr Hilla Limann, into power on September 24, 1979. The 1979 Republican constitution
was promulgated by the AFRC regime on the same date by the AFRC Decree Number 24.
However, Limann’s government also faced multiple challenges with the economy, politics
and above all a decomposed military.79 With regards to the military, the problem was not
only of establishing civilian control, but, it was also a matter of institutionalizing control at
lower organizational levels within the military. This is because the unity of command had
been fragmented, dividing the senior officers from a resentful and suspicious rank-and-file.
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Particularly, the mutiny by the junior ranks had itself undermined hierarchical norms and
led to the incremental breakdown of discipline and stability.80 Notably, a major challenge
for the Limann Government was what to do with Rawlings and the former members of the
AFRC, as well as the insurgent ranks who remained in the camps. 81 The civilian
government made some aggressive efforts to bring the armed forces under its control with
mixed outcomes. 82 Some of the measures employed were no different from earlier
governments. These ranged from ascriptive manipulation of sensitive commands
surveillance, to a closely coordinated programme of psychological warfare in which the
battle for hearts and minds could be won by discrediting the former regime. 83 An
accompanying strategy was designed to weaken the military by creating internal divisions
and mutual suspicions between officers and ranks, on the one hand, and Ewes and non-
Ewes, on the other. This strategy of divide and rule was applied with some success to the
leadership of the AFRC. The government also contemplated the option of disbanding the
armed forces with the assistance of foreign military forces. This option was later discarded
because of the high risk involved.84
However this potpourri of mechanisms to confine the military to the traditional role failed
to deliver the desired result. Notably allegations of corruption against senior government
officials of the PNP also led a steady decline in popularity of the government.85 In the
ensuing milieu the Third Republic became the shortest in Ghana’s history, having stayed in
office for only 27 months and was toppled on December 31, 1981, by the Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC).86Aside from the preponderance of military intervention
in politics, other reasons could be adduced for the demise of the Third Republic. Most of
these reasons are however, attributable to the processes of political enfeeblement, social
fragmentation and economic decline that had plagued Ghana since the early years of
independence.87 Naomi Chazan captures this succinctly stating that:
“By 1981 the economy of Ghana was on the verge of collapse:
production rates were substantially below 1970 averages,
agricultural output was stagnant, alarming shortages were recorded
in basic commodities, the debt burden had increased, and foreign
interest and investment in the Ghanaian economy had virtually
disappeared… Scarcity intensified social and cultural cleavages as
well. Ethnic tensions escalated, regional identities became more
pronounced”.88
These factors contributed the cycle of coup d’états in Ghana. Nonetheless, after
each coup d’état, there were processes at returning the country to constitutional rule
in which the military play continued to key roles. These political changes are
summarized in table four below.
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Table 4-4: Political Changes in Ghana from 1957-2017
Duration Name of Government/Regime Type Republican
Status
6 March 1957- 24
February 1966













































































4.3 Political Transitions and the Military
Almost all announcements of coups d’états come with either explicit or implicit intention of
a return to civilian rule. Political transitions in post-independence Ghana have been led and
determined by the military since the first coup d’état in 1966.
The political transition doctrine, also known as “transition paradigm”, argues that any
country in which there is a shift away from an authoritarian regime is deemed a country in
transition to democracy.89 The transition paradigm also points to three sequential phases on
which democratization appears to build. These are the 1) opening, 2) break-through; and 3)
consolidation phases. The opening phase is the means through which the political transition
begins and coincides with a reformist move usually promoted by the governmental
authority. The break-through phase coincides with the collapse of the old regime and the
establishment of a new democratic government that comes to power through a precise
political path. This is often done through the conduct of national elections, enactment of a
new constitution, and establishment of a new democratic institutional structure. The
consolidation phase is seen as the climax of this ‘natural’ progression towards democracy.90
This is the stage in which democracy is institutionalized and manifested through the
implementation of state reforms, holding of periodic elections, flourishing of civil society
and the overall acceptance of the society of democracy as rule of the game. 91
The transition paradigm has been subjected to criticisms due to its denial of the determinant
impact of structural factors and conditions like economic situation, history, institutional
legacies, ethnic diversity and socio-cultural dimension in transitional countries.92 Moreover,
analysis of political situations of the Third Wave of Democracy countries raises some
questions about the validity of the transition paradigm. Specifically, only a few out of the
nearly one hundred countries that were considered as transitional in the early 1990s had
truly embarked upon the democratic enterprise. 93 In addition, democracy entails the
adherence to basic political and civil rights and the presence of institutions. According to
Yusuf Bangura (1992), of all processes of democratization, it is most essential about the
demilitarization of the state and its institutions and democratization of the rules governing
economic and political competition.
With regards to transitions from military to constitutional rules, the nature of military rule
and the complexion of military leaders have an important bearing on the conduct of
democratization process. 94 The military have, regardless of their own proclamations
ventured in to the political arena for varied reasons. The political orientation of military
governments in the country has also fluctuated. While in office, the military has been far
from a stabilizing element, but has, at different points, been a conservative, reformist,
dictatorial, populist or revolutionary force. Each military regime in the country has differed
from its predecessors and how it ensured a transition process to constitutional rule.95 As
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noted earlier, the first post-military transition process was initiated by the NLC brought in
the Second Republic in 1969. Another transition process by the SMC II from 1972 and later
Rawlings from 1979 gave birth to the Third Republic in 1979. The last transition in 1992
was also led by the PNDC will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of the
chapter.
The drafting of new constitution is essential to almost all transition processes as coups
often come with suspensions of earlier constitutions and dissolution of governments. In
Ghana, the military rulers initiated the processes through several measures including the
composition of constitution commissions and constituent assemblies to draft and debate
new constitutions for the consideration of the military. The general public is eventually
made to decide on the draft constitution through referendums. In most instances, the
military rulers have the liberty to amend the draft constitution in their interest.96Most
especially, constitution-making provided opportunities for both established and newly
emerging social groups to safeguard their interests.97This was the situation in almost all
transition processes in Ghana from 1966 to 1992. Despite the adoption of new
constitutions, in most instances, a military regime would want to hold on to power until it
could be assured of an acceptable successor regime, or at the very least of constitutional
rule which would provide a framework within which the regime could establish itself.98 For
instance, the constituent assembly for the 1979 Third Republican Constitution, adopted a
provision indemnifying all members of past military regimes-NLC, NRC, SMC I and II.99
The indemnity clause while not meant to free past military rulers from responsibility for
crimes and misdeeds committed while in office, was seen as an attempt to legalize military
rule and an implicit attempt allow corrupt rulers to keep their ill-gotten wealth.100 Similarly,
Section 34 of the transitional powers under the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution grants
indemnity to all past coup makers and their functionaries against any liability for acts or
omissions during their regimes.101
4.4 The PNDC Regime and Democratic Transition from 1981-1992
It is important to situate any discourse around democracy and security sector oversight and
governance in Ghana within the country’s historical experience. Particularly, the role of
the military in Ghana’s turbulent political past contributed to a distinct developmental
trajectory in which the statutory security sector, in general, and the military in particular,
is now increasingly willing to subject itself to democratic, civilian control and oversight.102
Some have argued that despite the general assertion that coups d’état are the end of
democracy,103 the situation in Ghana is different in that, the last military intervention in
December 1981, laid the ground for a return to democracy as well as restructuring and
restoring the domestic and international legitimacy of the GAF.104 A narrative on the nature
of the PNDC regime and the political transition process is therefore important.
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From December 1981, the PNDC began putting the country under control of the military
with little or no oversight over the performance of the security sector, except for a secretive
clique around the head of the PNDC, Chairman John Rawlings.105 The 31st December 1980
coup was dubbed “the peoples” revolution by Chairman Rawlings, who called for a “holy
war” against “enemies of the people.” 106 The PNDC regime (1981-1993) was an
authoritarian one that ruled by decrees, but was not a typical military government as all
cabinet and almost all leading members of the regime were civilians. Arguably, it did not
represent the corporate interest of the military neither was it a civilian government.107 The
regime tried to rid itself of the military burden by insisting from the beginning that it was a
“people's government.”108 Nonetheless, the regime relied on support from sections of the
military for survival especially in the first precarious months in office. For example,
officers and other ranks were appointed as second-in-command in all ministries, state
organizations, agencies, regional and district administrations.109 It is arguable though that it
was not the object of the regime to institutionalize the military or its interest in Ghanaian
politics.110 The PNDC was an amalgamation of several interest groups: radical Marxist
scholars, liberals, socialists and military officers. It espoused socialism led by political and
social forces who were in the least, bent on ridding the Ghanaian society of its corrupt
elements and creating a new egalitarian political and economic system. 111 Indeed, the
regime took steps towards repairing the tainted image of the military. This included purging
the military of perceived corrupt and politicized elements including those who led previous
coups against elected governments.112
The 11-year rule of the PNDC and its attempt at directing the democratization process
could be categorized into 3 distinct phases, each with its own policy choices.113 The early
period of the PNDC, could be described as the populist phase, or PNDC I, where the
regime was most radical. During this period, the regime sought to bring about
democratization by incorporating the people into politics both as guardians against elite
abuse and as contributors to the construction of a new Ghana.114 The idea of the peoples’
revolution informed adoption of leftist economic policies and the creation of revolutionary
structures such as the Citizens Vetting Committees, (CVCs), Peoples’ and Workers’
Defence Committees, (PDC/WDCS), and other parallel structures within the military.
These committees were charged with decision making in workplaces and the communities.
The committees were first coordinated by an Interim National Coordinating Committee.
The Defence Committees initiated a reign of terror on Ghanaians. For instance, people with
private cars were ridiculed as exploiters, and many Ghanaians of high social or business
standing were removed from their posts without any evidence of malpractice. In some
cases, armed soldiers, collaborated with the Defence Committees, but frequently acted on
their own to terrorize civilians.115 As part of efforts at reforming the basic structures of the
revolution, membership of the defence committees was liberalized and P/WDCs were later
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re-christened Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). The same term was
used for similar organizations in Burkina Faso following the coup d’état in August 1983
that brought Captain Thomas Sankara to power. Rawlings had developed a strong personal
friendship with Sankara and the two leaders seemed to be mutually inspired by their
revolutionary ideas.116The Defence committees were initially coordinated by an Interim
National Coordinating Committee and later reorganized under the National Defence
Committee, (NDC). Another body, the National Investigations Committee was responsible
for overseeing the behaviour of public officials, while Citizens' Vetting Committees (CVC)
reviewed the earnings of individuals with large bank accounts or extravagant lifestyles.117
In line with the revolutionary antics, civilian members of the defence committees were
given military training. 118 The PNDC also enjoyed the support from several radical
movements, such as the June Fourth Movement (JFM), the New Democratic Movement
(NDM) and the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG). These groups were also
mobilized to implement a series of economic activities, including the evacuation of cocoa
from the rural areas and urban clean-up operation.119
Other structures like the People's Tribunals (PT) were established at regional and
community levels to serve as powerful instruments for pursuing revolutionary justice
goals.120 These tribunals often described as “kangaroo courts”, imprisoned people while
others were condemned to death after dubious trials.121 The roles of these structures were
formalized by the promulgation of the PNDC (Establishment) Promulgation Law 42.122
Despite the existence of this legislation, the Peoples and CDRs faced serious challenges
such as lack of clarity in terms of their functions and conflicts with existing structures of
power. Members of the committees also abused their positions by using the committees to
pursue personal vendettas and opportunism.123 Particularly, the abduction and killing of
three high court judges and a retired army major on 30 June 1982, brought to the fore the
excesses of the regime.124 The activities of private media were largely curtailed by the
Criminal Libel Law and prosecution of daring journalists, thereby stifling press freedom.125
4.4. Towards Economic and Political Liberalization
In the early 1980s, in the face of mounting economic problems, PNDC was faced with
challenges to its legitimacy by local political actors. Serious questions were also raised
about the regime's political and ideological stance. Those attacks resulted in considerable
instability for the early years of the regime.126 The period from 1983 to late 1985, was
described by Naomi Chazan as the PNDC II, where the regime sought to redirect
democratization efforts through encouraging the rehabilitation of the economy and
exploring alternative venues to democratic politics.127 The earlier emphasis on participation
was replaced by a stress on hardwork. In this regard, Chairman Rawlings proclaimed
production and efficiency as the watchwords of the regime. He also called for the “populist
nonsense” to give way to “popular sense.”128 Due to initial failed attempts at repairing the
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country’s economic crisis, the regime was unable to follow through its revolutionary and
populist political and economic policies. It made a U-turn from its leftist stance to embrace
the neo-liberal orthodoxy of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and Economic
Recovery Programme (ERP) of the International Financial Institutions-World Bank and
IMF from April 1983.129 The reasons why the PNDC regime which had professed socialist
leanings implemented IMF/World Bank-sponsored adjustment policies have been well
captured elsewhere.130 To reiterate this point briefly, Kusi for instance, argues that, Ghana
had reached abysmal levels in its socioeconomic development by the early 1980s.131 This
required effective and sustainable economic measures to salvage the economy. The country
depended largely on cocoa export for bulk of its foreign earnings. However, over the years,
poor agricultural policies, coupled with lack of incentives for agricultural production,
overexploitation of cocoa farmers, and poor agricultural pricing policy contributed to a
significant decline in cocoa production from 403,000 tons in 1970 to 179,000 tons in
1983.132 In addition, non-performing state-owned enterprises constituted a huge drain on
government finances. So the regime was faced with a challenging economic situation and
most importantly, little or no aid came from the leftist or socialist fraternity.133
Following the shift in economic direction, Ghana implemented six IMF reform packages
between 1983 and 1992, in which the most severe of austerity measures were put in place.
This attracted stiff opposition from local actors such as trade unions and professional
bodies. 134 These programmes necessitated balancing of macro-economic indicators to
reduce the budget deficit and major structural reforms under the aegis of economic
liberalization. These included downsizing the civil service, price controls, privatization of
state enterprises, removal of subsidies, and free trade.135However, structural adjustment had
mixed impact on Ghana's development. In one sense, the reforms and the renewed access to
international finance arguably facilitated the country’s economic recovery.136 On the other
hand, opinions have varied on whether the poor people in Ghana actually shared in the
economic recovery as workers faced hardships under the ERP, partly due to the massive
retrenchment carried out as part of the reforms.137 This led some analysts to ponder on
whether the economic improvement was merely a statistical artefact, or a temporary upturn
prompted by the inflow of international capital. These concerns raised further doubts about
the 'sustainability' of enforced structural adjustments, as well as fears about relapse of the
economy when the flow of funds dries up.138
Besides the economic stabilization, ERPs and SAPs also had political liberalization as
conditionalities. Therefore, Ghana’s political liberalization process resulted from internal
and external pressures which intensified from the late I980s. It is argued that it was
economic rather than political forces that compelled the PNDC to yield to the demands of
democratization.139 This notwithstanding, the PNDC, adopted a piecemeal approach to
democratization. Since its rise to power on December 31, 1981, it redefined its
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interpretation of democracy on several occasions. Each revision came with new policy
measures.140 The PNDC exerted its control over the institutional arrangements, sequencing,
or timing of the transition. 141 For instance, to follow up plans for a more measured
transition to democratic rule, the electoral commission was renamed National Commission
on Democracy (NCD) and tasked to formulate a new framework for politics in the
principles of peoples’ democracy. The NCD was set up by PNDC Law 42 in 1982. In
keeping with Section 32 of the PNDC law 42, the NCD was required to perform the
functions of an Electoral Commission (EC) and to help develop a programme for returning
Ghana to democratic rule. 142 The NCD was therefore, mandated to design a 'true
democracy’ for Ghana that takes into consideration the tradition, history and socio-cultural
values of Ghanaians.143 In addition, it was also expected to educate Ghanaians on the
objectives of the revolutionary transformation in order to advance democracy and assess
limitations to the achievement of the democratic system. However, the NCD was generally
dormant except for occasional elite-type sponsored seminars. It could not provide any sense
of direction in the political debate that ensued.144 The debates on the future political system
centred around two opposing views. One view particularly preferred by the PNDC stalwarts
was a no-political system of government because proponents of this view attributed the
country’s problems to party politicians. The other view was for a multiparty system, due to
people’s bitter experience under Nkrumah’s one party system.145 The multiparty system
triumphed.
4.4.2 The Promise of a ‘Peoples’ Democracy
While the PNDC was implementing the SAP programmes aimed at economic recovery, the
third phase of the PNDC regime’s democratic experimentation commenced. This phase
appeared with a merger of involvement in politics with participation in formal political
institutions and stressed the establishment of viable channels for political activity.146 The
PNDC regime as particularly concerned with the social inequities that had emerged during
the implementation of the structural adjustment programme. So it decided to tackle the
connection between political and social issues more directly. The process started with the
creation of local government structures in 1982 and elections in 1988. Particularly, in May
1982, the PNDC formally declared its commitment to decentralization based on the “power
to the people” slogan that was ushered in by the 31st December 1981 revolution.147 This
commitment was followed with the announcement of a decentralization plan that aimed at
introducing participatory democracy with a four-tier hierarchical administrative level.
These levels included: i) area and town or village council-operating under the defence
committee; ii) district councils, with members elected from nominations by ‘popular
organizations’; and iii) regional councils, consisting of elected representatives from the
districts.148 The super-imposition of the CDRs on the local council system appeared as a
major attempt to politicize the latter and bring it under direct control of the revolution. The
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regional councils in particular were seen as the representatives of the central government in
the field and thus were to oversee the establishment of the P/WDCs in the communities and
workplaces.149 This notwithstanding, Agyeman-Duah aptly captured the sentiments that
“it seem that the PNDC was hesitant 'to deliver' on its promises of
participatory politics made in 1982. After five years, no mass
organization for the 'oppressed and exploited' had been formed,
no election for a 'constituent assembly' had been held, and no
constitution 'to serve the people's interests' had been written.”150
After the initial delays at delivering the purported “peoples’ democracy”, on the fifth
anniversary of the PNDC in 1986, Chairman Rawlings announced a plan to hold local
elections as a first step towards encouraging greater popular participation.151 The District
Assembly elections were depicted as a further stage in the creation of a 'true' democracy,
and as the culmination of efforts “…to democratize state power and advance participatory
democracy and collective decision-making at the grassroots.” 152 Since 1988, district
assembly elections are held on periodic four-year basis. However, it is noteworthy that
Ghana’s decentralization process had not been effective due to several factors including,
but not limited, to overly bureaucratic public administrative structures.153
4.4.3 The Birth of the Fourth Republic in 1992
Ghana’s electoral process to democratic rule formally started in January 1991 when a
timetable was outlined. A new constitution was adopted in April 1992. 154 This was
followed by a lift on the ban on political activities in May 1992 with a seven-month
window to presidential and parliamentary elections in November and December 1992
respectively.155 The NDC subsequently won the 1992 presidential elections held under the
supervision of the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC).156 This paved the way
for the inauguration of the Fourth Republic on 7th January 1993. The transition came in the
wake of the post-Cold War wave of democratization manifested by both internal and
external clamour for democratic governance, and particularly the indirect political pressure
from the World Bank and IMF. In what has been described by some analysts as “transition
without change”, the Rawlings led-National Democratic Congress (NDC) administration
succeeded itself-the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC).157 Rawlings resigned
from the military and contested the elections as a civilian, a phenomenon described by
Durotoye and Griffiths, as “political transmutation.”158 He was thus a central figure in an
essentially elite-driven process of incremental transition.159 It is argued that the transition
process was designed to give Ghanaians no alternative to Rawlings. 160 The domestic
opposition was very weak and largely ineffectual.161
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The elite-driven transition was not based on a pact between the PNDC regime and local
opponents. Rather, it ensued from a pragmatic and dynamic response of the PNDC, and
firmly led by Rawlings to anticipated pressures of the international financial institutions
(IFIs) for political liberalization.162 The survival of the Rawlings regime could also be
attributed to the strong financial support from external factors such as IMF and World Bank
and relatively ineffective opposition to its authoritarian rule.163 The PNDC regime was
faced with challenges of legitimacy and authority, especially from local actors partly due to
its chequered human rights records. It, however, differed from earlier authoritarian regimes
principally due to the willingness to hold periodically more-or-less free multi-party
elections and to some extent respect the civil and political rights of citizens.
Ghanaians enjoyed some political freedoms to form associations, including political parties,
subject to certain legal requirements and, in the midst of acrimony and threats, an
independent press continued to exercise limited freedom of expression. However, under the
democratic facade, the old neo-patrimonial rules of the game continued, manifested by
centralization of power, personal loyalties, pervasive clientelism, and corruption. 164
Particularly, unofficial presidential control of coercive force weakened the formal
democratic institutions designed to monitor, check, and discipline the Government between
elections.165 The Ghanaian democratic transition of 1992 had its own flaws, but it was a
remarkable step towards democracy because it constitutes the ability to transform an
authoritarian militarized state into a near-democratic one. This involves reinstatement of
institutions, constitutional rule, and operation of a multiparty political system, rule of law,
judicial independence, press freedom, local government and public probity in a state that
has suffered considerable decay.166 A new political liberalism was also instituted together
with neo-liberal economic management strategies that had been practiced for some years
with the support of international financial institutions and the other development
partners.167
4.5 From Coups d’états to Democratic Consolidation?
As noted earlier, Ghana’s democratic process was confronted with challenging beginnings.
Notwithstanding the numerous challenges and deficits, multi-party democratic rule had
been established in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. Since 1992, the country has held seven
successful elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016), producing three
political turnovers between the two major political parties, New Patriotic Party (NPP) and
NDC. 168 The peaceful political turnovers have also taken place in an environment of
burgeoning institutional context and a political terrain very accommodative of vibrant
media and civil society. 169 Ghana now ranks high on most of the basic measures of
democracy and good governance, including protection of fundamental civil liberties and
human rights.170 Compared to centuries-old democracies in other parts of the world, the
country’s democracy is relatively young. Nonetheless, considering the retreat of democracy
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in some West African states, one could argue on the basis of the longevity test that Ghana
has come of age having enjoyed 25 years of stability since the advent of the Fourth
Republican constitution in 1992 with three difficult political turnovers, in 2000, 2008 and
2016; and two closely fought elections in 2008 and 2012. 171 The 2012 elections was
perhaps one of the most challenging in the country’s political history. Considering the
closeness of the results to the previous presidential election in 2008, the stakes were
especially high for the incumbent NDC and opposition NPP. The contentious campaign
was characterised by wide range of issues, of which education and job creation were the
most dominant.
Despite the challenges with the electoral process and the tense political atmosphere,
Ghanaians once again went through the elections, albeit with logistical challenges with the
biometric voting system. Like all elections under the Fourth Republic, reports of voter
irregularities surfaced. Subsequently, the opposition NPP challenged the election results
and petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the results. After eight months of legal battle,
amidst political uncertainty, the Supreme Court upheld the results. The elections petition,
particularly, brought to light some apparent challenges of the electoral system, including
issues of over voting; voting without biometric verification; absence of the signature of the
presiding officers on results sheets; duplicate serial numbers; duplicate polling station
codes; unknown polling stations.172 These developments have once again brought to the
fore the pressing need for electoral reforms.173 Some reforms were carried out. Ghana
again went to the polls in December 2016. The political climate preceding the elections was
once again tense and characterized by localized violence, hate speech and violent actions of
political actors, thereby threatening the peace and stability of the country. Nonetheless, the
country pulled through another relatively successful election that brought the NPP to
power.
There is no widely accepted measure of consolidation of democracy. According to Larry
Diamond “consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and
profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. This
involves behavioural and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and
narrow its uncertainty. This normalization requires the expansion of citizen access,
development of democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment
and training, and other functions that civil society performs....most urgently, it requires
political institutionalization.”174 Similarly Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan identified three core
dimensions: behavioural, constitutional and attitudinal. Behaviourally, a democratic regime
is consolidated when “no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the
democratic regime or secede from the state.” 175 One of the key elements towards the
consolidation of democracy is a well-governed security sector, made up of civil, political
and security institutions responsible for protecting the state and the communities within
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it.176 Attitudinally, when “the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further
political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas.”
Constitutionally, when all actors in the polity, governmental and non-governmental alike,
“become subjected to, and habituated to the resolution of conflict within the specific laws,
procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic processes.”177 They argued
that, democratic consolidation is a particular, institutionalised, form of democracy, a
procedural system with the following characteristics: (1) open political competition; (2)
several freely competing parties; and (3) an array of civil and political rights guaranteed by
law. Political accountability is crucial and operates mainly via the relationship between
voters and their elected representatives. In addition, a state bureaucracy that is usable by the
democratic government and an institutionalized economic society.178
Ghana has considerably met some of the above criteria. For instance, there has not been any
overt attempt at usurpation of democratic rule since 1992. Elections have become widely
accepted as the only means of attaining political authority. Elections are more than mere
formalities, their regular conduct is central to democratization. Besides infusing
government with new blood, elections may contribute to the maturation of nascent
democratic cultures. 179 The country has made significant progress at institutionalizing
electoral democracy. Ghana’s most notable achievement has been the progressive
improvement of electoral management and the increasing acceptance of election results as
fair by participants and observers alike.180 While there were significant disputes about the
1992 elections that ended military rule, subsequent elections after 1992 have witnessed
remarkable improvements, though complaints of electoral malpractices surfaced. Notably,
the change in administration in 2000 from the NDC to the NPP took place without major
challenges to the outcome of the election. Secondly, the political turnover in 2008 from
NPP to NDC took place amidst some difficulties with the electoral process. Again, the
political turnover in 2016 from NDC to NPP occurred amidst forceful takeovers of public
assets and violence by political supporters. As noted earlier, the difficulties of the electoral
process were also brought to light in the 2012 elections petition to the Supreme Court by
the NPP.
These notwithstanding, the three relatively peaceful political turnovers demonstrate that
Ghana has passed Huntington’s “two-turnover” test by which a government loses an
election, the opposition wins it and then, next time, loses power.181 According to this view,
after two cycles of peaceful leadership replacement, most political actors have both won
and lost without revolting, which indicates that they have accepted the rules of the electoral
game. Obviously, political turnovers do not guarantee democratic gains, but they may help
build trust in the rules of the game and boost the legitimacy of the political process. They
are ultimately necessary for the institutionalization of competitive multiparty politics.182 It
is evident that Ghanaians have accepted that democratic elections as the preferred way to
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attaining political power to run the country. Many citizens have come to accept democratic
elections as the preferred means of accession political power.183 The popular support for
democracy is evident in almost all Afrobarometer surveys. For instance, in 2008, the survey
found that 79 percent of Ghanaians sampled prefer democracy to other forms of
government. This rose to 82% in 2012. 184 The strong support for democracy is manifested
by progressive increase in voter turnout since 1992. From a low of 50.2% in 1992, turnout
was 77.9% in 1996, 60.8% in 2000, and 85.0% in 2004. However, there was a drop to
about 72.9%, in 2008 still high by national and international standards.185 Presidential
elections in 2012 and 2016 recorded voter turnouts of 79.43% and 68.62% respectively.186
While Ghanaians have come to accept democracy, they have reservations with
developments in the current democratic dispensation. For instance, as shown in the chart
below, the country recorded signs of increasing deterioration in overall governance
performance over the last decade (2006-2016) as shown by the Mo Ibrahim Index of
African Governance.187
Figure 2-4: Ghana’s Governance Score from 2007-2016
Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2017.
4.6 The Ghana Armed Forces in a ‘new’ Democracy: 1992 to 2016
Historically, local armies existed before the advent of colonial rule in the Gold Coast, but
these were not standing armies. 188The Ghana Armed Forces has its root in the colonial
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Gold Coast Constabulary (GCC) raised in 1874 and re-designated the Gold Coast
Regiment (GCR) in 1901. The GCR fought in defence of the British Empire in German
Togoland, Cameroon, and East Africa during the First World War. It also fought on the side
of the Allied Forces during the Second World War as West African colonies became
important to Britain's war effort as sources of manpower and raw materials. 189 The GCR
was later amalgamated with other armed units of the West Coast into the West African
Frontier Force (WAFF) created in 1897 on the orders of the British Secretary of State for
Colonies, Lord Joseph Chamberlain, to raise regular military units in all colonies.190 The
WAFF led by British officers and British Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) became an
integral part of the British Army for the purpose of maintaining internal security and
defence of the colonial territories.191 The Headquarters of the West African Command was
established in Accra and remained there until 1956.192 There had been earlier attempts to
raise regular colonial units as far back as 1821 when Governor Charles McCarthy raised the
Royal African Colonial Corps of Light Infantry (RACCI). However, this unit was
annihilated in local battles and the Governor was killed.193
Colonialism created a system which made extensive use of forced labour, with the north
used as an area of labour reserve and deliberately underdeveloped.194 In the Gold Coast,
people from the northern territories were mostly used for forced labour. The northerners
were noted for their martial qualities and deemed loyal and honest, hence their recruitment
into the colonial armies.195 It has been argued that, the colonial authorities believed that due
to their remoteness the northern ethnic groups would prove more effective at suppressing
anti-colonial uprisings in the south.196 Festus Aboagye argues that the British preferred the
fighting qualities of the Hausa197 race, and therefore, recruited mostly northern Muslims
into the Gold Coast Constabulary.198 Glover’s Hausa forces from Nigeria were indeed used
as the nucleus of the Gold Coast Hausa Constabulary from 1879. 199 Likewise, David
Killingray notes that, the Gold Coast Regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force
(RWAFF), consisted of about 1,000 men recruited exclusively from the Northern
Territories, including French subjects from across the border, led by British officers.200 The
colonialists believed that southern Christians posed high risk for desertion. Southerners,
especially Ashanti, partly due to their numerous wars with the colonial powers and
relatively better economic opportunities as cocoa farmers, detested joining the colonial
army. 201 The few southerners, who were enlisted especially in peacetime, were mostly
deployed in clerical and technical positions and as bandsmen.202 It has been argued that the
colonial patterns of recruitment exploited existing group rivalries in African societies, to
the extent that certain groups were not represented in the colonial regiments. Therefore, at
independence, the same colonial armies formed the nucleus of the formed militaries of the
newly independent states. As the military became the most visible expression of
sovereignty, underrepresented groups could not identify with this national symbol.203
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As noted in chapter two, the colonial legacy permeated into the post-independence makeup
of the military where people from certain relatively deprived regions in terms of economic
and educational opportunities opted for military service. For many men from the north, the
military offered opportunities for wages, and a more attractive form of labour to that
offered in mines or farms in the south.204 For instance, even after a decade of independence,
about 60% of the personnel of the GAF were people of northern descent. 205 Beside
northerners, Ewes also showed interest in military service. Some officers interviewed have
argued that, the people from relatively resource-endowed areas such as the Akans did not
show a lot of interest in military service.206 This probably accounted for their low numbers
in the armed forces. However, as mentioned earlier, southerners constituted majority of
Ghanaians in the officer corps and senior positions in GAF in the immediate post-
independence period. This is because they better had access to secular education.
The 1960 First Republican Constitution provided for the establishment of the GAF.207 This
was reinforced by The Armed Forces Act, 105 (1962) that “provides for the raising and
maintenance of the Army, Navy and Air Force of Ghana, for matters connected therewith
and for the repeal of certain enactments relating to the existing forces and other defence
matters.”208The GAF is a tri-service institution made up of the army, navy and air force
operating under a Joint Service General Headquarters. Of these services, the army is most
senior in terms of age and size, as it constitutes about 80% of the total strength. The Navy
and Air Force were post-colonial institutions created in 1959 by the first African
government by an act of Parliament.209 Currently, each of the three services is made up of
various specialized units. For example, the army is made of six infantry battalions, as well
as a number of combat support units including armour, artillery, engineers and signals. The
total strength of the GAF is around 15, 500, making it one of the largest in West Africa.210
As discussed earlier, after independence in 1957, the new armed forces soon became a
major political destabilizing force especially in the first three decades of independence.211
As captured by a retired Ghanaian general, “about three-quarters of post-independence
history Ghana has been under military rule marked by excesses such as human rights
abuses. This led to negative perceptions of the military because people think the country’s
developmental challenges have been caused by the military.”212 Some of the regimes were
quasi-military made up of a mix of military, police and civilian actors. This
notwithstanding, coups d’états, especially junior-led ones like the AFRC regime in 1979
and the early revolutionary days of the PNDC in 1981 led to what Eboe Hutchful
described as the decomposition of the GAF because command and control and discipline
were severely damaged. 213
The acquisition of power and its proximity to state resources and dissipation has been the
bone of contention between the military and political elites in most developing countries.
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Esew argues that “the military has not tasted power and consequently were subservient to
civil authority. Having, tasted it however, they feel they should seize it again once their
corporate interest is threatened.” 214 Similarly, others opine that as the military have
exercised power for a long period in Ghana’s political history, it was difficult for them to
accept civilian control.215 As aptly captured by a former military ruler, Colonel Ignatius
Kutu Acheampong that “once you have touched the magic wand of power, never dream
that you can go back to your village, the barracks or wherever you were before.”216
Nonetheless, the military returned to the barracks in 1993. As Ghana transitioned into a
democracy in the wake of the post-Cold War democratization wave, it became necessary to
clearly place the military to conform to the political features of democracy. In transitioning
democracies, especially in post-conflict contexts, defence transformation processes are
often carried out for a total overhaul of the defence architecture to align it to the prevailing
democratic culture. Likewise, in advanced democracies, strategic defence review processes
are carried out periodically. Both processes often involve national consultative processes
and internal debates involving all relevant stakeholders including political leadership,
government ministries and agencies, the people, the military and other actors. During these
processes, a gamut of issues is considered. These includes: threat assessment, defence
choices and political consequences, the balance between non-military and military means of
addressing threats, resource allocation for defence and security and non-military uses of the
armed forces.217
In the case of Ghana, the context was different as the country was not a typically post-
conflict one. However, the dynamics, particularly decay of the security sector that led to
state collapse in conflict societies were similar to the Ghanaian situation especially in the
late 1970s up to early 1980s. This situation notwithstanding, the above mentioned
processes of defence transformation were not holistically followed through. Indeed, during
the constituent assembly deliberations on the 1992 constitution, issues of defence were
discussed. The subsequent provisions on the armed forces under chapter 17 of the 1992
constitution was couched with some caution due to the civil-military relations history of
the country and diverging views among the pro-PNDC and anti-PNDC members of the
constituent assembly on the role of the armed forces in the new democracy.218 It is argued
that during the first civilian government of Rawlings’ National Democratic Congress
(NDC) from 1993-2000, Rawlings did not consider it a priority to warm the perceived cold
relations between the military and civilians. The military remained visibly strong in the
Ghanaian society. Since 1992, the country has endeavoured to establish democratic control
over the security sector in general and in particular, to improve civil-military relations
through a number of institutional reforms which has contributed to improved security sector
governance.219 These reforms will be highlighted in the next chapter. It has been observed
that, in the Fourth Republic, both political and military elites have come to the realization
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that institutionalization of democratic and civilian control serves their mutual interests.220
Particularly, coups d’états leaders and military officers have learned through their past
experiences that there are no quick-fix solutions to the country’s socio-economic and
political problems. Coups d’états have actually undermined the professionalism of the
military as well as command structure, discipline and efficiency.221
As argued by Samuel Huntington, democracy operates based on accepted separation
between the military and the civilian spheres.222 This distinction means that the military are
expected to refrain from politics unless through constitutionally approved channels.
Similarly, politicians are not to interfere in purely operational matters of the military.
Military leaders can however, contribute to the formulation of policy, only that they should
do so in such a way that it does not undermine the authority of the civilian decision
makers.223 The powers of the military are determined in terms of the law, specifically the
Constitution and the Defence Act. The key questions here are how has the GAF been
placed as an important state institution in the Fourth Republic? What constitutional
mechanisms exist for managing civil-military relations? To answer these, one explores how
constitutional arrangements underpinning the current democratic terrain ensure civil and
democratic control of the armed forces.
4.6 The 1992 Constitution and the Ghana Armed Forces
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana explicitly addresses the issues of democratic control.
Specifically, Chapter 17 of the constitution stipulates the role of the armed forces.
Particularly, Article 210(1-3) states that:
(1) There shall be the Armed Forces of Ghana which shall
consist of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and such
other services for which provision is made by Parliament.224
(2) No person shall raise an armed force except by or under
the authority of an Act of Parliament.
(3) The Armed Forces shall be equipped and maintained to
perform their role of defence of Ghana as well as such other
functions for the development of Ghana as the President
may determine.
The above constitutional provision is in line with the earlier Armed Force Act of 1962. The
constitution also outlines certain structures and mechanisms aimed at ensuring democratic
control of the armed forces. Specifically, the President as the Commander-in-Chief is
vested with the power of appointment of persons to hold offices in the armed forces. The
Armed Forces Council, among other functions advises the president on issues relating to
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defence.225 In other words, the 1992 constitution vested political command of the Armed
Forces in the President who is the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, acting in
consultation with the Armed Forces Council. According to the Constitution, the overall
coordination of national security policy is placed under the National Security Council
which is chaired by the President. The National Security Council (NSC) is the strategic
decision-making organ. The NSC is made of the following: the president; the vice-
president; the ministers of defence, interior, foreign affairs and finance, and such other
ministers as the president may determine; the representatives of the services, namely: the
chief of defence staff and two other members of the armed forces, the inspector-general of
police, the commissioner of police for the council of the minister of interior, and one other
member of the police force; the director- general of the Prisons Service, the directors of
intelligence (external, internal, and military respectively), and the commissioner of
Customs and Excise and Preventive Service (Now part of Ghana Revenue Authority,
GRA). To ensure strong links with the highest level of the government, the secretary of the
cabinet also acts as the secretary of the NSC.226The often sensitive posts of National
Security Coordinator and National Security Advisor or Minister for National Security are
responsible for the National Security Secretariat. The National Security Coordinator and his
deputy are supposed to lead in the collation of information in relation to the security of
Ghana, and transmitting them to the office of the president. The Minister for National
Security is responsible for policy and political control of NSC.
The administration as well as operational control and command of the Armed Forces is
vested in the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).227 The CDS is subject to the overall control of
the Commander-in-Chief, acting in consultation with the Armed Forces Council.228This
command is exercised under the direction of the Minister of Defence, in times of peace, and
under the direction of the President, in times of war or state of national emergence.
However, this constitutional provision on the function of the CDS in practice is often
fraught with challenges as there is lack of clarity in the constitution about what constitutes
day-to-day operational matters in which in the CDS could take decision without recourse to
the Armed Forces Council.229
Besides the constitutional guarantees on the roles of the armed forces in Ghana’s security
set up, SSR discourses emphasize the need for national security policies to be moved
beyond state centric security to human security to meet the security needs of citizens. In the
case of Ghana, although it is not explicitly stated in the 1992 constitution, there appears a
shift from regime security to human security in which the military is expected to provide
the enabling environment for the citizens to realize their potential and ensure well-being.230
For instance, the Directive Principles of State Policy that guide all citizens, Parliament, the
President, the Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies
and persons in the application or interpretation of the Constitution also enjoins the state to
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protect and safeguard the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ghana, and seek
the well-being of all her citizens.231 This role expected of the armed forces goes beyond
physical protection to providing security to the economic and strategic interests of the
country. Therefore, the 1992 constitution clearly provides a legal framework for the role of
the armed forces as well as retooling and restructuring of the armed forces.232 Unlike past
constitutions of Ghana, the 1992 constitution did provide a framework for the GAF to be
deployed in civic activities to support the development of the country.
4.6.1 A ‘New’ Role for the Ghana Armed forces in a Democracy?
The traditional mission of the GAF is to “protect by land, sea and air, the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Ghana against internal and external aggression thereby
contributing to the transformation of the economy to achieve growth and accelerated
poverty reduction especially among the vulnerable and excluded.”233 Basically, the role of
the GAF in the current democratic dispensation includes the following:
1. defend the territorial integrity against internal and external
threat;
2. support the police in providing internal security;
3. support national development;
4. project Ghana’s foreign policy through UN and regional
peacekeeping; and;
5. collaborate with ECOWAS, AU for regional peace and
security.234
With regards to the traditional role of the armed forces, Ghana has not been at war with any
other state. However, there were periods of uneasy relations with some neighbours such as
Togo (1960-1990s) and Burkina Faso (1987-1994) which centred on political leadership in
the past.235 Although the country is not experiencing a national-scale conflict or undergoing
some form of humanitarian crisis, Ghanaians are not living in absolute freedom from
fear.236 Among the security challenges faced by the country are protracted internal security
challenges: chieftaincy disputes; conflicts over natural resources, political and election-
related violence, communal violence, and crimes such as armed robbery.237 Even though
these security threats do not result in crisis of national magnitude, they often result in the
loss of lives and property and thus constitute a threat to the relative peace and stability of
the country. Moreover the changing nature of security threats in the sub-region brought
about by multiple and interlinked threats of piracy, smuggling of natural resources,
terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking among others.238 This has
necessitated the need for appropriate response by the military.239
The relative stability and territorial integrity of Ghana can be attributed partly to the
alertness and astuteness of its armed forces.240 Ghana also enjoys friendly relations with its
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neighbours despite some periods of uneasy relations in the past. As done in some countries
across the globe, the military is often called to help in cases of lawlessness where the police
are often seen as ineffective or even corrupt. Over the years, the GAF has been engaged in
different operations and initiatives to support the police in the maintenance of internal
peace and security. For example, Operation Gongong, aimed at assisting the civil
authorities to maintain peace was launched to restore peace in the
Dagbon/Nanumba/Konkomba areas of the Northern Region in the 1990s. Following the
outbreak of conflict in other parts of northern Ghana, for example, in Bawku between the
Mamprusis and Kusasis in December 2008, the military was deployed to assist the police.
Troops are deployed in various trouble spots such as Bawku, Nakpanduri, Bunkpurugu, and
Alavanyo to ensure calm.241 Another example is Operation Calm Life, launched in 2002 to
assist the police in combating armed robbery in the urban areas and highways. This
operation has arguably led to a reduction of armed robbery cases in the urban areas
particularly in Accra and Kumasi.242
The GAF also supports the democratization process by providing security during elections
and other national events. For instance, the armed forces help in securing and transporting
the ballot papers to every part of the country, including the remote areas.243 Of particular
mention is Operation Peace Trail, which is activated every election year to assist the civil
authority in the maintenance of a peaceful atmosphere before, during and after the
elections. 244 The GAF is an integral part of the National Election Security Taskforce
(NESTF). This body is formed and led by the Inspector General of Ghana Police. The
NESTF includes representatives from other security agencies namely, the Ghana National
Fire Service (FNFS), Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Ghana Prisons Service (GPS),
National Security, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) and External Intelligence
Service.245 Other members include the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE),
the Ghana Information Services, the National Ambulance Service and the National Disaster
Management Organization (NADMO).246 The NESTF is the highest body responsible for
formulation, planning and implementation of security measures for elections exists national
level with divisions at regional, divisional and district levels.247
However, the involvement of the military in purely internal security functions which are
essentially police functions often attracts criticism. Particularly, the use of the military for
law enforcement purposes has the tendency to undermine the rule of law. For instance,
while the military are trained in the use of lethal force, they may not have the requisite
training (unless they are military police) in evidence gathering and preservation of sites.248
Similarly, a Ghanaian senior officer remarked that “this internal security role has
contributed to demystifying the armed forces. However, the challenge is that, this
development affects the professionalism of the military as one can cite examples of soldiers
engaging in undesirable acts like extorting monies during night patrol on roads.” 249
116
Similarly, a defence attaché with a foreign mission in Accra remarked that the GAF is often
relied on by the state as the institution of last resort in times of crises or disasters. In
particular, the deployment of the military in internal peacekeeping mission as a stabilizer
force in support of the police. There appears to be an acceptance from the society based on
the perception that the military is fair and well-disciplined in maintaining stability and
security. However, the deployment of the military in such purely police functions comes
with a risk. The military may lose the support of the local community especially in cases
where the military is perceived to be biased or unprofessional.250
4.6.2 Towards a Developmental Armed Forces
The GAF is increasingly engaged in developmental activities such as disaster relief, civil
construction, protection of Ghana’s economic interests, agriculture and other income
generating ventures like establishment of a shoe factory and a financial institution. For
example, Operation Boafo assists the civil authority to manage natural and man-made
disasters like floods, earth quakes and fire outbreaks. This operation assists NADMO and
other state agencies to provide assistance to affected people and offer humanitarian
assistance to those who lose their homes and properties. Particularly, the 48 Engineers’
Regiment has a disaster management detachment equipped with light and speed boats and
other equipment. This unit is always on standby during raining seasons to offer immediate
assistance when needed. The 37 Military Hospital in Accra is also the official national
disaster management hospital where injured victims are evacuated to for medical
treatment.251
The GAF is also engaged in a number of activities aimed at safeguarding the economic
interest of the country. For example, in the area of maritime security, GAF in collaboration
with fisheries ministry, and agencies like the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), is
protecting Ghana’s territorial water against illegal fishing. For example, Operation Stock
Control, launched in December 2008, is a joint Naval/Air Force operation against pair
trawling and illegal fishing methods in Ghana’s territorial waters. This aims at eliminating
the illegal practices that contribute to depleting marine fish stock. The Navy also provides
similar assistance on the Volta Lake.252 Following the discovery of oil in commercial
quantities in 2007 and the launch of commercial oil exploitation in the Jubilee oil field in
2010, the GAF through Operation Jubilee initiated a plan with other agencies for the
emerging oil industry to prevent the insecurities associated with the ‘oil curse’. The plan
deals with both onshore and offshore threats. The Navy is responsible for off- shore or
maritime security and the army is responsible for the on-shore security. Both services are
supported by the Air Force. 253 The military is also part of the Petroleum Security
Coordinating Committee (PSCC) led by a retired general. In addition, Operation Cow Leg
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was launched in 2010 to control the negative activities of foreign herdsmen. The herdsmen
from neighbouring countries, called Fulani, often get into violent conflicts with local
farmers because their cattle destroy local farms. The armed forces are also part of national
task force against illegal small-scaled miners whose activities have become a threat to the
environment in particular and human security in general. 254 Under Operation Vanguard,
joint-task force from GAF and the Ghana Police Service are deployed to affected mining
communities to stop and destroy unauthorised mining pits.255
4.7 The Peacekeeping Enterprise
A number of developments towards the execution of the mission of the GAF have arguably
contributed to restoring the reputation of the GAF as an important institution in current
democratic dispensation. Of particular mention is Ghana’s involvement in international
peacekeeping. In 1960, the first Ghanaian peacekeeping contingent was deployed in the
Congo Crisis on the orders of the first president Kwame Nkrumah. While Ghana’s
deployment in the United Nations (UN) Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was informed by
the pan-Africanist vision of Nkrumah, it was met with some difficulties and
controversies.256 Since then, the country has progressively earned a good reputation for its
participation in international peacekeeping. The country is now the ninth largest troop
contributing country (TCC) to UN missions.257 For more than 50 years, the UN has relied
on the professionalism of Ghanaian peacekeepers in several missions around the globe such
as Lebanon, Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, Cambodia, Kosovo, Liberia, Sudan,
Rwanda, the Balkans, and Pakistan.258 Ghana also contributed to other regional peace
operations under sub-regional Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group, ECOMOG since its inception in 1990 to help end the bloodshed in Liberia.259
Others include Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire as well as continental missions in Somalia
and Sudan.260 The country has about four battalions deployed in peacekeeping missions at
any point in time.261
Considering Ghana’s resource constraints as a developing country, several questions have
been raised and reason given on Ghana’s continued participation in international
peacekeeping missions.262 In this vein, Aning and Aubyn argue that Ghana’s unwavering
support for UN peacekeeping is motivated by multiple rationales, including: “to keep its
neighbourhood safe and peaceful, a principled commitment to the UN’s peace and security
architecture, and the operational and financial benefits that stem from providing
peacekeepers. 263 In essence, participation in peacekeeping, demonstrates Ghana’s
commitment to sustain global peace, security, and stability.264 It also serves as one of the
opportunities through which Ghana can demonstrate its influence in world affairs and
enhance its image and prestige in the international system.265 Therefore, peacekeeping
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serves as a public good in terms of Ghana’s efforts to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and stability.266
4.7.1 Benefits from Peacekeeping
Participation in peacekeeping has contributed to better resources, training and international
prestige to GAF as an institution. Peacekeeping has become an avenue for the military and
police to acquire overseas experience and training.267 GAF has benefited from diverse
internationally sponsored capacity-building initiatives and training assistance programmes
such as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and African Contingency Operation
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) by the US. France has also provided Reinforcement of
African Peacekeeping capabilities programme (RECAMP), and Military Training
Assistance Programme (MTAP) by Canada.268 These collaborative training and assistance
programmes have also offered opportunities for the GAF to accumulate military equipment
and technology by retaining the supplies provided by the UN and other donors. 269
Particularly, the UN has since 2000 been operating the Wet Lease System as against the old
Dry Lease System. Under Wet Lease system, troop contributing countries sign a
memorandum of understanding to supply a number of troops as well as logistics and
equipment for the stated period of operations. The TCCs get monthly reimbursement for
troops, equipment and logistics and even take back all their equipment at the end of the
operation.270
However, Ghana has not had any significant advantage from the supply of equipment as it
is unable to purchase and deploy significant quantities of equipment in order to maximize
the benefits from the reimbursement of equipment under the Wet lease System.271 Despite
the international peacekeeping accolade, some doubts have been expressed about the war-
capabilities of the GAF. Some members of the armed forces interviewed during this study
have expressed concerns at the resource constraints of the armed forces and their effects on
training and logistics and the overall operational efficiency of the armed forces. It is
noteworthy that, in order to improve the logistical needs of peacekeepers and empower
them to discharge their duties with minimal hazards, the Government of Ghana has set up
an inter-ministerial technical committee in January 2015, to review Ghana’s participation in
peacekeeping operations. The committee was expected among other functions to formulate
policy for accepting offers for participating in new missions, review equipment
procurement system, determine procedure for requisition for funds from the GAF Peace
Support Operation Account, and review of sources of funding for peace support
operation.272 In addition to the review, there are plans at equipment upgrade to enable the
country draw full reimbursement of UN Wet Lease System.273
Moreover, at the level of individual officers and soldiers, peacekeeping has brought about
greater financial rewards and international exposure. For instance, the daily allowance of
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about $35 paid by the UN to troops goes a long way to supplement their local wages. Most
military personnel are able to acquire properties such as housing, cars and domestic and
commercial appliances and provide for their families partly from the financial rewards they
receive from peacekeeping.274An often not mentioned point is the institutional and personal
benefits of peacekeeping that have invariably contributed to keeping the military busy and
possibly taking their minds off intervention in internal politics.275 Ghana’s involvement in
peacekeeping has contributed to the country’s stability and the consolidation of its
democracy.276 Besides, since independence, one of the factors that have accounted for the
military engagement in Ghanaian politics has been grievances over poor economic
conditions in terms of salaries and housing facilities.277 Successive governments since 1992
have implemented policies to improve the economic status of security officers, but their
impact has been minimal. Financial rewards from peacekeeping have become means of
keeping the military “financially happy”.278 Peacekeeping has contributed to improving
civil–military relations at home and contributed to greater professionalism within the
military through pre-deployment and in-mission trainings. International requirements for
participation in peacekeeping missions also go a long way to keep the military in check. For
instance, personnel are required to not have committed any violations of International
Humanitarian Law, Human Rights law and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, and must not be
subjects of any disciplinary measures before they are deployed to peacekeeping missions.279
In addition, peacekeeping has become an income generation venture for the country as it
also benefits from the compensation packages offered by the UN. 280 The government
makes an average profit of $3600 annually per soldier on peacekeeping mission.281 This
contributes significantly to the country’s foreign proceeds considering the high numbers of
troops deployed to missions around the globe.282 Proceeds of peacekeeping have been used
to purchase aircrafts and other equipment for the military. Other national assets like the
Presidential Jet too were purchased from peacekeeping funds in 1999.283 As peacekeeping
has become a major preoccupation of the GAF, and income generating venture for Ghana,
the recent decrease in peacekeeping funding has possible implications on future of
peacekeeping operations globally.284 For instance, following the announcement by Donald
Trump administration in April 2017 to cut more than a billion dollars in US funding to
global peacekeeping efforts, the United Nations announced plans to pull more than $600
million from its peacekeeping budget.285 The proposed budget cuts are result of pressure
from key contributors to the UN such as US and the EU who want to see reduction in
peacekeeping budget. These developments would make it impossible for the UN to
continue to essential work in peacekeeping. These developments therefore call for a deeper
reflection on the future use of GAF if peacekeeping operations should reduce.
In addition, it has been observed that the GAF is very experienced in peacekeeping. For
instance, when deployed in peacekeeping environments which are often hostile and
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unpredictable, Ghanaian peacekeepers endeavour to first establish a strong relationship and
trust with the local populace.286 This is often done by observing the rules of engagement,
respecting the customs, taboos, and traditions of the local people and not imposing military
culture upon them. 287 Ghanaian troops often undertake more civil-military projects in
missions.288 Also, the generosity of Ghanaian peacekeepers has been documented.289 There
have been examples where Ghanaian troops have paid the school fees of local children,
helped teach in community schools with a shortage of teachers, helped to arbitrate disputes
between locals, and even provided healthcare facilities for the sick. 290 This trust and
relationship-building has proved important for the success and safety of the Ghanaian
peacekeepers.291 Certain material factors including troop numbers, mission budgets and
non-materials factors-contextual, societal, and political may account for behaviour of the
military in peace keeping environments.292
Participation in peacekeeping has exposed many Ghanaian military personnel to the horrors
of state collapse and human suffering. To this end, Ghanaian peacekeepers seem to have
developed some conflict resolution skills and accommodation that support harmonious
civil-military relations. 293 Nevertheless there is the need for deeper enquiry on how
peacekeeping has contributed to changing soldiers’ self-perception and issues of military
ethics. For instance, it is been observed that when it comes to relations between some
soldiers and the Ghanaian public especially, there is much room for improvement.294 As
would be discussed in subsequent chapters, cases of military brutality against civilians
continue to surface in the media.
4. 8 Summary
The armed forces are an important state institution in any democracy. Since the advent of
the Fourth Republic in January 1992 democratic governance has been firmly established in
Ghana. Some constitutional and institutional arrangements were put in place to ensure that
the armed forces conform to the features of the democracy in which it is located. A
professional, disciplined and well-trained armed forces that accepts civilian, civil and
democratic control and functions according to the constitution of a country is an important
assert for national development especially for young democracies. GAF has since 1992
gradually redeemed its image and reputation needed for the execution of its traditional
mandates. In addition to its traditional duty to protect the territorial integrity of Ghana, the
GAF has become an important institution in the national development process contributing
in diverse ways. New and emerging security challenges also requires appropriate response
from the armed forces to keep the polity and people safe and stable.
However, the existence of legal or constitutional requirements is not enough to build
democratic armed forces. This therefore calls for holistic defence transformation, or in the
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least, institutional reforms. Indeed some ad hoc processes have been initiated in that area
since the end of military rule in 1992. The subsequent chapters will therefore examine in
greater detail what has actually been done through the lens of David Chuter’s guide to
defence transformation. In doing this, the thesis explores how this could contribute to
improving civil-military based on Schiff’s Concordance theory. The role of certain key
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Processes and Mechanisms of Transforming Ghana’s Defence sector since 1992
“Armed Forces the world over are gradually and systematically
changing from their old ways of doing things for the better. Our
Armed Forces cannot be left out of the trend.”1
5. 0 Introduction
Ghana’s history of authoritarianism has influenced the structures and functions of the
defence sector. Reform is therefore required if that sector is to be in tune with the country’s
current democratic dispensation. Ghana is not a post-conflict state, yet, it shares certain
similarities including among others the decay of the security sector in the 1970s and early
1980s. Since its inception the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) has represented an external
projection of the British Defence apparatus. Its roles, shape and structure were designed to
serve the political, economic and security needs of the colonial power. These have however
remained unchanged since independence. But the country the armed forces are supposed to
serve has changed tremendously. The doctrine of the armed forces has essentially focused
on territorial defence partly due to the geo-political environment of the Cold War era and
periods of uneasy tensions with her immediate neighbours like Togo to the east, Côte
d’Ivoire to the west and Burkina Faso in the north. Ghana has not been at war with her
neighbours except for a few border incursions and subversion activities from neighbouring
countries, particularly Togo and Cote d’Ivoire.2 The current threats facing the country are
essentially not territorial.3 The security threats faced by Ghana, like most West African
countries are internal. There are also recent concerns about terrorism and transnational
organized crimes.
In transitioning democracies such as Ghana, defence transformation is required for a total
overhaul of the defence architecture to align it to the prevailing democratic culture and
respond to current security and developmental needs.4 As noted earlier in chapter four, the
framers of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana did clearly stipulate the role and nature of the
armed forces in the current democracy. This chapter, therefore, seeks to analyse the
changes in Ghana’s defence sector since 1992 using Chuter’s framework. Chuter argues
that, there is no single process called defence transformation, because every country’s
experience and starting point tends to differ.5 Chuter therefore proposes four clusters by
which the processes of defence transformation could be examined. These include:
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1. Cultural transformation, which entails the change of the institutional culture,
leadership, management and administrative ethos of the institution. This also
involves the traditions and value system upon which the institution is based.
2. Human transformation involves the reconfiguring the institutional make up with
reference to race, ethnic, regional, gender and human resource practices.
3. Political transformation refers to efforts to ensure that the conduct and character of
the institution conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is
located. This includes the acknowledgement of principles of civil supremacy,
transparency and accountability and the existence of appropriate institutions of
oversight.
4. Organizational transformation involves more technocratic process within which an
organization is rightly sized, while its management practices and organizational
processes ensures cost-effectiveness and delivers services efficiently.
Ghana’s defence and security sectors have seen some transformation, but not a coordinated
defence transformation process. The transformation has not come as a result of post-
conflict or negotiated settlement. Rather, it emanated from the specific political, economic
and security conditions of the country from late 1980s-2000s. During these years, a
constellation of donor pressure and local democracy groups created enabling environment
for security sector and intelligence reform processes, which compelled political authorities
to begin to enact changes in the security system.6 As noted previously, in chapter four,
political transitions under the Fourth Republic involved two different political parties, NPP
and NDC with contrasting track records on the defence and security sector.7 Each of these
parties had a peculiar experience in civil-military relations.
From the late 1980s and 1990s a series of extensive reforms were undertaken in Ghana’s
public sector that culminated in the establishment of the World Bank-funded National
Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP). 8 Despite demands from international
development partners to reform the security sector as part of the public sector reforms, the
defence and security sectors were left virtually untouched as the Rawlings administration
managed to resist their inclusion. 9 There were indeed developments that point to
politicization of the military. For instance the Association of Committees for the Defence of
the Revolution (ACDR), which were rechristened the Peoples’ and Workers’ Defence
Committee, still operated in the barracks. The government however, embarked on some
reforms whose primary objective at the time, was to prevent the occurrence of military
intervention, rather than to introduce wholesale democratic reforms in the entire security
and defence sectors.10
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During the first civilian government of NDC (1993-2000), it is argued that the cold war
between the military and the civilian public especially, was not ended with the inception of
the new democracy. The NDC government, which was an offshoot of the PNDC regime did
not consider it a priority to warm relations. It appeared former President John Rawlings was
determined to politicize and make the military a constituency of the party, for various
reasons including regime security. 11 Particularly, his leadership style and temperament
seemed to compound the situation as he appeared more committed to upholding the
supremacy of the military and its traditions than subjecting the institution to democratic
control, accountability and healthy civil-military reactions. 12 The president appointed
soldiers to political positions and as heads of civilian institutions, while serving officers
freely engaged in politics.13 Of particular mention was the 64 Regiment that was largely
seen as an elite unit within the armed forces for presidential self-aggrandizement. This unit
was formed in the early 1980s as a supposed rapid response force for national emergencies.
It was specially trained and well-equipped with its command directly linked to the seat of
government. However, the unit was often deployed for unmilitary functions such as private
debt collection, civilian arrests and general disciplinary measures against civilians. The
deployments were mostly done without due regard to established chain of command of the
armed forces.14
Rawlings was however, able to control the military and curtail coups d’état. He also
attempted to some quiet reforms to professionalize the armed forces and put an end to the
revolutionary zealousness that marked the PNDC and rebuild the command and control
structures.15 There were some ad hoc processes initiated to reintegrate the paramilitary,
notably, the CDRs into the armed forces. However, these encountered some challenges
such as ages of the some paramilitary made it impossible for them to join the armed forces.
The younger ones were made to go through the enlistment processes and got into the armed
forces.16 Rawlings could be credited for remarkably “controlling the military, preventing
coups and maintaining the longest period of ‘stability; upon which the Fourth Republic
thrived.” 17 The control mechanisms employed the Rawlings administration included a
combination of factors: hardnosed politics with opponents, draconian security systems and
attempts to infuse professionalism in the military. For instance the PNDC government
contracted British and Canadian officers in 1985 to train officers at the Ghana Military
Academy until 1992.18
Further, there were efforts to restore key governance institutions within the armed forces.
These included the Armed Forces Council (AFC), the Defence Administrative Committee,
and the Defence Staff Committee. These measures contributed to enhancing defence
management and suppressed the praetorian tendencies of GAF.19 The government also set
up two committees, namely; General Erskine Commission in 1987, to review the structure
of the GAF and Brigadier-General Kpetoe Board in 1996, to the review of roles and
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structure of the GAF. 20 The Brigadier-General Kpetoe Board was set up following
recommendations made by an earlier Brigadier Twum-Barimah special committee set up by
the Armed Forces Council to rethink Ghana’s defence policy and restructure the armed
forces.21 These committees spent several spent months visiting military installations and
facilities across the country and produced voluminous reports. However, the PNDC/NDC
government did not follow up with white papers to signify the acceptance of these reports.
The key question is why would a government set up a commission and expend resources on
them and refuse to act on their recommendations. These development point to lack of
commitment or a deliberate attempt to exert firm control over the military thereby denying
the general public accountability.22
It is also noteworthy that there were earlier advances by the NDC government at ensuring
civilian control over the security sector. These included the enactment of the 1996 Security
and Intelligence Services Act (Act 526) to regulate the activities of the security and
intelligence agencies and the establishment of Regional Security Councils (REGSECs) and
District Security Councils (DISECs). Act 526 is unique because it provides an improved
management of security and intelligence in Ghana. Within this act, the military forms part
of all security architecture from the national, regional, metropolitan, municipal to district
levels. This is significant as it seeks to expand the role of the military beyond the provision
of physical security to actually include them in the decision-making and implementation of
security policy. Although earlier initiatives by the PNDC/NDC government brought about
some reforms in the sector, it did so in the context of a political system that was
undemocratic. For instance, the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (ACT 526) only
enumerates the various offices and functions of the national security agencies. However,
the act does not articulate the policies which are to be upheld and implemented by these
offices.23
While the idea of security sector reform gained greater traction after 1996, the political
changeover in 2001 from the NDC to the NPP government led by John Kuffour did provide
the actual impetus for reform of the defence and security sectors in Ghana.24 Although
enhancing civilian, civil and democratic control as well as professionalizing the military
appeared the motiving factor, issues of regime security were of key concern.25 President
Kuffour made security issues a priority on the agenda of his government. This was
informed by the politicized nature of the military and its tendencies to intervene in politics.
The NPP government made a bold declaration to professionalize the military and make it
apolitical. Some reforms were initiated by the NPP government. For example, Armed
Forces Defence Committees (AFDCs) and the elite 64th Regiment set up by the erstwhile
PNDC/NDC were disbanded. There were pronouncements by key government officials on
professionalizing the armed forces and improving civil-military relations. Notably, in 2005,
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Vice-President Aliu Mahama suggested that the GAF should further integrate into all
dimensions of national life in order to improve civil-military relations. 26 While the
government did not come out with a complete national security policy, there were some
efforts including a conference on a national security in 2007.27
Some measures were initiated by a network of civil society organizations which aimed at
fostering civil-military relations and generating greater understanding on SSR issues. These
included a series of workshops to deepen the military’s appreciation and commitment for
constitutional rule. 28 Courses on security sector governance and management were
developed and run with the help of local institutions- African Security Dialogue and
Research (ASDR), University of Ghana and Ghana Institute for Management and Public
Administration.29 In the same fashion adopted by earlier political administrations, the NPP
government approach to reforms was piecemeal. This approach to reforming the defence
sector is attributable to the lack of strong political will by successive governments to
effectively transform the post-authoritarian armed forces and defence sector. 30 Several
reasons accounts for this state of affairs, including the fact that the military remains a very
sensitive institution in the political history of Ghana. The untimely demise of previous
regimes such as the Third Republic in 1979 is illustrative of what can happen to a civilian
political administration that moves too aggressively against the military. 31 The NPP
government faced some challenges in overseeing and restructuring the military. For
instance, there were accusations against the government for making key appointments in
the GAF along ethnic lines. These issues will be discussed in detail in this chapter. Against
the background of noted reforms carried out by the two main political administrations
under the Fourth Republic, this chapter examines issues of cultural, human (regional
balance and gender), organizational (right-size and institutions of defence management),
and political (parliamentary oversight) transformation in the defence sector. It will be
argued that the defence sector in Ghana has undergone transformation, but in a piecemeal
fashion. The major catalysts for change in the GAF have been post-Cold War
democratization of domestic politics, the use of the armed forces for both internal security
and external peacekeeping purposes, and the impact of the Ghanaian economy on the
defence budgetary constraints.
5.1 Cultural Transformation in the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF)
In dealing with the military, it is important for one to understand its culture; especially its
norms of behaviour, belief systems, language and ethics, among other features. 32 The
military has a distinct culture that must be understood as uniquely different from the
civilian world.33 Military culture can be described by four qualities: First, the culture is
learned through socialization training at boot camps and military academies. Second, it is
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broadly shared by members, for instance saluting. Third, it must be adaptive to changing
conditions, such as on issues of integration of women into the military. Fourth, it is
symbolic in nature as exemplified by insignia and language used in the military
environment.34 It is generally held that the military culture is unique because functional
imperatives of war and military operations ensure that the military stands apart from the
civilian society. The armed forces often have a culture built upon preparedness to fight that
involves leadership, management and motivation.35 The core values of the military culture
often involve discipline, courage, and the idea of bravery and sacrifice where individuals
must be willing to subordinate themselves for the common good.36 As noted by Charles
Kirke, in military culture a loyalty and identity structure consists of ideas about
“belonging.” There is emphasis on history and traditions, which are used in indoctrination
of a special worldview, which underlines patriotism, sacrifice, heroism, and commitment.37
In the military, features such as hierarchies and power distances, masculinity, collectivism
(in the form of group orientation and cohesion) are fundamental to the structure of the
organization.38
The culture of the GAF does not differ significantly from the general attributes of military
culture in Africa. However, there are peculiarities in terms of behaviour, customs and
operating styles, among other features. As noted previously, the GAF was modelled upon
the British military system and thus has some of the core cultural attributes of the British
system. Typical of most militaries, the organizational culture of the GAF is one of unity of
purpose and mutual respect for command and control.39 Soldiers in Ghana are expected to
exhibit the highest professional standards and cultural attributes. However, the reality on
the ground is different. The general and historical perception of the culture of the GAF has
been negative, characterized by a culture of coups d’état, indiscipline and abuse of
civilians. Indeed, an aberration of the ideal military cultural ethos by officers and rank and
file of GAF can be linked to Ghana’s history of civil-military relations. Since the colonial
era, the prevailing culture of the GAF appeared cult-like. Soldiers saw themselves as
separate and distinct elite group, close to the colonial powers, and viewed civilians as
uncivilized and thus be subjected to violence. People with little or no formal education
were recruited as soldiers and kept in the barracks, to “protect them from the ills of the
society” and serve the colonial purpose of repressing local dissent.40 As a result, military
personnel had limited contact with the general society, and when they did interact there was
a tendency for the military to abuse or bully unarmed civilians.41
With the return to democratic rule, the military is striving to court a positive image among
the general society from one of brutality to that of people-friendly armed forces.42 Some of
the measures aimed at improving civil-military relations will be discussed in detail in the
next chapter. The Ghanaian military is well noted for exhibiting a high sense of
professionalism, especially, in peacekeeping environments. Several Ghanaian military
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personnel have earned meritorious accolades in international peacekeeping. Nonetheless,
the extent of change in the negative institutional culture associated with the GAF is mixed.
Typically, the military is often seen as a highly conservative institution and thus resistant to
change. There is the need for greater efforts by civilian authorities and the military
hierarchy to effect comprehensive reforms.43 As mentioned earlier, there are efforts at the
institutional level for change. These are manifested by pronouncement and posture of the
military hierarchy. However, the behaviour of some officers and rank and file towards
civilians raises questions. This can be attributed to an institutional perception of superiority
of the military over civilians.44 There is yet to be complete change from the traditional
culture of aggressiveness or violence associated with the military. Particularly, the use of
the military for internal security purposes frequently brings them into contact with the
civilian population. As noted earlier, civilians are often perceived as idle and undisciplined
group of people, whom the military has to keep in check or bend backwards to
accommodate.45 This perception may account for the recurrent military callousness even in
a democratic dispensation. Likewise, some civilians dislike the military due to the latter’s
self-perception of superiority and aggressive behaviour.46 Ghanaians, including members of
other security services such as the police have haunting experiences of military excesses in
terms of harsh and violent treatments. During the periods of military rule, soldiers often
made their presence felt in the street and markets of the major cities, usually in an
unwelcome fashion.47While the unwelcoming presence of the military in the Ghanaian
society and its attendant violence is reduced significantly in recent times, incidences of
military brutality continue to surface in the media occasionally. A few such incidences are
captured in Table 5-5
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Table 5-5: Reported Incidences of Military Brutalities
Year Location Incidence
August, 2000, Teshie, Greater Accra Shooting incident occurred during passing celebrations of
members of Intake 34 of Ghana Military Academy at Next Door
Beach Resort, Teshie, led to death of a civilian, Edmund Ofori
Ayeh.
April, 2005 Kumasi, Ashanti
Region
Residents of the Kumasi suburb of North Suntreso were reportedly
subjected to brutalities and massive destruction of property amid
sporadic gunshots by a group of men believed to be soldiers.
About 50 people, including a 79-year-old blind woman sustained
various degrees of injuries, including cutlass wounds. The men
were said to be avenging the death of a colleague soldier who had





Two policemen and two soldiers were implicated in the brutal
beating that led to the death of a mini-bus driver, George Atuah.
The deceased was arrested for allegedly refusing to stop at a
police-military checkpoint.
July, 2008 Accra, Greater Accra
Region
Some drivers of Commercial vehicles locally known as trotro and
their mates were allegedly subjected to dehumanizing methods of
punishment by military guards at the 37 Military Hospital for
flouting traffic regulations. Some of the drivers complained of
being hit by soldiers and forced to arrange dead bodies at the





Officers from the Air Force Basewere accused of stripping a 70-
year old woman and her pregnant friend naked, and forcing several
others to remove their shirts. The incident reportedly happened
because they were wearing NDC party T-shirts, and using the





Vice President John Mahama condemns brutality of residents by
military deployed for internal peacekeeping in Bawku.
August, 2009 Nalerigu, Northern
Region
Residents accused soldiers of raping at least three women in the
town. They also reported of brutalities and destruction of property
during a raid by security officers in an operation to restore calm,
following a rampage by locals to demand justice over the murder
of former People’s National Congress parliamentary candidate,
Moses Alando Banaba.
June, 2010 Kumasi, Ashanti
Region
Violent Clashes between soldiers and police involving several
separate assaults carried by soldiers over two days left 12 police
personnel injured and police property destroyed. The attacks began
after a police officer attempted to arrest a soldier for riding an
unlicensed motorcycle. The soldier threatened him and returned
with reinforcements to attack the police officer. In response,
members of the Motor Traffic and Transport Unit (MTTU) of the




April, 2011 Bawku, Upper East
Region




Accra An Accra Fast track court convicted two soldiers for causing the
death of former Northern Regional Chairman of the Convention





Residents reported of being man-handled by military personnel
engaged by mining companies to provide security in mining areas.
June 2014 Burma Camp, Accra A 30-year old mason petitioned the Commission of Human Rights
and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), to compel the GAF to apply
punitive measures against a group of soldiers who reportedly
forced the petitioner to sweep and collect rubbish at Burma Camp





A 22- year old driver’s mate, Stephen Kwaku Manu, died four
days after he was allegedly brutally assaulted by uniformed men
believed to be soldiers on the Bekwai District Forestry Task Force
in the Ashanti Region. Manu was subjected to severe beatings for
removing a wooden slab the soldiers had used as a speed rump on
the Brosase-Fawoman road in Bekwai.
April, 2016 Tamale, Northern
Region
A 16-year old boy Christopher Bamah was reportedly tied to a tree





A group of military personnel numbering 20, from the Air Force,
reportedly stormed the Kwesimintsim Police station with two
military pick-ups, ransacked and vandalized the place, over the
arrest of their colleagues, who were detained in connection with
the arrest of a Ghanaian in the British Army for dangerous driving.
During the scuffle, two police men of the station were injured.
Source: Author, culled from local newspapers.
The above table points to recurrence of military brutality of civilians even in a democratic
dispensation. Typical of such brutality was a case captured on camera on 6th March 2013,
when two journalists were manhandled by members of the military police at the
independence celebrations parade in Accra for stepping outside a security zone.48 This
incident attracted widespread condemnation in the media. The military high command
subsequently rendered an apology to the Ghana Journalist Association after an internal
investigation into the incident which authorized sanctions against the soldiers involved,
while the victims were compensated. 49 The apology from the military high command
signifies attitudinal change in leadership as this would not have happened under military
rule. However, even under democratic dispensations such as the first NDC government
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under Jerry Rawlings (1993-1996), as a former military officer, Rawlings unapologetically
abused civilians. A typical case is the beating of his vice president Mr. Kow Nkensen
Arkaah at a cabinet meeting in December 1995. It is illustrative to note that, in most of the
above incidences, there were condemnation from official military sources resulting in some
internal investigations and disciplinary actions. However, the outcomes were never made
public.
Another significant development that points to cultural change in GAF was the gruesome
murder of Captain50 Maxwell Adam Mahama on May 29, 2017, by some residents of
Denkyira-Obuasi, in Central Region, who claimed they mistook him for an armed robber.
The military officer was head of a contingent deployed to protect mining concession from
the activities of illegal small scale gold miners, locally known as galamsey.51 Typically,
people expected a brutal response from the military. The heavy military presence in the
town after the incident resulted in many residents fleeing their homes. The military earned
the admiration and sympathy of the Ghanaian public when no reports were heard of soldiers
brutalizing locals of the town. The military high command ignored calls for retaliation by
angry soldiers. Rather, members of GAF were urged to exercise restraint and allow law
enforcement agencies to deal with the issue leading to arrest and on-going trial of some
suspected killers.52 For instance, at an officers durbar at Burma Camp, Major General Obed
Akwa, CDS, noted that a “new image of the Ghana Armed Forces is being carved”, adding:
“we don’t have officers and men who will take reprisal action as perhaps was the case in
the past. I like to commend all of them and to urge those who are still deployed in the
operational area to live peaceably with their civilian counterparts and allow the law to take
its course.”53 Pronouncements such as these from the military hierarchy show that the GAF
recognizes the need for a cultural transformation and it is making some efforts in that
direction.
This notwithstanding, one may argue that the institutional desire for cultural change is yet
to transcend to the level of individual soldiers. The behaviour of soldiers in Ghana points to
the assertion that GAF is not very people-friendly because of the perception among soldiers
that presenting an unfriendly demeanour is a mark of competent soldering. Some soldiers
believe that behaving against community norms makes the effective soldiers.54 Violence is
part of the military’s core business as they have the authority to use legitimate violence to
defend the state and its interests. Therefore, controlling and coping with it is an inherent
challenge many military organizations tend to face.55 Soldiers as part of their training are
subjected to arduous training regimes. The training process often involves purposeful
exhaustion, psychological intimidation, and personal humiliation, treatment aimed at
breaking down feelings of individualism within new recruits.56 The primary purpose of
basic training in the military is to transform the individual recruit into a combat-ready
warrior.57 This contributes to violent behaviour of soldiers especially outside the combat
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zone. There is the need for a total overhaul of military training regimes to make them more
humane and possibly contribute to attitudinal changes in the recruits. The GAF once made
public statement about introducing reforms in the training of military recruits. This
statement was issued when video went viral on social media showing recruits being
subjected to beating by a trainer.58 However, there is little evidence on the ground with
regards to the nature of the reforms and their implementation. Further, societal norms often
encourage violence, for example, in some African societies; there is the tacit acceptance of
violence by the elderly or persons in positions of authority as a normal method of resolving
conflict.59 A typical example is the traditional belief that, men have a right to control or
discipline women and children through physical violence. In the case of Ghana, the
perception on the part of the military as the upholders of discipline arguably influences the
soldiers’ violent behaviour. It is therefore, not surprising to see military men taking the law
into their hands to discipline civilians whom they perceive to have committed violations of
either societal norms or national laws and order.
The transformation of military culture is essential to democratic consolidation, and Ghana’s
military has made some modest changes most noticeably in the area of recruitment. The
current calibre of cadets and recruits, come with relatively higher educational and
professional qualifications. A retired Air Vice Marshal interviewed remarked that in the
past, highly qualified people could not question authority because “conformity was a norm,
and non-conformity was queer.” 60 But as people advance in terms of education and
technology, things need to change. In this regard, there have been some gradual changes
especially with the barracks mentality.61He acknowledges some developments such as the
31 December 1981 coup by junior officers changed the GAF to some extent. Hitherto, other
ranks could not go to officers’ offices, the coup broke the hierarchical relations and was a
major awakening that changed the relations and norms of the military.62 Nonetheless, the
issue of power distance remains an attribute of the GAF especially in terms of the relations
between superiors and subordinates. The general response of officers interviewed is that
this is needed to ensure effective command and control so as not to undermine discipline.
There is still some amount of mistrust between officers and soldiers. For instance, during
interactions with some officers and other ranks, it became apparent that officers are often
perceived differently by other ranks as not serving their interests.63
The culture of GAF is largely influenced by the calibre of people that make up that
institution. In this regards, efforts at altering the negative culture of GAF must be
accompanied by human transformation.
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5.2 Human Transformation in GAF
Human resource is an important asset to any institution. There has been human
transformation in the GAF. The institution has since independence moved away from the
days when people with little or no educational qualification found rescue in military
service. As an institution widely noted for its excellence, the GAF continue to upgrade its
entry requirement to secure the best qualified and highly skilled of the Ghanaian society.
For example, the minimum educational entry requirement for officer corps is now first
degree or higher national diploma. While that of the recruits is Junior High School and
Senior High School certificates. Like most of the reputed military academies across the
world, the Ghana Military Academy is a reputed institution that has produced some good
Ghanaian officers as well as, other officers from neighbouring African countries. Military
personnel in Ghana now have better access to educational and professional development
opportunities. These have contributed to enhancing their professional outlook. However,
the current state of the human resource of the GAF could be improved to prepare officers
and ranks to adequately meet the need of the 21st century defence and security environment.
Besides the human quality in the armed forces, issues of gender and regional balance are
focus of this study. Most countries expect their armed forces to be a fair representation of
the entire population with respect to race, ethnic composition, social class, religion and
gender. With regards to countries with a history of military interventions in politics, the
concern, particularly with respect to the officer corps as leaders of the armed forces, is that,
an unrepresentative defence force may pose a threat to the principle of civil supremacy over
the military. According to Chuter, human transformation involves the modification of the
institutional make up with respect to race, ethnic, regional, gender and human resource
practices. This is important because in cases where the armed forces do not represent the
demographic composition of the populace, the minorities, or even majorities invariably
regard such imbalances as inimical to their political power and safety. The need to foster a
non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture in line with the constitutional
imperatives is at the heart of defence transformation. This section of the chapter seeks
answers to the question of how the GAF transformed its human resources with specific
focus on issues of regional balance and gender. For the military especially, personnel are
essential for effective and efficient performance of its war and peace time functions.
5.2.1 Regional Balance in GAF
Identity issues such as ethnicity and religious affiliations are often treated with sensitivity
in Ghana as they play critical roles in politics and society. Ethnicity is a broad concept that
encapsulates the culture, language, religion, heritage, history, territory and consciousness of
a distinct group. Most African states have plural societies with deep ethnic or religious
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cleavages. 64 Some have argued that the historical evolution of African states makes
ethnicity a most significant factor in the internal affairs of these states. Key issues like
politics, economics, education, revenue allocations and resource allocations are to a large
extent determined by or perceived to be determined by ethnic cleavages and
considerations.65 While ethnicity is not inherently conflictual, it has been observed that
political ethnicity, has been a major cause of political instability in Africa.66 Political
developments in the past four decades, regarding competition for political power, have
disrupted the political harmony and national integration anticipated by nationalist and pan-
African leaders in the post-colonial Africa, partially due to political ethnicity. The modern
political elites are increasingly resorting to ethnic support in their quest for political
power.67 Political meddling in the military, especially along ethnic lines, has been cited as
one of the underlining causes of frequent military interventions in politics on the African
continent, including in Ghana.68 As mentioned previously, the colonial patterns of military
recruitment was mainly based on fictitious martial races or ethnic bias in which people
from certain parts of the colonies especially minorities ethnic groups were mainly drafted
into the colonial armies for sole purposes of counter-balancing historically powerful
ethnicities and suppressing local dissent against colonialism.69 The post-colonial defence
establishment continued along these lines as many African leaders did not seek the
opportunity to rebuild national militaries. Rather, most of them maintained the status quo
and actually exploited these shortcomings to sustain their authoritarian political systems.
Various mechanisms including as political patronage within security and defence
institutions were employed by leaders for reasons of regime security.70
In the course of the interviews, it was very challenging for interviewees to openly discuss
such issues. Therefore getting reliable and statistical data on the regional composition of the
GAF was not possible as such records were treated with confidentiality. However,
interviews with some serving and retired persons across the ranks of the GAF revealed that
the current regional composition of the GAF is relatively balanced as compared to the pre-
1992 era.71 It is notable that the issues of ethnic and regional composition of the armed
forces have been very contentious in the past with possible lingering effects on the current
state of affairs. This is influenced by the general societal tensions around ethnicity in
Ghana. The country has ten administrative regions with about 75 ethnic groups which can
be categorized into four main language groups who share a common cultural heritage,
history, language, and origin. These are namely: the Akan, Mole-Dagbani and Gonja,
Guan, and Ga-Dangme and Ewe.72 Akan is the predominant ethnic group and constitutes
about 47.5% of the population. Among the Akan, the Ashanti are the largest. This is
followed by the Mole Dagbani and Gonja with 16.6%, the Ewe, 13.9% and Ga-Dangme,
7.4%. There are other smaller groups which together constitute about 1%.73 These groups
are located in specific geographic locations that make up the 10 administrative regions of
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Ghana. Below is a map of Ghana showing the distribution of ethnic groups (these ethnic
groups are not however confined only to the areas shown in this figure).
Figure 3-5: Ethnology Map of Ghana
Source: Adopted from Ganle, (2015), original map by Department of Geography & Rural
Development, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology.
The Mole-Dagbani and Gonja occupy the northern two-fifths of the country including the
Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions. The Akan occupy the Ashanti, Brong
Ahafo, Central and Eastern Regions. The Ga-Adangbe and Ewe occupies the Greater Accra
and Volta Regions. The exceptions are the Guans, who cut across the west-central part of
northern Ghana through to the Volta Region, to the southern parts of Eastern and Central
Regions.74 It must be emphasized that no part of Ghana is ethnically homogeneous. The
urban areas especially are heterogeneous with people of mixed ethnic or religious descents.
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This is partly due to migration to towns and cities for socio-economic reasons. Easy social
mobility and inter marriages have led to the scattering of ethnic groups without necessarily
weakening their socio-cultural bonds.75 Ethnic cleavages dating from both pre-colonial and
colonial eras, and the effects of colonialism on different ethnic groups, coupled with the
uneven distribution of social and economic amenities and opportunities in both colonial and
post-colonial Ghana have created tensions among various groups across the country.76
Historically, ethnic groups to the south, close to the Atlantic coast were exposed to the
colonial economy, western education, and Christianity, whereas those to the north, have
been less exposed to those influences and are mostly Muslim. 77 These feelings have
permeated in the conduct of politics and public service in the country since independence.78
Particularly, there exists some fault lines among Akans who constitute about half of the
population and non-Akans, namely, Northerners, 79 Ewes, Ga and other smaller ethnic
groups. 80 Nonetheless, these deep-rooted ethnic cleavages among Akans, especially
Ashanti’s and some of the above mentioned groups, particularly, the Ewes, have not
presented an existential threat to the Ghanaian body politic.81 However, the exploitation of
ethnic and religious identity by the political class if not checked could prove to be costly for
the consolidation of Ghana’s democracy.
As noted previously, ethnic or regional considerations were used during recruitments in the
colonial army which formed the nucleus of the post-independence armed forces.82These
historical developments have arguably contributed to the present day debates on regional
balance in the GAF. Considering Ghana’s political history, successive governments since
independence have been conscious of issues of identity in the governance process in
particular, and the society in general. As a way of dealing with regional balance in public
sector employment and government appointments in the current political dispensation, the
1992 constitution has provisions that seek to ensure non-discrimination and regional
balance in public sector appointments. Specifically, under the directives of state policy,
Article 5 states that:
‘the State shall actively promote the integration of the peoples of
Ghana and prohibit discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of
places of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or
religion, creed or other beliefs. A further article 6(b) requires the
state to “take appropriate measures to achieve reasonable regional
and gender balance in recruitment and appointment to public
offices.”83
Since 1992, there have been conscious efforts to apply this constitutional requirement in
recruitment and appointment in GAF. There have been debates in the media especially on
how ethnicity and cronyism has undermined efficiency and professionalism in the armed
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forces. Concerns of perceived imbalances in recruitment and command appointments in the
military often arise during all the different governments under the Fourth Republic. For
example, there have been media reports that certain regions, particularly the Volta region
and the three northern regions tend to have high numbers in both officer corps and other
ranks. 84 This is perceived to have arisen out of irregular recruitment and promotion
practices.85 These concerns were more pronounced following the first political turnover in
2001 under the Fourth Republic when the NPP government felt the military was dominated
by Rawlings’ ethnic kinsmen and loyalists. According to a newspaper, citing confidential
sources, in 2000, Volta region had about 27.28% of officers in the GAF and about 26.98%
of the other ranks.86 Hence there was the need to neutralize the perceived influence of
certain groups like the Ewes and northerners, who were seen as largely sympathetic to the
erstwhile PNDC/NDC government to ensure survival of the new government.87 Indeed,
there were also perceptions of favourable enlistment processes during the PNDC/NDC
era.88
Subsequently, from 2001, there were attempts by the government to address the perceived
regional imbalances in the GAF through recruitment of more people from other regions.89
Allegations became rife in media reports that under the NPP, there were some irregular
recruitment practices to prevent non-Akans from joining the military, while a lot of serving
personnel from Volta, Ga and Northern origin were frustrated out of the service.90 It was
also observed that recruitment practices under the NPP were not based on an official policy.
Efforts by the military leadership to achieve a semblance of regional balance came with
some challenges. As noted by a senior officer, “people who did not meet the criteria for
selection were considered in the name of regional balance.”91Similarly, some retired and
active members of the armed forces interviewed also argued that, the nature of the
recruitment was detrimental to the quality of personnel for the armed forces.92 For instance,
when the NPP left office in 2009, a board of inquiry was set up by the military high
command to investigate the circumstances that led to a botched recruitment of 420
recruits.93 Prior to the release of the report of the board, the Director of Manpower and
Personnel, Colonel Kwadwo Damoah was released from the service for diverse reasons
including the perception of his close affiliation with the erstwhile NPP government.94
Per the GAF recruitment policy, personnel are recruited based on their regions of residence
and not their ethnic origin. The formula for arriving at force levels to be recruited is based
on the country’s latest population census and the needs of the armed forces. All ten regions
of Ghana are then allocated quotas based on population density.95 The capital region,
Greater Accra often gets the highest quota due to its population density. Due to this policy,
it has been argued by several of those interviewed that, the regional composition of the
current armed forces is fairly balanced and is no longer dominated by people from the three
northern and Volta regions.96 In 2014, the military introduced an online application system
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to reduce the human factor in the selection processes. Each year, the military issues
recruitment advertisements with detailed eligibility criteria. These include citizenship, age,
character and minimum educational qualifications for the officer corps and other ranks.
There are additional special requirements for each of the three services and their respective
units.97
Nonetheless, it is argued that, it is impossible to achieve regional balance in GAF. This is
because people’s motivation for joining the military profession differs and is influenced by
some social and historical factors. For example, people from certain parts of the country
like Volta and northern Ghana, due to socio-economic and historical reasons tend to show
more interest in military service than people from the forest and coastal areas. In addition,
due to the cosmopolitan nature of urban areas in Ghana, unsuccessful persons in
recruitment processes in a particular region may go to other regions and get successfully
enlisted. Such persons may not necessarily have social or ethnic ties to the regions and may
deny indigenes of other regions the chance to enlist.98 In addition, there have been efforts
by past governments, especially under Nkrumah, to promote national integration and
sustain unity among the diverse ethnic groups in Ghana. Some of these measures included
the public boarding school system and rotation of public servants across regions. These
measures have resulted in inter-ethnic marriages and thus making it impossible to clearly
categorize offspring of such unions into distinct ethnic groups. Moreover, recruitment is
voluntary in nature, so it is difficult to restrict entry from certain regions or particular ethnic
groups who are mostly interested in military service. These developments present practical
challenges to measures of transforming human composition of the armed forces with
regards to regional representation of personnel.
Despite the existence of constitutional requirements and the armed forces recruitment
regulations, yearly recruitment processes have not been entirely devoid of reports and
perceptions of political and other ethnic undertones. Interviewees acknowledge that
decisions on recruitment figures and promotions are often influenced by the aspirations of
the government of the day. Of particular interest is the perceived influence of political and
ethnic affiliations in recruitments and promotions in the GAF.99 There exists in Ghana the
custom of “protocol recruitment” where certain highly-connected people are recruited
regardless of whether they meet the established recruitment criteria. The “protocol
recruitment” is often used to satisfy the wishes of political and economic elites, including
top military officers, to secure public educational, employment and other benefits for their
wards or people connected to them. This reflects the informal system of patronage that is
deeply engrained within the Ghanaian society. There is a practice in the military where
senior officers are given quotas (often two persons each) that allow them to bring persons
for enlistment into the services. Some have attributed undisciplined practices to protocol
recruitment in the military.100 It is argued that, the prospective applicants of the protocol
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system often get in with little or no background checks done on them.101 The military is
often pressurized by politicians with protocol lists of applicants. Nonetheless, there is
institutional resistance by the military to ensure that persons coming from the protocol list
do meet the laid down criteria. As recounted by an officer who once served as aide de camp
of a chief of defence staff, “there had been instances in the past, where the protocol lists
were shredded.”102 Nonetheless, people do get recruited through the protocol channel. For
example, in December 2015, about 501 recruits undergoing training at the Army Recruits
Training School (RTS) were sent home for demonstrating behaviour that were deemed “far
reaching and inimical to the security of the state.” 103 It is reported that these recruits
protested against the strenuous training they were undergoing. Matters arising out of these
developments have raised questions about the calibre of persons and how they were
recruited into the armed forces.104 Indeed the decision by the military high command to
send these recruits home lends some credence to the relative professional autonomy of the
institution amidst political interferences.
5.2.2 Promotion and Regional Balance
Promotions to senior officer ranks and command positions in the armed forces are done in
accordance with the constitutional provision that requires the president as the Commander-
in-Chief to carry out such functions in consultation with the Armed Forces Council (AFC).
Per the Armed Force Regulations, (relating to Administration) promotion of an officer to
the rank of Colonel or equivalent and above shall be made by the cabinet acting in
accordance with the advice of the AFC.105The promotion of any officer to any rank lower
than Colonel or equivalent shall require the approval of the Chief of Defence Staff or such
officer as he may designate106. In line with the above service regulations, promotions in the
junior officer corps from Lieutenant to Captain are based on promotional exams. Further,
promotion from the rank of Major to Lieutenant Colonel is based on recommendation at the
service level. These procedures are the same for equivalent ranks in the navy and air force
as shown in Table 6 below. The president is also responsible for top command
appointments in the armed forces. It is instructive to mention that, certain criteria are often
considered as basis for promotion and appointments. These include command and
operational experience, seniority, education and professional qualifications, military
training and length of service.107 These are calculated based on a points-based system.
The practice of promotions based on ethnic ties and personal alliances is a common feature
of most militaries across Africa. It is common practice to find the upper echelons of such
institutions filled with people from a particular ethnic, religious or regional affiliation, who
are deemed more loyal to the political authority or the president. The practice that puts
ethnicity and cronyism above efficiency undermines professionalism of those
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institutions.108 However, the practice in the GAF is that, in top level appointments like
service chiefs, there are efforts to ensure a modicum of regional balance at the top hierarchy
of the institution. The critical concern is whether this practice contributes to watering down
ethnic sentiments or rather aggravating the latent tensions. For instance, as argued by an
officer, officers and soldiers do not often care about the ethnic or regional affiliations of
their commanding officers during operations at home or abroad. However, when it comes
to top command appointments, regional or ethnic affiliation becomes an issue, rather than
the point-based system of promotion. This may create challenges of finding senior officers
from certain regional groupings to fill certain positions rather than concentrating on the
professional qualities of officers. Moreover, the appointment of an officer from a particular
ethnic group may not necessarily mean that all other related ethnic groups are represented.
Due to political involvement in senior-level promotions and appointment, there is the
tendency for officers to seek political favour as opposed to their professional ethics of
political neutrality. A retired officer remarked that, “unfortunately some soldiers are
dabbling in politics openly while there are allegations of some officers bearing membership
cards of political parties.”109 A former staff officer of the GAF also wrote that “…in matters
of promotion and appointment, much consideration has been given to “whom you know”
and what ethnic group one comes from.”110 The negative effects of political influences in
the military as well as other security services is such that some people are often rewarded
with promotions and appointments, while some deserving personnel are denied promotions
or even frustrated in the service until their subsequent release from the service due to
various reasons. 111 This development sacrifices meritocracy. 112 Irregular promotions in
GAF have led to officer inflation at certain ranks, such as colonel, with little or no
vacancies for such officers.113There is the need for the military to place emphasis on merit-
based promotions as these could contribute to enhancing professionalism and enhancing the
strength and credibility of the military institution among the general public.
Table 6 -5: Promotion Procedures for Officer Corps
Ranks in Army/Navy/Air force Procedure Years in
ranks
From 2ndLietenant /Midshipman/Pilot officer to
Lieutenant/Sub Lieutenant/Flying officer
Recommendation 2
From Lieutenant/sub Lieutenant/flying officer/
to Captain/Lieutenant GN/Flight Lieutenant
Career planning examination 4
From Captain/Lieutenant GN/Flight Lieutenant to
Major/Lieutenant Commander/Squadron Leader
Career planning examination 5
From Major/Lieutenant Commander/Squadron Leader to Recommendation and 5
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Ranks in Army/Navy/Air force Procedure Years in
ranks
Lieutenant Colonel/ Commander/Wing Commander availability of vacancy
From Lieutenant Colonel/Commander/Wing Commander to









From Brigadier-General /Commodore/Air commodore to
Major General / Rear admiral/Air vice marshal
Recommendation and
availability of vacancy
From Major-General/Rear Admiral/Air Vice marshal
to Lieutenant-General/Vice Admiral and Air Marshal
Recommendation and
availability of vacancy
Source Armed Force Regulation, Vol. 1(1970).
5.2.3 Towards Gender Transformation in the GAF
The concept of gender refers to the socially ascribed roles to males and females. It
includes relationships, personality traits, attitudes, behaviour and values that society
ascribes to men and women.114 The military is a gendered social institution with gendered
identities. Its values, practices, rites and rituals often reflect accepted notions of
masculinity and femininity.115 It is argued that, the military is a prototypical masculine
institution. Therefore, gender integration in the armed forces has been part of defence
transformation and reform discourses of most countries around the globe. For instance,
some have argued that integrating gender in the defence sector is a means of responding to
different security needs within society and to the changing requirements of the sector
itself.116 It is argued that gender mainstreaming in the defence sector enhances operational
effectiveness, helps to create representative and non-discriminatory institutions, and
strengthens democratic, civil oversight.117
There is official recognition of gender integration in public sector institutions in Ghana. For
example, the 1992 constitution, under Directive Principles of state policy, specifically
article 35(5), prohibits discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of places of origin,
ethnic origin, gender or religion, creeds or other beliefs.” Furthermore, articles 17, 24 and
27 of the same constitution contains a number of provision that are relevant to women’s
right to full and equal participation within the society and the armed forces with regards to
non-discrimination on grounds of gender, paid maternity leave, and childcare; of equal
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rights to training and promotion. Specifically, under chapter five on fundamental human
rights and freedoms, Article 17 (1) says that “All persons shall be equal before the Law,”
while 17 (2) says “A person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race,
colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status.” In addition, Article 24
relates to economic rights. Thus, under 24(1) “Every person has the right to work under
satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work without
distinction of any kind”.118
Article 27 specifically relates to women’s rights; and
contains the following provisions:
(1) Special care shall be accorded to mothers during a
reasonable period before and after child-birth; and during
those periods, working mothers shall be accorded paid
leave.
(2) Facilities shall be provided for the care of children below
school-going age to enable women, who have the traditional
care for children, realize their full potential.
(3) Women shall be guaranteed equal rights to training and
promotion without any impediments from any person.119
Beside these constitutional guarantees, Ghana is a signatory to most international and
regional instruments relating to the advancement of women. 120 The UN’s Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action (BFA), often considered as a defining framework for
change for gender equality and women empowerment globally was accepted by the
government of Ghana in 1995. Since the Beijing Declaration there has been intense gender
activism led mainly by civil society organizations and other women groups. In August
2015, the government of Ghana adopted a National Gender Policy to mainstream gender in
the national development processes. 121 It is generally held that a reasonably gender
balanced force is essential to achieving the defence goals of any nation. Like most
militaries in West Africa, GAF is not balanced in terms of gender. Women constitute about
10% of the entire force strength. It is necessary to explore in detail the gender related
policies and practices adopted by GAF to achieve gender transformation.
Male dominance in African militaries is a colonial legacy. In pre-colonial Africa, women
were part of the native armies and played diverse roles. Their presence contributed to the
military power of their kingdoms. For instance, women like Yaa Asantewaa, the queen of
Ejisu, Ashanti, actually played significant roles and led wars against British colonial
authorities in the Gold Coast.122 Yaa Asantewaa was the most influential decision-maker in
a national security meeting and subsequently the leader of a 5000 army in the last Anglo-
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Asante war known as the Yaa Asantewaa War of 1900-1901.123 While Asante lost the war
leading to the capture of Yaa Asantewaa, her bravery ignited the independence struggle by
the Ashanti Confederacy. 124 Women were not recruited into the colonial army. The
involvement of women in the GAF started after independence, when women were recruited
to serve in support roles. The first woman to enter the GAF in 1958 was reportedly a
nurse.125 The Directorate of Women’s Auxiliary Corps was established in 1964 with the
goal of training women and increasing their representation in the armed forces. Women of
other ranks were recruited from January 1964 to serve in supporting services as telephonists
and signallers. 126 The Directorate of Women’s Auxiliary Corps was modelled on the
Women’s Royal Auxiliary Corps in the United Kingdom.127 This was the first step towards
promoting gender issues in the GAF. As noted by former army commander, a political
decision was taken by Nkrumah that every woman in the armed forces should belong to the
women’s auxiliary corps. For example, the women corps had their own mess.128 However,
the women corps was later disbanded in 1966 following the overthrow of Nkrumah. Since
then there has not been establishment of a similar structure or unit within the GAF to
address issues gender representation. Nonetheless women are now recruited and trained to
serve in all ranks and almost all units expect the infantry.
Low representation of females in the armed forces is part of a larger national problem of
gender imbalance in Ghanaian society, especially at the upper echelons of public sector and
governance institutions. Since independence, affirmative action policies and directives have
been used by governments to address gender and regional imbalances in access to health,
education, work and politics. 129 An example is the 1998 Cabinet Directive that was
supposed to provide a set of guidelines for the systematic and sustained implementation of
the various aspects of affirmative action towards equality of the rights and opportunities for
women in Ghana. As a set of special measures adopted by governments to systematically
and institutionally address the structural discrimination and collective disadvantages which
women suffer as a group, affirmative action in Ghana has produced mixed outcomes. For
instance, the country has seen increasing numbers of girls at the basic levels of education,
and to some extent in tertiary levels, but it has been less effective in improving women’s’
representation in public life including the armed forces. It is noteworthy that there are on-
going efforts since 2016 towards the passage of the Affirmative Action Bill, into law, to
provide legally mandated systems and policies to ensure women's equal participation in the
public sector.130
The GAF does not have a gender policy to clearly articulate policies and programmes for
ensuring gender representation of its force. There is no official recruitment quota system for
women. Hence women are not necessarily targeted through recruitment. Nonetheless, there
have been some deliberate attempts to increase female representation. In 2001, the GAF
high command decided to allocate 10% of total recruitment to females. 131 While this
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practice is not backed by a clear policy, it has contributed increasing women representation
in the armed forces as women now constitute about 10% of the entire force strength as
compared lesser figures before 1992. There is unofficial advocacy programme to encourage
women to join the armed forces.132 In the absence of an official policy on increasing female
recruitment, it is therefore challenging for one to assess how GAF implements the
unofficial 10% quota. There is the need for more coherent approach at targeting women
into the armed forces. A male officer noted that, in dealing with gender issues in GAF, the
current practices have been more cosmetic than coherent processes backed by an official
policy. As he puts it, “it is more of showing all-female quarter guards rather than a
functional issue.”133
As noted earlier, military service is one of the most sought after jobs in Ghana. This is so
because it provides stable employment in a country with high unemployment rates.
Recruitment to GAF is very competitive and is based on specific employment
requirements. As noted by an officer, issues of gender are often not primary concern when
special skills are being sought.134 However, it is noteworthy that there are different physical
requirements such as height for men and women. For example, minimum height of 1.68m
(5.6 inches) for males and 1.57m (5.2 inches) for females.135 It is widely held that, men
tend to apply more than females for military service. Various personal, historical and
societal perceptions about women in military, whose detailed analysis fall outside our
scope, may account for this development. If the current demographics of the country that
points to about 51.2%136 female population is anything to go by, then, the current state of
affairs on gender integration in the GAF as a public sector employment provider gives
cause for concern. The table 7-5 below presents a general overview of the female strength
in the rank and file of the GAF. In the course of the interviews, it became evident that the
highest intakes of females often happen in the recruitment of other ranks.137 However, these
figures since 1992 as compared to the strength of the entire armed forces over the years
remain low. Even though figures were not provided for the officer level intakes over the
years, some personnel interviewed point out that the numbers of female officers are far
below that of their male counterparts.
Table 7-5: Recruitment Figures on Female Soldiers from 1993-2015
Year Army Air force Navy Subtotal
1992 - - - -
1993 - - - -
1994 - - - -
1995 - 13 8 21
1996 7 - 12 19
1997 40 - - 40
1998 1 - 2 3
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Year Army Air force Navy Subtotal
1999 0 28 20 48
2000 57 - - 57
2001 - - - -
2002 - - - -
2003 107 48 35 190
2004 86 59 68 213
2005 86 71 36 193
2006 92 50 55 197
2007 101 57 58 216
2008 118 63 - 181
2009 - - 56 56
2010 55 25 30 110
2011 57 13 13 83
2012 - 18 8 26
2013 39 70 49 158
2014 - - - -
2015 46 82 55 183
Total 892 597 505 1994
Source: Ghana Armed Forces, Directorate of Military Records, 2016.
5.2.4 Involvement of Women in GAF Operations
While GAF has made some progress in making some of its operations more accessible to
women in order to avoid discrimination, the emphasis has been on recruitment of women,
without giving due consideration to gender equality once they are recruited. The situation in
GAF does not differ significantly from the practice where gender integration is done from a
gender-neutral perspective. This does not bring about gender equality in the armed forces
because it obliges women to conform to and assimilate to masculine traits.138 This state of
affairs affects women’s ability to function as equals, especially where there are no
conscious efforts to value essential feminine traits. Militarized masculinities are privileged
leading to subordination of women in the armed forces. 139 Technically, all units and
branches in the armed forces are open to women: they can be recruited and deployed into
any unit of their choice. However, the reality is that female personnel are mostly deployed
to support services because they are stereotypically perceived as not capable of undertaking
certain positions like infantry. As observed by a former commandant of the Ghana Military
Academy (GMA) that, “females finish training and there are no places to post them to than
administrative and support roles. Advancements in technology will eventually make some
support services like clerical duties mostly done by female personnel redundant.140 There is
the need to employ innovative measures aimed at attracting and retaining highly qualified
female personnel in the GAF who can serve in more diverse roles. Currently, there are
more women in the Ghana Air Force and Ghana Navy than Ghana Army. The Ghana Navy
started recruiting women in 1992, after nearly four decades of its establishment.141 It is
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argued that there are more women in the navy because the nature of their training is not
purely fighting. However, most of the females in the navy are stewards, cooks, supplies
personnel. This points to an essentialist understanding of women’s role in the armed forces.
Female officers in the Ghana Navy, by convention are also not employed in the executive
branch which is the command branch of the Navy. This is because the Ghana Navy ships
are designed without cabins suitable for women.142
There is, however few women in the technical army corps, military police, signal corps, and
engineering.143 As far back as 1963, the Ghana Air Force trained its first two female pilots;
Pilot officer Ayele Kome and Pilot officer Millicent Danquah. However, after the departure
of these two officers from flying duties in 1968, the Ghana Air Force did not recruit female
pilots for another 30 years. In 2001, another duo of females; Selasie Agbenyefia and VC
Ayako were recruited and trained as pilot officers.144 As at 2014, the Ghana Air Force has
only three female pilots.145 Some have observed that women in the Ghana Air Force are
employed as helicopter and transport aircraft pilots but not as fighter pilots by convention.
This is because of conventional acceptance that flying fighter aircrafts is too complex for
women to handle.146 Interestingly, the first batch of female pilots were trained to fly fighter
aircrafts. However, the present batch of female pilots is mostly involved of in transport
duties because the GAF is essentially not a fighting military, but the aircrafts are equipped
with fighting capabilities. 147
The changing roles and utility of the military obviously calls for a reconsideration of the
role of women in GAF. Some modest efforts have also been made in incorporating females
in diverse roles in diplomatic missions, observer missions, peacekeeping, parachute training
and physical training instructors.148 With regards to peacekeeping as noted in chapter four,
GAF began participation in international peacekeeping as far back as in 1960. However,
Ghanaian female soldiers were not deployed until 1984, when one woman, a nurse was
deployed to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). 149 Women were
banned from participating in peacekeeping missions between 1986 and late 1994 due to
various reasons including allegations of indiscipline and misconduct. In 1994, the decision
was reviewed and one woman was deployed during the ECOMOG operations in Liberia
while a few others were deployed to Rwanda. Subsequently, many more women have
served in missions like the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) among others. Since 1994, the representation of
female personnel on peacekeeping missions has increased steadily. Ghanaian women are
allowed to assume operational duties in international peacekeeping.150
The increasing representation of women in Ghanaian peacekeeping contingents is in line
with UN requirements to incorporate females to enhance mission effectiveness.151 It is
argued that in peacekeeping context, women soldiers have essential traits to contribute. As
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such, they are empathetic, more open to negotiation, less likely to behave inappropriately
and are therefore valuable assets to missions that involve protection of civilian
population.152 Since the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1325 (2000),
there has been renewed discourses on gender balance in UN peacekeeping forces.
Resolution 1325 formally recognized the distinct roles and unique experiences of women in
the context of armed conflicts and thus calls for integration of women in peace processes.153
It seeks about 30% women representation in peacekeeping contingents. It is noteworthy
that while the GAF has made efforts to ensure equality in the GAF by increasing the
numbers of women on peace supports operations (PSOs), in line with resolution 1325,
women are however, not allowed in command and combat positions in Ghanaian
contingents.154 Furthermore, in 2004 the UN Security Council (UNSC) called on member
states to implement resolution 1325 through the development of National Action Plans
(NAP). Ghana is among several countries to have developed these National Action Plans
and implementation plans in 2010. 155 The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social
Protection (MoGCSP), working with relevant stakeholders, developed the Ghana National
Action Plan (GHANAP I) 2012 – 2014 to enable Ghana take proactive steps in achieving
the objectives of UNSCR 1325.156 With the expiration of GHANAP 1, there was the need
to develop a new National Action Plan. Even though the duration for the implementation of
GHANAP 1 has elapsed, there is little evidence on the ground with regards its effective
implementation. Notably, most security agencies, especially female officers who were to
play active roles in the implementation process were neither familiar with the GHANAP I
nor involved in the review process.157
Notwithstanding the above challenges to incorporating women capabilities in GAF, it is
notable that since 1992, some efforts were made at addressing gender issues following
some recommendation of top female officers.158 For instance, there have been some policy
reforms to address issues like equal-pay for equal work in the GAF pay policy. Previously
women soldiers were paid two-thirds of what their male colleagues earned and were not
allowed to do general duties. These practices have changed since 1992.159 In addition, there
are efforts to address gender-sensitive such as a sexual harassment. Even though GAF does
not have a comprehensive Sexual Harassment policy, such issues are generally addressed
based on existing policy guidelines such as the Code of Conduct for the Armed and
Security Forces and the Armed Forces Regulations. GAF address sexual misconduct in its
Code of Conduct by drawing from the standards on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse set
by the United Nations. Although there is no established policy or specific mechanism for
reporting and dealing with sexual harassment, service personnel with complaints, reports or
grievances have access to the standard military chain of command. Through this they can
approach their immediate superior who will deal with the matter in the same way as any
other disciplinary problem through the military disciplinary measures, which could lead to
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courts martial, loss of rank and or dismissal. If it is regarded as a serious criminal offence, a
matter will be referred directly to the police. However, if the problem exists in the direct
chain of command, then there is no independent alternative available within the military.
Issues of sexual harassment are often underreported by females due to varied reasons
including fear of ridicule, exclusions and the overall consequences on their careers.160
There have some policy reforms such as revised maternity leave regulations. Per the GAF
Regulations on administration (1970), a pregnant female officer is entitled to twelve weeks
maternity leave of which six weeks shall be taken as ante-natal leave and the other six
weeks taken as post-natal leave. The regulations say that “maternity leave shall be taken on
half pay”. The half pay provision is against Ghana’s Labour Law (2003) and has since been
expunged.161 Yet, according to GAF regulation on administration, female officers cannot
marry and become pregnant in the first three years of enlisting. Female personnel who
marry during their first three years could be released as unsuitable for further service,
unless in the opinion of the Chief of Defence Staff, their continued employment is in the
best interest of the GAF. This is because the first year in military academy is needed to
complete foundation training, while the remaining two years is used for other career
trainings. 162 However, this provision does not apply to specialists who enlist for short
service. It noteworthy that the regulations on marriage and pregnancy have been revised to
six months after enlistment. Female soldiers can now marry and get pregnant after six
months of joining the force. Some female personnel interviewed were of the view that the
revised regulation on marriage and pregnancy has contributed to increasing the interest of
women in the military. 163 Furthermore, female persons who marry after securing
permission may apply to leave the service at any time after marriage without prejudice to
reengagement.164
5.2.5 Gender and Career Progression in GAF
In the course of the study, it was identified that, not much has changed in the area of career
progression for women in the GAF. While there is no formal restriction on female
progression, institutional practices over the years tend to prevent women from getting to the
apex in the GAF. For example, one female officer lamented that deployment of women to
support services naturally prevents them from getting to the top, which is also true for
men.165 Most women are not deployed to elite jobs often associated with combat. For
instance, most females do not go into the infantry, or armed units like the armoury and
artillery regiments.166 These confer higher prestige, rewards and possibilities of quicker
advancement in ranks.167 The absence of women in the pure infantry fields can be attributed
to societal thinking or the perception that “women cannot be in the trenches”. Indeed, the
provisions in the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff Instruction Procedure (CSIP)
Volume 3 only allow women to be employed in support service roles and not in command
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and combat positions. Per the CSIP, combat and command roles where strategic,
operational and tactical decisions are taken are stereotypically reserved for their male
counterparts. For instance, Article 10.15 of the CSIP specifically states that “every officer
must pass in both the practical and written examination before his/her due date for
promotion.”168 In practice, a young male officer can rise to become a battalion commander,
after successful completion of his Young Officers Course, promotion exams, (both written
and practical). He must also pass Combat Team Commander’s Course and the junior and
senior staff courses at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC).
On the contrary, women are exempted from taking part in the Combat Team Commander’s
exams because there is informal acceptance that since they cannot become commanders,
they are not allowed to write such examinations.169
It is often said that “women are delicate for the front lines" due to their physiological and
biological make-up such as menstrual cycles, pregnancy and the effects on their mood and
general wellbeing. However, on female deployment, one senior male officer argues that
there is the tendency for commanders to over protect females by not allowing them to be
deployed for certain “hard” duties which they are capable of doing effectively. Even in
internal operations, females are not often taken due to cultural connotations relating to the
roles of females. 170 There is the existence of an unspoken barrier where stereotypical
societal perceptions on being “just women” and what their roles should be have crept into
the institutional culture of the armed forces thereby hindering women’s’ attainment of
leadership positions.171
Indeed, “glass ceiling” exists in the GAF whereby women face some institutional barriers
in their desire to reach the top of the organization. Typical of most security institutions in
Ghana, a woman can complete all her career training and other criteria for promotion, yet
she may not be promoted while her male counterparts or even juniors are advanced above
her. For example, the societal perception that women are too fragile for certain jobs and
they have to submit and support men all tend to provide the basis for discrimination in the
workplace. A male officer interviewed remarked that “we have always had women in the
armed forces mainly in support roles. Having women in operational units is not healthy
because seeing an injured female soldier could hurt military discipline.”172These views
often held by male officers are not backed by data, but rather based on their emotive
conviction that women do not belong on the battlefield.173 Such chauvinist views clearly
demonstrate a skewed understanding of women’s capabilities and these go a long way to
negatively affect the career progression of females in the GAF as the top hierarchy is
dominated by males most of whom may share similar sentiments.
As noted earlier, recruitment to GAF is voluntary and based on qualification, people have
the option to choose which branch or units they wish to serve in. Logically, men apply and
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progress along their career paths faster than women. It is observed that the infantry as well
as artillery and armour units are often male-dominated. These units are in principle, open to
women, but women often prefer deployment in certain branches that put them in support or
administrative functions. Indeed some women in GAF have also accepted stereotypical
distinction of what roles they can perform as women. 174 These come with ranks beyond
which they cannot rise. If women go into units like signals, engineering and medical corps,
they could rise to the top and arguably become generals. Until recently, most senior female
officers in the GAF were in the military hospitals and the signals units. 175 For example,
since independence, the highest rank ever attained by female officers in the Ghana Army is
colonel.176 This changed in March 2016, when the army announced the promotion of its
first female Brigadier-General Constance Afenu 177 who once headed the Forces Pay
office.178 Despite the admiration felt by many female officers, it can be argued that, this
promotion is mere tokenism as the institutional masculinist culture and policies are yet to
change significantly. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right direction that women can now
become generals in the GAF and perhaps pave the way for holistic gender transformation in
the institution.
Further, the military is an ‘up or out’ institution, where people are up for voluntary
retirement once they are unable to rise above certain ranks within a certain timeframe. The
attainment of higher ranks is determined by institutional, educational and mobility
requirements, with the need to deploy to combat or operational zones. All these
requirements make it difficult for women to make a career in the military. 179 Certain
female-specific reasons like maternity leave, child care, and refusing transfer and
deployment due to family reasons tend to affect female progression while men do not
typically face these issues. Notably, some existing facilities and training are not gender-
sensitive. For example, there is the lack of female facilities like washrooms or ablution
units. Even though, there are crèche and day care facilities available in most garrisons in
Ghana, there are no workplace child care facilities to support nursing female service
members. Moreover, regulations for promotion are not often modified to take into account
specific needs of women.
Some of the above mentioned requirements on marriage and pregnancy are unfavourable to
female personnel as they may be compelled to put their reproductive rights on hold in order
to meet the requirements of their chosen profession. It was observed that, not all females
could sacrifice reproductive years for careers and some were mostly not able to complete
career training within two years due to reproductive issues. For example, the armed forces
regulation on administration states that an unmarried woman who becomes pregnant could
be released. It is argued that this clause was put in place for moral reasons. In practice, it is
observed this does not really present a challenge to the GAF as personnel are often
disciplined. Even those who flaunt this may be protected by the system unless there is an
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official disciplinary complaint against them.180 A noted problem is that, some females are
compelled to opt for abortions which is not legal in Ghana unless under certain medical
conditions, insanity or rape. This provision also leaves the female personnel at the mercy of
her superiors who may choose not to deploy her. The critical concern should be how the
GAF could review its rules by taking into consideration the reproductive rights of females
whether in marriage or not. In addition, during pregnancy, servicewomen are considered
not fit for employment, which means they cannot attend the mandatory military courses
required for promotion. This has a negative impact on their career progression.181
Generally, the current GAF regulations contain some outdated provisions which require
extensive review to bring it in tune with current realities.182 This point was once captured in
one of the review boards that “the Armed Forces Administration is beset with frustrating
experiences as a result of obsolete regulations, directives, instructions and non-adherence to
procedures and provisions of the regulations. These regulations, instructions and
directives/orders are not revised as and when they become obsolete.”183 There is therefore
the need for organizational transformation to modify policies and management practices.
5.3 Organizational Transformation in GAF
The central concern of organizational transformation in this chapter relates to the
technocratic processes undertaken to ensure that the GAF is rightly sized and how relevant
institutions for defence management operate to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of the
GAF. Ideally the processes of determining the appropriate strength of an armed force
should emanate from the larger national security and defence policies. In the case of Ghana,
as noted earlier, there is no comprehensive national security strategy to set the tone for
defence policy. Successive governments under the Fourth Republic have rarely issued
policy statements or guidelines on defence on a regular basis. Both the NDC and NPP had
some sections on defence in their various manifestoes.184 However, once in government,
their respective administrations tended to give low priority to the issues of defence as
compared to policies and initiatives that seek to address socio-economic development of the
country. The Ghanaian public and civil society do not also demand it from governments
and often shy away from public discourse on defence matters. Interestingly, there is a
purported defence policy dated in July 2012 and signed by the late President John Atta
Mills.185 However, the processes in arriving at this document are not all-inclusive, as the
draft did not go through parliament. A minister of defence interviewed alluded to an on-
going process to develop a national security strategy and defence policy for the country.186
It is not clear when the process will culminate into a comprehensive document. The GAF
currently has no doctrine of its own; consequently personnel, training and equipment
policies are not based on any adapted or indigenous doctrine. Existing doctrines are rather
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based on adopted frameworks from the British system. For example, peacekeeping has
become a major preoccupation of GAF. A peacekeeping doctrine adopted in 2014 is
essentially an adaptation of the UN Capstone Doctrine.187 It is noted that currently training
in the GAF is mostly directed at peacekeeping training and not for internal operations. As
rules of engagement for peacekeeping are different from rules for internal military
operations, it is important to train troops to be able to tackle current security threats such as
terrorism.
In the absence of clearly defined national security strategy and defence policy, earlier
mentioned constitutional provisions such as; The Armed Forces Act 105(1962) and its
amendments, Security and Intelligence Act 526 (1996), and various Armed Forces
Regulations (Administration, Finance, and Discipline) provide frameworks for the
operations of the defence sector. Historically, GAF operated based on OpTraLog
(Operational, Training and Logistic) statement issued by the CDS bi-annually. This
statement incorporates the policy guidelines and strategic aims of the GHQ and addresses
the roles of department under the GHQ.188 The OpTraLog is based on review of the internal
defence environment to show short-term vision of the CDS and set strategic goals for each
service.189
5.3.1 Right-Sizing the GAF
Military restructuring in terms of size, is seen as vital for more effective and efficient
implementation of an extended range of military tasks including issues of force size, use of
new weapons and technologies. 190 Generally, decisions on force levels, equipment and
logistics requirements of the GAF should be based on current threat assessment of the
nation, and the roles/tasks that the GAF are required to perform in the defence of the nation
and other external commitments to the international community. It is also important to
consider the roles the military would be required to undertake in the socio-economic
development process. These decisions often emanate from the Order of Battle (ORBAT),
which shows the hierarchical organization, command structure, strength, disposition of
personnel, and equipment of units and formations of the armed force. Ideally, ORBAT is
revised in response to changing military needs and challenges. Generally, defence force
planning has been given very low attention in Ghana. Therefore, in the absence of clearly
articulated medium to long term plan, the GAF is being managed on ad hoc and short-term
(biannual) plans which give it no defined direction or focus.191
Opinions have varied among respondents on the size of the GAF. It is believed that
Nkrumah’s envisaged force level was 27,000 for all ranks. This vision was discarded by the
NLC regime. By 1969, total force levels approved was 21,000. However, this level has
never been fully attained. In the 1980s the figures were as high as 15,100 and 16,000 in
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1985 and 1989, respectively. As shown in chart below, in, the early 1990s, force levels
dropped to about 7000-9000 due to various reasons including the post-Cold War
demilitarization efforts and reduction in defence spending. From 1995-1996, there was an
increase. This is attributed to the budgetary constraints of the era, where ageing warrant
officers were not released but there were new recruitments.192 The figures dropped from
1997-2005. Since 2007, the figures have gone up significantly. In 2015, the strength of the
GAF was approximately 15, 500.193 The army as the senior most institution has about
11,500 of the total strength, while the navy and air force has about 2000 each.194It is
noteworthy that, the figures below are only approximations, as the actual size of the GAF
might be higher than the figures stated.
Approximate Force Strength
Figure 4-5: Approximate Strength of GAF from 1992 to 2015
Source: Author, data sourced from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance.
Considering the international norms on force levels not to constitute more than 1% of a
country's population, Ghana could have about 240,000 armed forces by its current
population size of 24,000,000. Obviously this figure is not sustainable within the
contemporary discourse on demilitarization and reduction in military expenditure as well as
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the socio-economic needs of the country and role of the GAF. The processes involved in
arriving at these figures over the years have not been extensively studied. Respondents
interviewed noted that the size of the military is often not determined by clearly defined
processes. Even though there is a formula arguably used for the calculation based on
population size, the reality is that, like most public sector institutions in Ghana, recruitment
figures are determined based on what political leadership thinks it could afford.195 Some
have argued that the current size in terms of personnel is appropriate considering the
population size and the economic constraints on maintaining effective and efficient armed
forces. The country is not at war or a “nation-in-arms”196 faced by eminent geostrategic
threats. Majority of respondents opine that GAF is not rightly sized and operating at 50% of
the required strength to effectively perform its roles and duties. Such views call for more
personnel while cognizant of the fact that, defence budgetary constraints makes it
impossible in the short to medium timeframe. For instance, as far back as 1996, a review
committee proposed an improvement in the military capability to at least one-third of the
total strength of Ghana’s immediate neighbours in terms of personnel and arsenals. The
proposed force strength was 17,000 with corresponding equipment and logistics that could
defend the nation, and discharge all assigned international obligations more effectively and
efficiently. In this regard, there was a recommendation for an increased defence budget
from 0.8% to about 2.5% of GDP to equip and modernize the armed forces.197 These
recommendations were not accepted by the Rawlings-led NDC government.
Furthermore, there have been internal processes aimed at restructuring the GAF to
effectively respond to internal security threats. For instance, command structures of the
army have been redesigned and increased from two to three with the introduction of a
central command. Since 2012, the former northern command in Kumasi has been renamed
the Central Command. A new Northern Command has been created with its headquarters in
Tamale. The Southern Command remains with its headquarters in Accra. Accordingly, the
ten administrative regions in Ghana have been categorized into the three commands as
follows: Northern command caters for the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions.
The Central Command covers Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Eastern Regions. The Southern
command oversees Greater Accra, Volta, Western and Central Regions. While the Central
command is a work progress, the ultimate is to establish military base in every region of
Ghana. As at March 2016, six regions had military bases. The four regions with no military
establishments are Upper East, Upper West, Eastern and Central Regions. Nonetheless, the
ongoing re-organization of the military is not backed by a comprehensive force level
analysis to inform future recruitments.
In addition, all the respondents emphasized the need for massive investment in the defence
sector. Notably, one officer argued that defence diplomacy is an important element of
national power. For instance, peacekeeping has become an important feature of Ghana’s
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foreign goals. The demands of peacekeeping often contribute to increasing recruitment of
females in particular, which adds to the overall size of the armed forces. This
notwithstanding, the size of the GAF in relation to its internal and external responsibilities,
particularly, peacekeeping tends to overstretch the personnel.198 An estimated 4000 troops
are always on peacekeeping duties.199 These developments in addition to retirement limit
the numbers at home. The general consensus gathered from most military personnel
interviewed is that, GAF is overstretched in terms of its size and the corresponding tasks.200
Nonetheless, there was consensus among respondents that the GAF is relatively effective
and efficient in achieving its core mission in spite of its resource constraints.201 Some
analysts have argued that international peacekeeping in particular; have contributed to
enhancing professionalism as well as effectiveness of GAF. The relatively good
performance of the GAF in peacekeeping therefore raise questions about the usefulness of
the concept of military effectiveness based on highly bureaucratized institutions with
sophisticated documents on strategy and high planning.202 Nonetheless, Ghana needs to
upgrade its defence forces and capabilities, as countries across the globe are moving
towards mechanized militaries, but the country is still doing traditional soldiering due to
lack of advanced military technologies.203 Therefore, one can argue that the current force
strength should not necessarily be increased, but could be adequately trained and equipped
with modern technology and equipment to function effectively at a sustainable cost to the
country. As the Ghanaian economy has been a determinant of decisions pertaining to the
defence sector, it is imperative to look at the impact of the Ghanaian economy on the
defence sector.
5.3.2 The Ghanaian Economy and Defence Expenditure since 1992
As mentioned in chapter four, economic imperatives have been a major drive of Ghana’s
transition to democracy in 1992. After more than two decades of democratization, the
record of economic growth has been mixed. This has impacted on the country's defence
spending. In the mid-2000s, the country recorded some marginal growth moving the
country from low income to a middle-income economy.204 While an improved economy
could bring about improvement in equipment, training and strategy in the military, there
has not been much spending on defence. For example during the 2016 budgetary hearing
process of the Ministry of Defence, it was revealed that the ministry is saddled with debts
in millions of Ghana Cedis, made up of gratuity, rent, food rations, clothing and fuel among
others which has adverse effects on the operations of the armed forces.205 In April 2015, the
government was compelled to return to the IMF to help deal with severe economic
challenges whose deeper accounts falls outside the scope here.
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Almost all respondents interviewed agreed that the state of the Ghanaian economy has an
impact on defence. The defence sector has suffered most as the economic situation of the
country declined over the years. A top civil servant at the ministry of defence remarked that
“The kitty is not enough, we ask for what we need and government cuts down so we have
to work within what is provided."206 Budgetary constraints have been key reasons behind
restructuring of the overall size and strength of the armed forces. Since the 1990s to early
2000s, Ghana’s defence spending has hovered around 0.6-1% of GDP.207 During the NDC
government (1992-1999), there seems to have been some reductions in military
expenditure. Yet, there are some contradictory analyses on this issue. 208 Notably, in the late
1980s to the 1990s, the Structural Adjustment Programs directed by the IMF and World
Bank demanded cuts in the public sector including military spending. There is however,
some evidence that points to increase in military spending. 209 See Table 8-5 below.
Table 8-5: Military Expenditure in Ghana 1992-2015

























Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security, (2016).210
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The longstanding complaints of underfunding in some sections of the armed services still
persists and was emphasized by officers and non-military analysts interviewed. This has
resulted in the ageing and deterioration of infrastructure such as barracks and office
accommodation and logistics. While some of the existing equipment have reached the end
of their life cycle, modern military hardware, technological devices, and carrier vehicles are
in short supply.211 Despite, the low spending in defence, salaries and emoluments of the
military are always provided for and thus issues of mutiny over pay is rare in Ghana. As
one officer interviewed observed “payment of salaries is always on time, but availability of
funds for infrastructural development and procurement of logistics needs to improve.”212 In
the face of budgetary constraints, inter-service competition exists within the three arms of
the GAF, where the army as the largest service tends to dominate the budgetary process and
attracts the biggest spending leading to further deterioration of the air force and the navy.213
Since 2006, Ghana has seen an increase in defence spending, attributed to the discovery of
oil in Ghana in 2007 and subsequent production from December 2010. With the rise in
maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the navy in particular has seen some modest
retooling of equipment. 214 For instance, between 2011 and 2015, there have been 11
recorded cases of actual and attempted piracy attacks on the Ghanaian territorial waters in
particular, and several others on the Gulf of Guinea generally. 215 These threats are
challenges to political and regional stability and informed the John Mahama government’s
decision to procure four C-27j Spartan Transport Aircrafts for the air force in March
2013.216 Therefore the acquisition of this aircraft is expected to enhance easy access to
remote areas within the country during emergencies and improve domestic and
international operations of the GAF.217 There have been some efforts to procure various
types of ammunitions and weapons and resource all units within the GAF with reasonable
levels of vehicles for operational and administrative duties. Examples include four (4)
MI171 Helicopters procured in 2013 for troop transport.218 It is noteworthy that, due to
Ghana’s economic challenges, defence spending is largely sourced from loans from
international and local financial institutions, as well as bilateral donor supports.219 For
instance, the US government under the Foreign Military Financing, (FMF), and programme
often provides grants and loans to assist foreign nations in purchasing U.S. military
equipment, services and training.220
The impact of the economy on defence has compelled the military to strive towards self-
sufficiency. For example, in pursuance of the vision of the armed forces to embark on
socio-economic development, the Defence Industries Department was established at the
ministry of defence to oversee the activities of the newly revamped Defence Industries
Holding Company (DIHOC). The DIHOC is part of the Civil–Military Collaboration for
Socio-Economic Development in Ghana programme (CIMCSED) launched in 2011. The
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commercial activities of DIHOC include a shoe factory which is a public-private
partnership between GAF and Knight AS from Czech Republic. This factory produces
shoes for the GAF and other security services as well as the general public.221 Like most
public enterprises in Ghana, the viability of this company gives cause for concern. Since the
launch of the factory in 2012, it has not been able meet the required work force and
production targets.222 Other income generating activities includes the 37 Military Hospital,
in Accra, and a block factory by 66 artillery regiment in Ho. In June 2016, GAF was
granted license by Bank of Ghana to operate a financial institution known as Services
Integrity Savings and Loans limited. This bank was subsequently opened in December
2016 to cater for the financial needs of military personnel, civilian employees and the
general public.223 The critical question is how much revenue these business ventures could
contribute to the defence budget. While the revenue is minimal, the involvement of the
Ghanaian military in purely economic or commercial schemes also comes with some
concerns for policy makers to consider. These have effects on discipline as by creating
avenues for corruption whereby senior military officers may be tempted to focus on
material gains through their interactions with civilian contractors through forced coercion.
Likewise, civilian elites may turn a blind eye to the military’s economic interests due to
various reasons. 224 Corruption and embezzlement of public funds is cause for concern
because it was part of reasons given for military takeovers in the past. However, the
military is not immune to corruption, though this does not feature in public policy
discourse. 225 Further research into corruption and its impact on the effectiveness and
efficiency of Ghana’s defence sector is important.
5.3.3 The Role of the Ministry of Defence in Managing Defence
Considering the very unique nature of defence and often the sensitive or controversial
issues that surround defence policies and their implementation, a defence ministry is
important as a means of making authoritative judgments and of transmitting the directions
of legitimate political authorities to the armed forces.226 The Ministry of Defence of Ghana
(MOD), was established in 1957 with the responsibility of formulating, and managing the
implementation of policies aimed at safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the nation as well as ensuring the protection of life and property.227 Over the years, the
MOD has evolved and transformed to its current status with regards to the performance of
its functions. Currently the existence and mandate of the ministry emanates from the 1992
constitution of Ghana and the Civil Service Act (PNDC Act 327) of 1993. The ministry is
the bureaucratic wing of the government that is in charge of policy direction and
implementation.228
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The vision of the ministry is to develop: “a highly professional, effective, efficient and
politically neutral Armed Forces which is subject to democratic or civil control.”229 As
shown in diagram below, unlike other ministries, the MOD has a peculiar organizational
structure. The President of Ghana sits at the apex of the organogram as the Commander-In-
Chief (C-in-C) of the GAF. This is followed by the AFC which is the governing Council of
the Ministry. The Minister for Defence is the Political head of the Ministry. The ministry is
made up of two branches, namely, the Civil and Military Branches. The Chief Director
(CD) of the ministry is in principle, the head of the bureaucracy who co-ordinates the four
divisions stipulated in the Civil Service Act 327. The military wing is headed by the
Principal General Staff Officer (PGSO), who is of the rank of Brigadier General. The GAF
is headed by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).The CDS is the most senior military adviser
to the Minister and the Deputy Ministers.
Figure 5-5: Organogram of Ministry of Defence Ghana in 2014
Source: Ministry of Defence, 2014
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5.3.4 Challenges of Defence Management in Ghana
As a civil service institution, the ministry is supposed to lead the defence management
process. However, in reality, its corps of technocrats and other civilian staff was (and
continues to be) skeletal and consists of the Minister, the Deputy Minister (when one was
appointed), the Chief Director, their personal assistants, few technical directors, clerks,
typists and receptionists. 230 The military as the largest agency within the ministry has
dominated the entire establishment. There has been a longstanding requirement for
restructuring the MOD to realign the status of the military in relation to the civil service as
a way of enhancing civil authority.231 Efforts have been made in the past to reform the
defence sector and subsequently draw up a national defence policy. The Ministry
subsequently launched a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) in 2003 with four main
objectives: to improve organizational and management systems; strengthen human capacity
and training; establish a management information system to facilitate monitoring and
evaluation; and relocate the MOD from Burma Camp.232 The overall objective was to
establish a higher degree of civilian political control over the management of the Defence
ministry. Since 2003, when the first phase of the PIP commenced, there has not been any
significant development until the NPP government secured the assistance of the UK
Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT).233It became clear that before such
a strategy could be developed there was the need for greater clarity on the roles and
responsibilities of the non-military, civil service component in the MOD in relation to the
military counterparts.234
It is instructive to note that since the creation of the MOD in 1957, unlike other government
ministries, it was first located at the Flag Staff House, (then seat of government) and later
moved to the largest military camp, Burma Camp alongside the General Headquarters of
the GAF in Accra. This location created a physical and psychological environment which
was hardly conducive for civilian control.235 The ministry has essentially been run by the
armed forces while the civilian defence minister remained a figurehead. This is because the
ministerial powers are limited and basically reduced to dealing with technical matters such
as presenting defence budgets to cabinet and parliament. A minister of defence described
the post as that of a “glorified deputy minister.”236 This is because, there is the President at
the apex of the structure as the Commander –in-Chief, while the CDS is charge with the
day-to-day administration of the armed forces. Nonetheless, under the NPP government
(2001-2008), the defence minister, Dr Kwame Addo Kuffour, who served from 2001-2007
appeared very intrusive to the dislike of the military top brass.237 This was partly attributed
to him being the younger brother of then President Kuffour.
In addition, because of the proximity of the ministry to the military, the ministry was not
seen as a significant part of the structure. For instance, a former General Officer
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Commanding the army in the 1970s remarked that during his time, “we didn’t mind the
minister of defence.”238 This resulted in considerable passive autonomy as the military was
left with much leeway in determining internal affairs and needs of the institution, such as
budgets with requirements being communicated to the Minister for evaluation and
transmission to cabinet and parliament. 239Further, the location, arguably affected civil-
military relations, especially, access to the general public. Notably, the ministry found it
difficult to meet its recruitment target, especially in getting civilian technocrats, partly due
to the perception of civilians not being comfortable in a military space.240 It was observed
that in the past some senior to middle level civil servants resisted posting to the defence
ministry partly due to its limited functions and the great influence of the military in the
running of the ministry.241 This left the ministry with few civilian technocrats to perform
essential tasks such as defence planning, strategic, budgetary and accounting, procurement
and other policy initiatives. In this regards, demilitarization of the direction and
administration of the ministry has been emphasized to give purely technical issues such as
financial administration, procurement, military supplies, personnel and human resource
development, education management and public relations to highly qualified and
experienced civilian technocrats.242
There have been some structural changes towards improving civilian oversight with regards
to the role of the ministry in defence management. The ministry is increasingly asserting its
role in the execution of these functions mentioned above. For example, since 2009, an
office complex has been built for the ministry funded by the Chinese government.243This
development is an important step towards improving the civilian oversight and defence
management in Ghana. This is because the ministry now have the opportunity to function
outside the physical environment of the military. Nonetheless, the provision of an office
complex alone cannot lead to improved civilian oversight in defence management as the
ministry is resource constraint. There is the need to adequately resource the ministry with
human expertise and logistics to enhance effective civilian management of the ministry.244
Of particular interest here, is the role of the MOD in the defence budgeting and
procurement processes. It is been observed that the role of the bureaucratic or civil wing of
the MOD in the process was minimal and even weak especially before 1999. The MOD had
limited functions and indeed acted as a clearing house between the military and political
authorities. It is however, important to note that, the MOD alone cannot be blamed for this
state of affairs. Other institutions like Parliament and Ministry of Finance also did not
perform their functions effectively in relation to the oversight and scrutiny into the defence
budgetary and spending processes.
Since 1999 there have been some modifications as part of national budgetary reform
processes. There has been some relative improvement in transparency of the defence
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budgetary process with introduction of new requirements for detailed explanation and
justification for expenditures. Now the directive for budgetary estimate is issued by the
Chief Director of MOD upon receipt of policy review by the ministry of finance. 245
Budgets are based on the MTEF, (Medium to long term expenditure framework) that was
initiated by the Ministry of Finance.246 Essentially, the MTEF is an annual, rolling three
year-expenditure planning that sets out the medium-term expenditure priorities with budget
constraints against which sector plans can be developed and refined. MTEF has helped
simplify the budgetary process. Budget estimates are now arranged under four areas (1)
Personal Emoluments, (2) Administration, (3) Service, and (4) Investment, thus simplifying
the budgetary process by eliminating the many confusing streams of expenditure in
previous budgets. MTEF also confers greater budgetary flexibility on Ministries,
departments and agencies (MDAs),247 and contains outcome criteria for the purpose of
monitoring performance.248 The MTEF provides a key entry point for budgetary scrutiny by
parliament as it requires details on specific budgetary items. However, this is only possible
if the necessary actors are capacitated to engage in debates around resource allocation in
support of policy objectives.249
5.4 Political Transformation: Parliamentary Oversight
Ghana’s political and institutional systems are based on a separation of powers between the
executive, legislature and the judiciary branches of government. As noted earlier, the 1992
constitution clearly articulates the role of government especially the executive in relation to
the military. Other arms of government like the legislature also have oversight
responsibility over the armed forces. The remaining sections of this chapter focus on
political transformation in Ghana’s defence sector. It explores the efforts being made under
the Fourth Republic to ensure that the conduct and character of the military institution
conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is located. Some of
these issues have been addressed in chapter four on the place of the armed forces in the new
democracy. As mentioned previously, the constitution has clearly spelt out issues of
civilian supremacy especially with regards to executive civilian authority. Since 1993, there
has been the emergence of armed forces that are comfortable with and realize the need for
political directives and control. In this regard, there is the existence of objective and
subjective civilian control of the armed forces. For instance, the military high command is
often consulted by political authority on issues relating to their expertise.250 The subsequent
sections of this chapter explore parliamentary oversight of the defence sector. It is
noteworthy that the subject of parliamentary oversight of defence has not attracted a lot of
scholarly attention. Therefore the research had to rely on the few available but dated
literature. These are supported by primary data from interviews.
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5.4.1 The Practice of Parliamentary Oversight on Defence in Ghana
Generally, security and defence policy is often seen as a ‘natural’ task for the executive arm
of government as they deemed have the necessary knowledge and capacity to act quickly.
In this setting, parliament is seen as a less suitable institution for dealing with security
issues, especially due to its often time-consuming procedures and lack of full access to the
necessary expertise and information.251As mentioned in chapter four, the 1992 Constitution
of Ghana elaborates on the executive oversight of the security and defence sectors. The role
of Parliament resides in its function as the source of legitimacy of all security institutions.
According to Article 210(2), of the 1992 Constitution, “no person shall raise an armed
forces except by and under the authority of an Act of Parliament.” The scope of
parliamentary oversight, by contrast, is less explicit; even though the constitution makes
reference to the investigative and inquiry functions of committees, it does not make specific
reference to oversight of the defence sector. Further, the Armed forces Act of 1962,
although amended several times over the years does not make any explicit provision for
parliamentary oversight.
As noted earlier, the passage of the Security and Intelligence Service Act 526 of 1996 was
seen as an attempt to prescribe in-depth national security architecture for the state. The act
also seeks to address the vacuum on parliamentary oversight and civilian control of the
defence and security sector and strips the security actors of their hitherto perceived opacity.
A case in point is that, Act 526 requires the executive to report to parliament annually
through the minister of national security. However, the oversight does not go beyond
submission of report by the executive. Over the years this requirement has not been met
consistently and parliament does not demand the report.252 In most cases the post of a
minster for national security does not exist for such persons to be summoned before
parliament to answer questions. National Security advisors and coordinators, who have
direct responsibilities in this regard, are not answerable to parliament, and rather to report
directly to the president. Even in instances where the post of a national security minister
exists as under the NPP government (2001-2009), when Francis Poku was appointed as
Minister for National Security. This brought no significant changes to bear on the process.
Typical of NPP administrations, the new Akuffo Addo government (2017) has filled the
post of a minister for national security. It is however too early to assess if the minister could
bring any political transformation.
It has been observed that years of the coups d’état contributed to institutionalization of the
political and institutional autonomy of the armed forces. For instance, Hutchful observed in
2008 that, many in the military are yet to come to terms with the notion of civilian scrutiny
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over the defence and security sector.253 There has been some relative change as the current
armed forces appear to have accepted civilian control of the military. However, past
experiences in civil-military relations still impact on the present dispensation. 254 For
instance, there is still mutual suspicion on the part of both civilian authority and military to
the extent that issues concerning the military are often handled tactfully by civilian
authorities.
Generally, the institutionalization of parliamentary oversight in Ghana's democratization
process has been severely hampered by the sporadic coups d’états and the dissolution of
parliament at each military takeover of political power. 255 Since the resumption of
parliament under the Fourth Republic in 1993, the institution had to re-establish its
influence in the political process. Some analysts have questioned the effectiveness of
parliament. Indeed, a former speaker of the house described parliament as a "talking shop"
with no teeth to bite.256 While this assertion is true in the past, some have argued that the
Ghanaian Parliaments becoming stronger in recent times in the performance of their
primary functions to the satisfaction of majority of Ghanaians.257
In practice, parliamentary oversight of the armed forces is done through committees like
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Finance Committee and the Parliamentary Select
Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCD&I).Typically, a parliamentary committee is
made up of a number of parliamentarians appointed to carry out certain tasks. Such
committees may offer a setting which facilitates detailed scrutiny of draft legislation,
oversight of government activities and interactions with the public and external actors. In
most cases, significant part of parliamentary work is done at the committee levels rather 
than in chamber. 258 Ghana’s parliament has 12 standing committees and 17 select
committees and every member is required to belong to at least one.259
The role of the Public Accounts Committee includes conducting examinations of the
audited accounts of all public institutions submitted by the Auditor-General. This activity
provides the Committee with some measure of oversight over the expenses of the GAF and
other agencies. The committee is empowered to question the rationale behind the usage of
public funds. The chairman of the PAC is by convention chosen from the largest minority
group in parliament. This practice allows the chairman to discharge his functions without
fear or favour of the executive.260 The Finance Committee deals with general issues of
finance and the economy, including loans and international business transactions. In
principle, it is supposed to monitor the purchase of military hardware from international
suppliers.261
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The PSCD&I in particular, has jurisdiction inter alia over policy, oversight, budget issues,
procurement of defence equipment, and the deployment of the military in a state of
emergency.262 The committee does not however have a direct role with issues of promotions
in the armed forces even though the executive is involved in some senior officer ranks
promotions.263The overall responsibility of the committee is to “examine all questions
relating to defence and internal affairs” in Ghana.264 The Committee has two key powers:
(i) investigations and (ii) inquiries into the activities and administration of ministries,
departments, agencies, public organizations, and corporations as parliament may determine.
They may investigate and inquire into proposals for legislation.265 The committee has the
powers of a High Court for the purpose of enforcing the attendance of witnesses,
compelling the production of documents and the issuing of commissions for the
examination of witnesses abroad.266 However, it has been observed that the committee
seldom exercises such powers.267 This is attributable to the authority, capacity, and political
will of parliamentarians or combination of all factors. Generally, the authority of
Parliament over the defence is derived from the legal frameworks that govern this sector,
including the 1992 Constitution, the Standing Orders of Parliament and other
legislations.268 The capacity of parliament to hold government accountable over the security
sector is a function of the resources (human, financial and technical) available to the
parliament”.269 The political will, refers to attitude of parliament towards the whole idea of
oversight. If parliamentarians lack the will to exercise their oversight functions, then they
will bring neither their authority nor their capacity to bear on the process.270
5.4.2 Challenges of Parliamentary Oversight on Defence
Generally, the executive arm of government of Ghana is vested with sweeping powers
under the 1992 Constitution. This does not differ significantly from earlier constitutions.
This hampers effective oversight responsibility of parliament. For instance, under article
108, parliament is prohibited from carrying out any financial acts unless initiated by or on
behalf of the president. This provision prevents parliament from debating matters of public
expenditures on its own initiative without request from the executive president. Parliament
is in essence denied the power of the purse which is one way to keep the executive in
check. Moreover, it is the duty of parliament to receive, examine, debate and approve the
president's budget proposals. Parliament has the ultimate responsibility to determine
whether the country has a good annual budget or not. As observed by a former member of
parliament, “parliament's performance in this area has not been satisfactory. Debates have
been too partisan and have not produced the benefits which the framers of the Constitution
envisaged.” 271 It is argued that for parliament to be effective in its oversight function, it
must be independent of the executive. The reality is that the president has effective control
over parliament and can obtain approval for virtually everything he wants from
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parliament.272 Notably, appointment powers of the president are enormous including key
positions in parliament. Both the speaker of parliament and the first deputy speaker are
nominated by the president and approved by members of parliament. In addition, the
majority leader and first deputy, the majority chief whip and deputy are all selected by the
president. The president also controls the Parliamentary Service Board as the clerk of
parliament and members of Parliamentary Service are appointed by the President. He
On the whole, the oversight role of parliament in certain critical areas like the security and
defence sectors in shaping national security policy and democratic control over the military
and ultimately preventing insecurity and promoting stability begs improvement. 273 For
instance, in 2013, the Ghanaian parliament was perceived as being little involved in
defence policy and the ability of committees to undertake oversight limited by a lack of
transparency.274 There are various gaps in the mandates of the different committees with
direct and indirect oversight of the defence sector generally.275 For instance, although the
committee may have the powers to hold an enquiry or investigation into the activities and
administration of a ministry or department in line with the standing orders of parliament,
many committees cannot initiate any investigation and bring matters before the house
except where such matters are referred to them by the speaker of parliament. This renders
the committee less effective.276 Moreover, the committees do not have powers to enforce
their recommendations and rest with other agencies like the Attorney-General to initiate
appropriate actions against agencies or individuals found to have committed infractions.
Some challenges tend to affect the effective oversight of the defence sector by parliament,
including structural and legal constraints. As noted earlier, the role of parliament in relation
to the defence sector and the scope of its responsibility are not clearly defined. Also, the
lack of a clear national security and defence policy framework currently makes it difficult
to determine the roles of the various security agencies and that of parliament. Moreover, the
frequent breaks in parliament in the past, and high turnover of parliamentarians currently
due to competitiveness of elections, do not augur well for the development of institutional
memory and development of consistent culture of oversight.277 The roles of parliamentary
clerks are essential backstop of knowledge to help parliamentarians perform effectively.
For instance, the defence and interior committee does not have adequate resources like a
library and staff to carry out both clerical and research duties to aid the work of its
members. Almost all the parliamentary committee members do not have professional or
technical advisors acting independently of the executive to aid their work.278 There is the
need for parliament to explore effective means of documenting practices over the years and
building a critical mass of experienced and resourced parliamentary staff to provide the
necessary technical assistance to members of parliament towards the effective performance
of their core functions. It is illustrative to add that several institutions provide capacity
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building courses to parliamentarians and staffers; the Parliamentary Training Institute was
launched in 2017 to institutionalize the training of members of parliament and other public
sector officials.279 With regards to the defence sector, the work of this institute can be made
more effective if it collaborates with other institutions that have the expertise in defence
and security sector training.
Furthermore, the highly complex nature and environment of the security and defence
sectors presents a particularly difficult challenge for effective exercise of oversight. This is
partly because some of the issues involved in performing oversight functions of this sector
are often too technical for members or politicians who do not have the requisite technical
experience or any specific training in issues dealing with security and defence. 280 For
example, the PSCD&I of the 6th Parliament of the Fourth Republic (2012-2016) had 18
members, with a former military officer and former minister of defence and former deputy
minister of defence. With the exception of these three and the chairman who seem
interested in military and broader security issues due to his professional background as a
journalist, most of the remaining members were first-time parliamentarians with little
knowledge and experience in defence issues281 While some parliamentarians have taken it
upon themselves to enhance their capacity in security issues by enrolling in advanced
courses in institutions like the KAIPTC, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College,
(GAFCSC), majority of members tend to rely on capacity building programmes offered by
some civil society groups and international partners in security and defence areas which do
not happen frequently due to funding constraints.282
The issue of gender underrepresentation in the defence sector is reflected in the
composition of the committee as no female parliamentarian sits on the committee. This is
reflective of the low female representation in public sector institutions in Ghana, including
parliament. For instance, there were only 29 females out of 275 members of the 6th
Parliament of the Fourth Republic (2012-2016). The seventh parliament saw an
improvement with 37 women out of 275. Since 1992, parliaments have struggled to achieve
30% women representation as identified in the Beijing Platform of Action. As shown in
table below, the percentage change hovered around 5.5% for the past 25 years. 283 As
discussed under gender transformation, the issues of defence have essentially remained a
male domain in Ghana. As the membership of the PSCD&I has been male dominated. A
possible reason is that only a few or none of female parliamentarians may have the needed
experience on security and defence issues as the committee in parliament are often formed
based on areas of expertise and interests of individual members.284 The PSCD&I of the
seventh parliament has three women out of eighteen members. 285 One can argue having
women with requisite knowledge on such committees could contribute to articulating the
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issues of gender representation in the armed forces to drive a wider national discussion on
the issue.
Table 9-5: Women Representation in Parliament 1992-2016
Year Number of Parliamentary Seats Number of Women Percentage
1992 200 16 8.0
1996 200 18 9.0
2000 200 19 9.5
2004 230 25 10.8
2008 230 19 8.2
2012 275 30 10.9
2016 275 37 13.5
Source: Author, adopted from Awuah, (2017)
Furthermore, the security services have peculiar organizational cultures, rules, and practices
and are governed by secrecy laws, all of which can potentially pose problems if an
oversight committee is not conversant with these institutional norms. The detailed
operations, rules of combat, weapons procurement and use by members of this sector are
often beyond the professional capacity of the average members of parliament, in general
and the members of the select committees in particular.286 Moreover, there has been little
transparency on security and defence issues especially during the Rawlings government as
the security sector was seen as the key power base of the regime. Excessive secrecy or
confidentiality on issues pertaining to defence issues still persists. During parliamentary
debates, issues of defence are often discussed in camera. Even in cases of plenary
discussions, questions are rarely asked openly because often, the speaker of parliament
would give a preamble invoking reasons of national security and thereby requesting
members to be circumspect in their submissions. Moreover, successive parliaments under
the Fourth Republic have not been able to overcome the issues of “how far it can or should
go in considering the military budget, nor whether it has the right to debate it openly on the
floor of the House."287
A ranking member of the defence and interior committee interviewed was of the opinion
that issues of defence budget are best dealt with at the committee where proper scrutiny can
be done.288 Often, ministers of defence appearing before parliament to answer questions are
reluctant to openly discuss certain issues pertaining to the armed forces in plenary and may
give out pertinent documents only to the committees in chambers.289All the same this
assertion may have some merit; plenary discussions on such matters could also enhance
transparency and public interest in the defence sector. In the world of technological
advancement and the spread of electronic media, certain issues that were considered secret
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are no more. For example, issues of arms trade are easily accessible on the internet, thus
national security clauses cannot be invoked to conceal certain information.290 However,
some amount of confidentiality may be necessary for reasons of national security, as
revealing too much information may create unnecessary alarm in the public and cause the
security agencies to lose credibility and trust with both the public and the government.291
Nonetheless, this justification is often abused in preventing the public from accessing some
relevant information. The situation in Ghana is often compounded by the reluctance or
inability of both the legislature and the executive under the Fourth Republic to make a
reality of the Right to Information Law.292 A draft bill has been before parliament since
2013. The bill was drafted in 1999 and reviewed in 2003, 2005 and 2007 but was not
presented to Parliament. Interestingly, the bill was tabled for consideration in the last days
of the sixth parliament in January 2017.293 President John Mahama in his last State of
Nation Address appealed parliament to pass the law when he had earlier said in another
forum he could not force parliament to pass the law. Reservations from then minority NPP
shot down attempts to pass the bill into law. Like previous government, the Akuffo Addo
administration has reiterated its intention to make pass the law.294 Since the draft bill has to
be reintroduced to parliament for consideration, one cannot expect a law to be passed
anytime soon due to the length of time required for parliamentary procedures.
Furthermore, the lack of transparency in Ghana’s defence spending makes the sector
susceptible to corruption. Ghana, like many other countries is faced with corruption risks in
its defence sector. These include: corruption in public procurement of weapons and
equipment, internal administrative issues such as emoluments and logistical supplies,
processes relating to recruitment and promotions and selection of personnel for
international peacekeeping missions.295 Interestingly, a group of about 200 ex-soldiers in
January 2016 sued the military high command over under-payment of gratuities contrary to
what was approved by the government.296 Matters arising from the law suit suggest that the
armed forces inflated the ranks of the soldiers in submitting their budgetary needs to the
government. However, these soldiers were paid in accordance with their appropriate ranks
at the time of their release from the service.297 This development further points to the lack
of proper scrutiny and transparency in the military expenditure process thereby making it
liable for financial malpractices and corruption.298
As noted earlier in chapter four, peacekeeping has become a major preoccupation of the
GAF. However, Ghana’s engagements in either regional or UN-mandated peacekeeping
operations are not adequately guided by parliamentary oversight.299 Parliament does not
have any oversight role or prior approval for deployment of Ghanaian troops abroad for
peacekeeping or any other purpose. As part of the enormous range of powers granted the
president, is the sole authority to decide on deployment of Ghanaian troops to international
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peacekeeping operation. This situation gives excessive leverage for executive manipulation
in such operations. This practice has persisted and was recently challenged by some MPs in
2017 when the new government of President Akuffo-Addo announced the deployment of
205 Ghanaian troops to the Gambia in support of ECOWAS mission to enforce the
outcome of an election and remove President Yahya Jammeh from office.300 However, the
challenge was only done in the media and was not followed through to a logical conclusion.
Other actors like the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Parliament, only play advisory
functions to the president.301The PSCD&I and the Finance Committee of parliament in
particular, discuss and approve budgets meant for peacekeeping procurement and expenses.
While the issue of Ghana’s peacekeeping enterprise has come up several times in
parliamentary debates, especially on defence appropriation, the house has continuously
been kept out of information on peacekeeping revenues and how they are being
managed.302 There is the need for the country to allow parliamentary oversight to impact on
the totality of executive decisions in relation to military operations both for national
defence purposes and peacekeeping missions abroad.303
Successive governments and leadership of the armed forces have not been transparent on
issues relating to peacekeeping funds accruing to the country. As noted in chapter four, the
GAF Peace Support Operations Account in New York, has become an avenue for
governments and the GAF to supplement the national defence budget, some of which has
been used to purchase aircrafts and other military equipment. However, there have been
allegations of corruption surrounding use of the funds by governments and the armed
forces.304 One cannot discount some of these allegations. For instance, the Ministry of
Defence in May 2015 set up a committee to review the country’s participation in global
peacekeeping operations to ensure effective participation and minimize risks. The
committee was also tasked to determine the procedure for requisition for funds from GAF
Peace Support Operation Accounts and levels of authorization, and review of sources of
funding, including determination of dedicated sources of finance/funding for Peace Support
Operations.305 Even at the level of the armed forces, reports often surfaced in the media
about scandals involving senior military personnel in relation to contractors and service
providers in peacekeeping.306
With particular reference to procurement relating to defence, there are tendencies for
procurement decisions to be taken with little reference to strategic requirements and
military effectiveness is eroded by weak oversight or controls on personnel.307 Over the
years, Ghana has scored low marks on the Transparency International’s Government
Defence Anti-Corruption Index, for lack of transparency and accountability in the defence
sectors. Defence procurement in Ghana, has a mixed history due to both weaknesses in the
system and turf wars between the civil and military wings of the MOD. The processes
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involve several layers of committees within the MOD and GAF. These include the
procurement planning committee, service technical committees, defence contracts
committees and tender boards.308 While there is procurement structure at least on paper, the
practice however, has been murkier as allegations of corruption and improprieties arising
out of defence procurement occasionally come to public notice. 309 Although the various
committees include civil servants from the ministry as well as the minister or deputy, the
actual process has been dominated by the military. For instance, a senior civil servant
interviewed observed that while the Ghana Public Procurement Act 663 of 2003 prescribes
processes to be followed in public procurement, the military often use their ‘age-old’
procurement procedures.310 Therefore lack of effective parliamentary oversight on military
expenditure makes it difficult to deal with the canker of corruption because the institutional
culture of the military makes it very difficult for insiders to report certain unethical or
corrupt tendencies in military expenditure. The procurement processes are allegedly often
short-circuited by the military under the claim of urgency, such as the need to fill
immediate operational requirements for national security and other purposes. Most often,
the military have their own preferred list of types of equipment and may have established
links with suppliers.311 There may be instances where orders might have been placed and
thus committing the ministry to purchase before authorization is secured from the ministry.
Indeed, there have been issues of unethical and corrupt practices against officers who deal
with procurement of basic necessities like food rations and clothing.312
The nature of the Ghanaian political system, particularly, the excessive politicization of
parliamentary debates in almost all issues including defence and security makes it almost
impossible for parliament to effectively have oversight into issues brought before it. A
notable example was in March 2008, when the debate on the financial proposal for the
purchase of some military aircraft was characterized by partisan debate.313 Both sides of the
house engaged in the “politics” of the proposal, rather than focusing on the substantive
issues that will inform public debate. Similarly in 2014, debates on a loan agreement
between the government of Ghana and VTB Capital Plc of London for $300 million to
equip the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), to enable them to effectively discharge their
peacekeeping duties was characterized by heated partisan debates between the majority and
minority sides of the house. The Minority raised questions on the genuineness of the deal
and voted against the agreement. The majority subsequently used its numbers to approve
the deal.314 Such an approach to parliamentary oversight does a great disservice to national
security and must therefore be discouraged. It is also observed that the parliamentary
oversight had not worked effectively because the Chairman of defence and interior select
committee is often from the majority party in parliament. They risked being punished by
removal from such positions if they are deemed to be too critical of “the usual way of doing
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things.” It is, therefore, important for parliament to recognize the important roles of the
various Parliamentary Committees.315
5.5 Summary
The end of the Cold War provided opportunities for defence establishments around the
world to readjust their structures, strategies, functions and capabilities to meet their current
and future strategic needs. While some countries are reforming their defence architecture,
the need for transformation, which involves a total overhaul of defence policies, human
composition, organizational cultures and technocratic practices at ensuring effectiveness
and efficiency, has become too pressing for any country to ignore. In the case of Ghana,
there is the urgent need to transform the defence sector to align it with current democratic
imperatives as well as ensuring professionalism to redeem the armed forces of its
chequered past. Indeed, some changes have taken place within Ghana’s defence sector
which were clustered and analysed under David Chuter’s Guide to Defence
Transformation, namely: Cultural, Human, Organizational and Political transformation. The
country needs a concerted approach to transform the defence sector to achieve optimal
results. It is noteworthy that the transformation in Ghana has happened as a result of the
democratization process. Therefore, unlike defence transformation processes outlined in
peace agreements, often with detailed guidelines and prescription, Ghana’s process has
been organic and thus unstructured. The table 11 below provides a summary of the notable
changes.
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In sum, the chapter found that, there is an institutional desire for cultural transformation.
This is amplified by pronouncements of the military hierarchy at different points in time.
However, the behaviour of individual soldiers requires drastic change. On human
transformation, there have been some changes in human composition with regards to
regional balance and gender. While issues of regional balance are treated with sensitivity,
respondents interviewed have pointed to fairly regionally balanced armed forces as
compared to the state of affairs before 1992. However, perceptions of regional imbalances
continue to surface in recruitment and promotions in the GAF. Gender mainstreaming has
seen some modest improvements in female representation in the armed forces, largely
attributed to the emphasis on female participation in international peacekeeping which has
contributed to increased recruitment of females. Yet, in the absence of a comprehensive
gender policy to guide institutional practices, the GAF remain a male-dominated institution
with a prevailing masculinist culture. Multiple challenges have been identified as affecting
efforts at enhancing career prospects for women in armed forces in line with current
international and regional imperatives on equal representation of demographic makeup of
the society.
There have been some organizational transformations to enhance the effectiveness and
efficiency of the armed forces. The defence and security needs of the country have changed
from territorial issues of the immediate post-independence era. However, doctrines
underpinning the operations and training of the armed forces have not changed
significantly. Divergent views emerged in the course of the study on the right size of the
armed forces while budgetary allocation to defence has remained low. An essential
institution for defence management such as the defence ministry has seen some modest
improvement as compared to pre-1999 years when the military was the main driver of the
process. The role of the civil wing was limited to technical matters such as forwarding
budget estimates to cabinet. Increasingly, the ministry is now asserting a civilian lead in the
management of defence issues.
With regards to political transformation, the principle of civilian supremacy of the
executive has been clearly identified by the constitution; while there have been an
emergence of an armed force that is relatively appreciative of the principles of civilian
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supremacy or control. However, the principle of parliamentary oversight even though not
explicitly defined by the 1992 constitution exists in the current political dispensation. The
constitution confers on parliament wide-ranging legislative and oversight responsibilities
concerning the functions of the armed forces. Other legal frameworks such as the Armed
Forces Act 105 (1962), Security Services and Intelligence Act 529 (1996) have also
provided the basis for parliamentary oversight. Nonetheless, the effective exercise by
parliament of its oversight responsibilities needs some improvements. The challenges have
been enumerated in the chapter.
The changes have taken place on an ad hoc basis and in the absence of clear and
comprehensive national security frameworks to set the tone for a defence policy. Indeed a
defence policy (2012) exists but not in the public domain. There are also questions about
the acceptability of the document among the relevant stakeholders. Therefore, the changes
identified in the defence sector have not been coordinated through a national process. While
transformation may be a priority for the Ministry of Defence and armed forces, in general,
the process is hampered by limited political will, strategic guidance, outdated institutional
regulations and the effects the Ghanaian economy on defence spending. On the whole,
Ghana has made some good progress at transforming her defence sector as part of the
democratization process. This notwithstanding there is the need for the country to embark
on a holistic defence transformation process that is backed by clear national security and
defence policies. The armed forces remain an important and influential state institution, it is
critical to explore how the changes and non-change identified in this chapter could
contribute to enhancing healthy civil-military relations in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
Concordance Civil-Military Relations in Ghana’s Fourth Republic
6.0 Introduction
Civil-military relations in Africa has received a lot of scholarly attention, especially in the
immediate post-independence era up to the late 1980s, when the phenomenon of coups
d’états became synonymous with politics in Africa. Some of the major debates have been
captured in the literature review. 1Generally, these debates have been informed by the
Huntingtonian and Janowitzian schools of thought.2 The Huntingtonian approach seeks to
professionalize the military through objective control. Objective civilian control puts
emphasis on maximizing military professionalism and respect for an independent sphere of
military action, while subjective civilian control seeks to maximize powers of civilian
political authority in relation to the military. Under this principle, civilian political leaders
determine what the military does, but allow the military the professional autonomy to
determine how best to do it.3 The Janowitzian perspectives proffers a military institution
that is progressive in nature and open to the influences of the wider society in which it finds
itself. While these broad theoretical approaches had their own merit, it became apparent
that they had limited utility in settings other than Anglo-Saxon, whose civil-military
relations are different. The return to democracy across the continent from the early 1990s,
brought led to a shift in focus from preventing coup d’états to a more holistic process of
building of democratic armed forces to achieve democratic consolidation.4
Civil-military relations in developing countries have been likened to a two-sided coin. On
one side of the coin, is the nature of civil-military relations together with the evolving and
developing political and economic systems. On the other side, is the role of the military in
the development process including the making of peace and stability.5 The role of soldiers
in such societies is not only for defence and deterrence. They are essentially part of the
development process as they are often called upon to assist in the provision of internal
security and also used to secure regime stability. The general concern often relates to how
civilians in newly democratizing societies can succeed in reducing military power and
establishing effective control over the armed forces.6 In this vein, Rebecca Schiff, while
noting the shortcomings of the earlier, but predominant approaches to civil-military
relations, proffered the concordance theory. This theory does not suggest a separation of the
civilian and military sphere but argues for partnership or agreement among three societal
institutions: the military, political elites and citizenry in four areas, namely, the social
composition of the officer corps; political decision-making process; method of recruitment
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of personnel and style of the military. Agreement on these issues should reduce the risk of
the military interfering in domestic politics.7 Concordance theory requires the three partners
to determine the domestic role and function of the armed forces. This sets the broader
relationship between military and society. The theory recognizes that the military is not an
essentially hostile and coercive state institution even though the field of civil-military
relations developed as a result of the frequent military interventions in politics.
Concordance theory recognizes pragmatism in civil-military relations. For example, Donald
Travis influenced by Janowitz’s idea of pragmatic civilian control, recognizes how a
professional soldier, who is a politico-military manager of violence relates with other
organs of government in policy making, planning and the management of national security.
Here there is the recognition of the numerous ways in which military professionals and
civilian political authority interact with one another in times of peace (to prepare for crises)
and during war (to achieve peace).8 The criticisms of Concordance Theory have been
captured in chapter two of the thesis. This thesis reinforces the views of Williams that
there exists no single template according to which the African civil-military relations
systems can be constructed.9 However Ghana’s contemporary civil-military relations can be
understood by situating it within Schiff’s theory. This theory recognizes both institutional
and cultural perspectives in explaining civil-military relations.
Civil-military relations in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, despite its chequered history, has
experienced some relative improvement and thus contributed to the country's growing
democratic credentials. Relations are thawing, as evidenced by the fact that there has been
no overt attempt at overthrowing a government since 1992. This state of affairs has been
achieved by partnership between two actors- the political elites and military on some of the
variables of concordance theory proffered by Schiff- the social composition of the officer
corps, political-decision-making process and the recruitment method and military style.
There is the realization among these actors that their mutual interests would be best served
within a democracy, notwithstanding the challenges.10The citizenry, the third partner, is not
essentially part of the equation.11 Even though, the Ghanaian populace are aware of the role
of the armed forces in the Ghanaian society and hold the institution in high esteem,
responses secured from a randomly selected sample of Ghanaians show a mixed
apprehension on the part of ordinary citizens about their perceptions of the armed forces.
Some elements within the armed forces have not entirely moved away from the traditional
aggressive culture or unfriendly posture towards civilians, despite ad hoc efforts at the
institutional level to mend and maintain good societal relations.
Accordingly, the first section of the chapter explores the partnership among the military and
political elites. It examines the relationship between the armed forces and the Ghanaian
society, including key actors such as civil society and the media.
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6.1.1 Politico-Military Concordance in Ghana: Social Composition of the Officer
Corps
The military as a profession sees itself as distinct corporate body set apart from laymen due
to its expertise and nature of activities. The officer corps is the embodiment of its unique
status in the society.12 It constitutes the critical mass for decision-making and is expected to
meet higher professional and moral requirements. 13 As noted by Schiff, the social
composition of any armed force is informed by the historical and cultural experiences of
that particular country. The officer corps of the GAF is carefully selected and trained to
lead the forces. Officers are expected to acquire officer qualities such as intelligence,
leadership, self-confidence, courage through their training. 14To this end, this corps is made
up of some qualified and skilled personnel who are recycled back into the society after their
military service.15 Nonetheless, not all members of the officer corps do exhibit the ideal
qualities of their profession. There are challenges with regards to their professional
development to adequately prepare senior officers to meet the needs of the 21st century
defence and security environment.
The social makeup of the armed forces, especially the officer corps, has been an important
determinant of civil-military relations since independence. The socio-cultural diversity of
Ghana has been illuminated in chapter five. With regards to the social composition of the
GAF, it is deeply rooted in the country’s socio-cultural history. One can argue that the
Ghanaian colonial legacy, and prevailing socio-economic and cultural realities, as well as
the evolving recruitment patterns are the bedrock of the social and ethnic composition of
the officer corps of the armed forces. As highlighted, the British colonial pattern of
recruitment largely favoured people from northern territories who were perceived to have
martial traits needed for effective soldiering and suppressing anti-colonial sentiments in the
south. Furthermore, people from the north and other less natural resource endowed areas of
the south opted for military service as it offered better employment opportunities than
working on cocoa plantations in the south.16 Due to various historical reasons noted earlier,
the officer corps was dominated by people from the southern part of Ghana. Nonetheless, in
present day Ghana, issues of regional affiliation are officially prohibited in recruitment
policies and by national laws. While various reasons including the general lack of
employment opportunities may influence the decisions of people to voluntarily put
themselves up for military service, one cannot discount the role of social factors such as
ethnic or regional ties within the armed forces. For example, Maurice Garnier argues that in
advanced and industrialized democracies, social composition of recruited cadets who later
become officers does not necessarily lead to changes in the dominant organizational
ideology of the military.17 While this argument could hold for some developing countries as
well, the social makeup of the GAF has been a factor in the country's turbulent history of
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civil-military relations. For instance, issues of ethnicization of the military by different
civilian and military regimes contributed to the cycles of coups d’état in the country.
Apart from the socio-cultural underpinning of coups d’états, the military’s claim to power
was partly based on the belief among some officers and at times, the rank and file that,
civilian political elites were the major participants and beneficiary of economic
mismanagement, as well as the instigators of internal political strife. In this vein, military
involvement in politics became the order of the day not because of the superior firepower
of the military, but because the civilian political order proved unsatisfactory in most
countries.18 Paradoxically, the military in government also fared no better than the civilian
elites they ousted. Coups became the quick root to power and the agency for guaranteed
self-aggrandizement among officers.19
In most African countries, the inability of successive governments, both civilian and
military to count on the loyalty of the armed forces to stabilize their political existence,
together with the breakdown of the command structure and control in the military
establishment undermined the professionalism of the armed forces to carry out its basic
functions.20 It is generally held in the predominant theories of civil-military relations that
military professionalism is embodied in the officer corps21 Professionalism in Huntington’s
view, is manifested by expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. Huntington argued that
a professional military does not dabble in politics and coups d’état are violations of military
professional ethics.22 However, this Huntingtonian perspective has been widely criticized
for its lack of nuanced explanations for the phenomenon of coups in non-western
societies.23 For example, Richard Price argued that, this line of argument does not make
allowances for situations where the soldiers’ definition of their proper professional roles,
tasks, and autonomy differ significantly from that of the political elite. In such situations,
the commitment of soldiers to their profession may lead them to intervene politically in
order to protect professional autonomy and prerogatives. This was particularly the case in
some new states with mal-integrated social systems where it was not uncommon to find
politicians and soldiers holding widely differing expectations.24 Also, in most developing
societies, military officers are often seen by the society or even by themselves as
modernizing elites with superior capability than that of their civilian counterparts.25
It can be argued that, while the social composition of the GAF has been a critical factor in
the country's civil-military relations history, it is often the lack of agreement or
concordance between the military, especially the officer corps and civilian politicians that
often precipitates military coups. For instance, during the Second Republic, the approach of
Prime Minister Busia in dealing with top brass of the military contributed to the untimely
demise of his government. Aside the insensitivity of the government to mounting military
grievance, and cuts in the budgets of the armed force, the apparent reproach by Busia
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manifested by his actions, such as anger at the vilification of Lieutenant-General Albert
Ocran, former member of the Presidential Commission and Chief of Defence Staff, when
the later publicly demanded that Busia and cabinet declare their assets in accordance to the
constitution. Again, Busia was said to have forcefully retired Lieutenant-General Michael
Otu, Chief of Defence Staff, and Brigadier-General R. J. Acquah. He also authorized a
public trial of Brigadier- General Alfred Kattah, on a charge of stealing, which according to
his colleagues should have been quietly handled by a court-martial.26 There have been
similar cases in the Fourth Republic. For example, after the political turnover in 2001, some
senior generals were released from the military by the NPP government. There were
challenges of how to reintegrate these older soldiers into society without them posing
threats to the survival of the new political administration.27
Since the return to democracy in 1992, there have been conscious efforts by successive
administrations to ensure a modicum of regional balance within the armed forces, in
general, and among the top hierarchy of the armed forces, in particular. As noted in chapter
five, the issue of regional balance remains a very sensitive issue in the military. Efforts are
made by government to maintain a semblance of regional balance in appointment to top
service commanders such the Chief of Defence Staff, Chiefs of Army, Air Force and Naval
staff respectively.28 Even though the general conditions of service of the armed forces begs
improvement, the general view held by respondents notably, civilians and rank and file of
GAF is that, the officer corps have better conditions of service. For instance, like most top
public and civil servants in Ghana, some key appointment holders in the military hierarchy
live in some of the affluent areas of the capital city and other urban areas across Ghana. The
conditions of service and other benefits senior officers are generally perceived to be better
as compared to other public servants in the security services. While military salaries are not
public knowledge, they are paid on time. Officers are also entitled to facilities such as
housing, free utilities, official vehicles, and other allowances such as clothing and good
pension.29 Since 2007, military salaries are subject to annual review. Previously salaries
were reviewed biannually. 30 Based on the author’s interviews with some mid-career
officers, it was revealed that the conditions of service of the officer corps, especially below
the rank of a colonel, are not as rosy as perceived by outsiders. This is reflective of the
general conditions of service for public servants in Ghana. In spite of this, the officer corps
is associated with affluent lifestyle that comes with perks of military service.31 In addition,
there are significant differences in the conditions of service between officers and other
ranks. Generally, officers are highly paid. They also have better facilities than the rank and
file. For example, in military barracks across the country, the officer corps have separate
accommodation and other facilities like mess and sports whose standards are higher than
those for the rank and file.
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Reforms discussed in chapter five have gone some way to generate a level of agreement
between the military and political elites on the social composition of the officer corps. As
noted under the discussion on human transformation in chapter five, governments under the
Fourth Republic have endeavoured to abide by the constitutional requirement on regional
balance in public sector institutions like the armed forces despite the noted challenges. This
has arguably contributed to the improved state of civil-military relations in the country.
However, this state of affairs does not take away the real or imagined perceptions of
regional and politically motivated appointments and promotions within the officer corps.32
The improved civil-military relations in the country has been attributed to the current
generation of senior officer corps who seem to have high appreciation of the tenets of civil-
military relations in general, and civilian and democratic control of the armed forces, in
particular. This has come about as a result of the changing human composition of the armed
forces, in general, and increasing exposure acquired by officers through local and
international training and educational opportunities and peacekeeping.33 For instance, the
training opportunities provided by the UK under the Defence Diplomacy Programmes since
the 1960s have had overall impact on force structures, the evolution of doctrine, combat
and staff training and the conduct of operations. It is however difficult to measure the
overall impact of these programmes on the development of politically neutral and
democratically accountable armed forces.34 Similarly, other developmental partners like
US, India, China provide professional training opportunities to Ghanaian officers. The
critical concern is the challenge of transferring learning and experiences to enhance
professionalism. 35 It is therefore essential to transfer these experiences to the next
generation of senior and mid-career officer corps and the rank and file, to some
extent.36This can be extended to the rank and file, because, as noted in chapter five, there is
the need for a complete cultural change among the rank and file and even some officers, as
their behaviour tend to undermine the efforts at the institutional level to enhance civil-
military relations and create a positive image for the GAF.
Human development is one the of features that sets the military apart from other
professional institutions, as officers enter, develop and eventually exit, they may have a
profound impact on the institution as a group due to generational influence in organization
and leadership.37 In this regard, generations must be allowed to teach and learn from each
other through formal and informal settings, including mentorship.38 This could enable the
next generation to continue to become more professional and effectively engage civilian
authority in the political decision making process in their field of expertise.
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6.1.2 Political Decision-Making Process
The GAF gaining a global and local reputation that is marked by core values of
professionalism and dedication of its personnel in executing their core mission both at
home and abroad (through peacekeeping). However, the military may not necessarily be
well served by the decisions made by politicians and military leaders. Poor defence
decision-making may result in loss of lives and public funds.39 It is imperative for key
decision makers to get the right information, the right structures, the right processes, and
the right people to make decisions to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the armed
forces. The political decision making process is an important determinant of civil-military
relations. The military is expected in principle to be apolitical, but the reality is that all
armed forces participate in the political process in diverse ways.40 As an important state
institution, it cannot be precluded from the political decision making process given their
organizational identity, autonomy and functional expertise. Some have argued that the
military is the executive power of politicians in the field of national and international
security, safety and public order.41 They are the agents or servants who work for the
political principals.42 The military can only be effective if the politicians who are the
representative of the people allow them to be. The effectiveness can be in diverse forms and
primarily depends on the resources allocated to the military as well as the missions and
operations set for them by politicians. This line of argument is reinforced in Levy Yagil
reconceptualization of civilian control of the military and control of militarization.43 In his
view, control of the military refers to the extent to which the citizenry, through civilian state
institutions, is able to set limits on the freedom of action of the military in the areas of
activity that have political implications. These areas include military doctrine and policies,
operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment, and promotion of officers.
The limits set should be in line with political objectives and the resources required to attain
those goals that elected civilians authority shape autonomously. The goals should also be
reflective of the general societal goals. The military, in turn, must abide by these civilian
directives leading to formation of relations of exchange, in which the military subordinates
itself to civilian rulers in exchange for the resources (material and symbolic) that the state
possesses and provides to the military.44
The different cultural norms and conditions that exist between political authority and
military officers has been a source of civil-military tension in most democracies.45In the
case of Ghana, due to the country's civil-military history, the political decision making
processes on defence issues, in general and the GAF, in particular, are handled tactfully by
political elites and the leadership of the armed forces.46 There is a conscious choice by
political authority in taking decisions that do not incur the displeasure of the military. As
discussed under political transformation, the process of defence budgeting has been
shrouded in secrecy for diverse reasons including national security. In the period before
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1992, the armed forces basically held the upper hand in deciding issues of budgetary
allocation, expenditure and even issues of force structure and size.47 Since the return to
democracy, the political decision making process on defence has been outlined in the 1992
constitution. This has contributed to harmonizing the relationship between military and
political authority. The military is also increasingly internalizing democratic principles and
internalizing the values of civilian control in its professional ethics. In this regard, there
have been shifts in the political decision making process, whereby institutions like the
defence ministry is asserting its role in defence management process. 48 Notably,
introduction of budgetary reform processes in 1999 further enhanced the role of civilian
authority.
Decisions on defence issues are often taken through a multi-tiered approach. As shown in
the diagram below, decisions or recommendations on routine operational issues often
emanate from a bottom-up approach. Most often, proposals made at the service or unit
levels are transmitted through formation and service commanders to the General
Headquarters and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for onward submission to the Ministry
of Defence. Most of these proposals are then discussed at the Armed Forces Council
(AFC), where recommendations are made and forwarded to the presidency for further
actions.49 However, key policy decisions often emanate from the top, coming for example
from the presidency and discussed at the Armed Forces Council to advise the President. As
noted in chapter four, The AFC is a constitutional body chaired by the Vice-President, and
made up of Ministers for Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, the Chief of Defence Staff,
and all Service Chiefs, Forces Sergeant-Major, and another two persons appointed by the
president in consultation with the Council of State.50 All major policy decisions on defence
including procurement, promotions of senior officers and appointments are taken at this
level. This council meets three times a year (but may hold emergency meetings when
necessary) to make recommendations that are forwarded to the commander-in-chief to take
final decisions with assistance of his cabinet.51 While the 1992 constitution charges the
CDS with day-to-day administration of the armed forces, the implementation of this
function is often problematic with regards to what kinds of administrative matters the CDS
could decide upon without recourse to the direction of AFC. Therefore subjection the
discretion of the CDS and the composition of the AFC, differences may arise on what
constitute routine and major matters in which the Council may have to be consulted.
Indeed, some AFC depending on the composition and wisdom of the members may require
the CDS to consult it on almost all operational issues of the armed forces.52
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Figure 6-6: Defence Decision making Process
Source: Author
From the existing constitutional and institutional arrangements, there is concordance
between the armed forces and the executive on the decision making process on defence
issues. As noted previously, the president chairs the National Security Council where key
decisions concerning defence and security may be taken. The vice president chairs the AFC
which takes key decision with regards to the policy and running of the military institution.
There is often consultation between the executive and the armed forces, primarily through
the CDS, on the defence decision-making process.53 A typical case was in 2010, when the
late President John Mills endorsed the ECOWAS decision to contribute troops to an
intended ECOWAS intervention in Côte d'Ivoire during the post-elections crises to forcibly
remove then President Laurent Gbagbo, who had refused to step down after losing
elections. President Mills later back-tracked his earlier commitment to ECOWAS after he
was advised by his Service Chiefs on the overstretched Ghanaian troops in peacekeeping
operations elsewhere and the possible security implication of any intervention in the
neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire.54
Despite the existence of concordance, the relationship between the military and civilian
political authority is not always cordial as one may want to believe. Indeed disagreements
do arise between leadership of the military and political authorities on defence issues such
as budgetary requirements and the use of the armed forces. However, such issues do not
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often get into the public domain. These differences are often resolved at the AFC and at the
level of Ministry of Defence.55 For example, after the political turnover in 2001, there was
tension between the NPP government and the military, 56 partly due to lack of proper
understanding of the actual role of the military in the governance process. The military was
perceived as sympathetic to the previous NDC administration that emerged from the
PNDC. 57While the military often perceives itself from a position of superiority over
civilians, the tendency of the civilian authority to also push the principle of civilian
supremacy to an extreme often to the detriment of established structures create frostiness in
the relation between the two actors.58 As recounted by a retired major-general,
“When the NPP took over power in 2001, there were discussions
mostly initiated by the military hierarchy to develop a clear national
defence policy as the country did not have one. Following demands
of the military for a defence policy, the political leadership felt its
authority was being challenged. But, it later saw the merit in the
argument of the military hierarchy and tasked the military to
develop the policy. However, the military made it known to the
political leadership that it was not their duty to develop a policy but
could provide professional input into a process initiated by the
executive. This position by the military did not go down well with
the political leadership. There was no comprehensive national
security policy to set out the tone for a defence policy.”59
Another senior officer observed that,
“While we try to present a semblance of a cordial relationship, the
reality is not always one of a harmonious relationship. There is
disconnect between political authority and the military. Political
authority may have not the requisite knowledge on defence issues.
But, military officials due to various reasons including their career
prospects are at times reluctant to stand up to their professional
stance in dealing with political authority. Few officers stood on to
their professional grounds and challenged political authority did so
at the risk of their promotions.”60
The statements as above point to instances of discordance between political authority and
military. However, the fact that these have not presented threats to the survival of the
Fourth Republic is indicative of improved civil-military relations in Ghana.
In addition Schiff argues that issues of military size and composition are also central to the
political decision-making process. These also have a direct impact on the general society
due to the potential involvement of the citizenry with the armed forces and the economic
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cost involved.61 So it is critical that the citizens along with the military and the political
leadership agree on the institutional methods for determining the size and composition of
the military. Ideally, the citizenry, through elected officials, may voice their agreement or
disagreement of the decision- making process that determines military size, budgets and
method of recruitment.62Even though decisions on these issues may ultimately be taken by
political and military officials at the highest domestic decision-making levels, it is
important that government institutions and political channels are in place to enable the
citizenry to express their participation. As noted in chapter five, the political space has
gradually been opened to the extent that traditionally ‘non-securocratic’ institutions such as
parliament, the Auditor-General, the Accountant-General, the Commission for Human
Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), and civil society are now playing critical roles
in the governance of the defence and security sector.63 However, these bodies are faced
with multiple challenges that hamper their effectiveness.
In the case of CHRAJ, it is a quasi-judicial institution established under the 1992
Constitution to help promote transparency and public sector accountability. It is also
responsible for promotion of human rights.64 It is expected to perform certain functions
including: “to investigate complaints concerning the functioning of the Public Services
Commission, the administrative organs of the state, the officers of the Regional
Coordinating Council and the District Assembly, the Armed Forces, the Police Service and
the Prisons Service as far as the complaints relate to the failure to achieve a balanced
structuring of those services, or equal access by all to the recruitment of those services, or
fair administration in relation to those services.” 65 In reality, CHRAJ is faced with
constitutional, legal, resource and administrative and financial constraints thereby rendering
it less effective. For instance, it cannot initiate investigation unless it is petitioned to do so.
After investigations, it lack powers to enforce it recommendations and has to rely on the
judicial system to enforce its findings. CHRAJ does not have powers to prosecute
corruption cases and it is seriously underfunded making it difficult to attract and return
competent staff.66 While CHRAJ has dealt with high profile corruption by public officials,
there is no public knowledge of its involvement in investigation of corruption cases in the
armed forces. Nonetheless, on issues of human rights violations, there have been few
instances where people have petitioned the commission on issues involving the GAF.
Nonetheless, the outcomes of such investigations are not made public.67
Similarly, capacity of state agencies, such as the Auditor-General to track and monitor
government expenditures of any kind, including military spending is limited by
constitutional constraints and inadequate technical resources and funding.68 For example,
on yearly basis, the Auditor-General Report on public accounts of Ghana is submitted to
parliament for scrutiny. Standing Order 165 of Parliament assigns to the Public Accounts
Committee, (PAC), powers to study the audited accounts showing the appropriation of
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funds granted by Parliament to the government.69 PAC may call upon heads of institutions
and individuals cited in these reports for financial irregularities to appear at his public
hearings to offer explanations. Subsequently, PAC makes recommendations on its findings.
The opening up of PAC proceedings to the public has significantly enhanced revived public
interest in issues of corruption and abuse of office including misappropriation of public
resources. The effort of parliament has been enhanced in promotion of accountability,
combating corruption, strengthening budgetary oversight and resource allocation. 70
However, PAC lacks to power to enforce its decisions and thus must liaise with agencies
like the Attorney General’s Department to enforce its recommendations including refunds
of monies into the public coffers and prosecution of public officials deemed to have
misappropriated public funds. With regards to the GAF, their financial transactions are in
principle subject to audit. For instance, one officer remarked that, “there is so much waste
of public resources within the armed forces. Periodically, auditors come to look into our
books, but the critical question relates to the depth of the audit and outcome of the report
they submit.”71 This is because corruption is prevalent in Ghana’s defence sector, yet the
public hardly made aware through the auditor-general report. Indeed cases that are deemed
too damaging for government are often not publicized through the work of PAC.72
Despite the semblance of concordance on the political decision making process, the defence
budgetary process and allocation is not immune from the wider economic realities of the
country. For example, as noted by a senior civil servant at the Defence Ministry, “civilian
authority do not fully understand defence matters…They always look at the financial side,
to decide on what the country could afford. 73 Another retired general observes that,
“analysis on defence budgetary needs is not always responded to by politicians. Most of the
time, allocations are not based on technical needs of the military, but what the politician
thinks the country can afford. Politicians must be schooled in defence and security issues to
be able to make informed decisions on the sector.”74 These views represent the apparent
lack of mutual understanding among the military and their civilian counterparts on critical
issues such as defence expenditure. With regards to defence procurement, Ghana like most
African or developing countries does not have a defence industry and thus relies on import
from advanced or industrialized countries. It is noted that key decisions on defence
procurement, such as equipment are often taken at the cabinet level following
recommendations from the AFC. In taking such decision on procurement, there is the
likelihood of collusion and corruption among politicians and top brass of the military. An
often cited case was in 2003 when parliament approved USD 55 million for the Ministry of
Defence to acquire helicopters for peacekeeping. It was however revealed that estimated
cost for these helicopters, contract provisions for training personnel, and provision of spare
parts and tools was USD 19,695,600.75 Developments such as these, raise questions about
the quality and integrity of both civilian authority and military leadership.
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6.1.3. Recruitment Method and Military Style
It is argued by Schiff and other writers that the methods of recruitment into the armed
forces and military style are important determinants of civil-military relations. The
recruitment strategy and the military style reflect the cultural conditions of the society. It is
argued that lack of ethnic and social balance of the officer corps and discriminatory
recruitment of the rank and file has an effect on the military style and civil-military
relations.76 Nonetheless, unlike most of the other determinants of civil-military relations,
recruitment does not have much to do with how political elites and military leaders interact,
than the way military personnel and armed forces are generally embedded in the civil and
political environment.77 Edwin Micewski argues that, issues of power relations between
military and political elites are the bedrock of civil-military relations, however, with
regards to recruitment; it is often societal-military interactions that influence recruitment.
This is because recruitment has an immediate impact on the connection between the
individual citizen and the defence of the state. 78 Generally recruitment policies and
processes are often informed by a broad range of factors including the security
environment, geopolitical and geostrategic interests, and economic conditions, and cultural
influences, educational and socio-political interests.79
As mentioned earlier, two methods of recruitment; conscription and persuasive methods
have been well debated in the literature. Conscription involves a universal obligation for all
citizens (often male population) to defend the state and undergo training for this purpose. In
such systems, the standing army is made up of a professional officer corps, a group of non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) and the conscripts. In some jurisdictions, these persons-
conscripts, former officers and NCOs are often enrolled into the reserve forces upon
termination of their active service. Persuasive methods often involve all-volunteer forces
drawn from state-employed professionals for whom soldiering is like any other job. There
may also be reserve force options for former professional soldiers.80 Essentially, armed
forces based on recruitment of professional volunteers and those manned by conscripts are
different in terms of their professional ethos, each of which may have advantages and
disadvantages for effective civilian and democratic control.81 It is argued that conscription
is often disliked by professional militaries because armed forces made of draftees are
expensive and require a large amount of resources to produce the required capability.82
Generally, most democracies are moving away from conscription to all-volunteer forces.
Schiff argues that persuasive recruitment indicates agreement among the political
leadership, the military and citizenry over the requirements of the armed forces. In this type
of recruitment, often voluntary in nature, citizens may put themselves up for military
service based on certain beliefs such as security, patriotism or any other cause such as
employment and job security.
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The method of recruitment into the GAF has been persuasive in nature since the days of the
colonial army. The professional military in a democracy should be raised to reflect the
social, ethnic, religious and geographical composition of the society. In this regard,
democracies are expected to develop sound recruitment policies to make it possible for
citizens from diverse background to make a career in the military either on long-term or
short service.83 The recruitment policies of the country since 1992 seem reflective of this
imperative. There is general agreement among political and military leadership and
citizenry in Ghana on the recruitment method of the armed forces. The citizenry does not
have a direct role in the formulation of these policies, but favourably respond to recruitment
advertisements. In most modern societies, the often cited benefit of military service as
providing some kind of national civic duty is hardly relevant in present day
circumstances.84 Citizens in such voluntary forces may look up to the military service for
various reasons such as altruistic service and self-enhancement motives; as well as
economic motives like better pay, gaining skills, and future employment.85
As mentioned earlier, GAF has become an employer of choice, whom thousands of
qualified young Ghanaians look up to for jobs every year. Most of the respondents sampled
on civil-military relations in Ghana viewed the armed forces in high esteem and
unanimously agreed on the need for armed forces in Ghana and thus consider the military
as an important partner in the governance and development processes. Most respondents
cited reasons of territorial defence, internal security, emergency response and rescue, and
civil construction in remote areas. However, respondents expressed mixed opinions to the
question of whether they wish to join the armed forces. Some of the respondents between
ages 18-30 wished they could make a career within the military. However, some of these
respondents expressed mixed feelings about the lack of openness in the recruitment process
of the armed forces. Indeed one respondent remarked that “their recruitment process lacks
transparency.”86 This perception is typically associated with recruitment into most public
institutions in Ghana. On hindsight, the processes that are generally merit-based. Yet the
actual selection processes are often characterized by lack of transparency and equal
opportunity for all Ghanaians. There is a high tendency for people to secure public sector
employment based on their social networks. As noted under the discussion on regional
balance, the issue of protocol recruitment process could be equated to a sort of partnership
between political elites and the military on who gets into the armed forces. Generally wards
or people associated with former and active military persons and people connected to
political elites may have the upper hand over ordinary citizens in a supposedly merit-based
recruitment process. Due to desire of most unemployed youth to secure jobs, some even fall
prey to scrupulous recruitment middle-men who dupe them of huge sums of money under
the pretext of securing enlistment for them.87 This situation can be partly attributed to lack
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of transparency in an otherwise merit-based system of recruitment in most public sector
institutions in Ghana including the armed forces and the police.
The military style exemplified by the external manifestations and inner mental
constructions associated with the military. These include the appearance, ethos, and public
perceptions about the military. The military style of the GAF is essentially British in nature
as the military was mirrored along the former colonial masters. For instance, the mess
etiquettes and other qualities of the British aristocracy such as gentlemanliness, finesse and
professionalism are the cornerstone of the military tradition in Ghana. As noted previously
the GAF is widely respected by the Ghanaian public for their unique corporate and national
character.
Indeed, the pomp and pageantry associated with military ceremonies have been essential
feature most national celebrations such as independence parades and government inaugural
ceremonies. Nonetheless, some aspects of military style which are manifested by the
organizational culture are essential determinants of the nature of the relationship between
the military and the general society. This will be discussed in the subsequent section of the
chapter.
6.2 The Military and the Ghanaian Society
The military in most democracies is an important tool of statehood, however, the prestige of
the military rests upon the approval of the general society.88 The armed forces is embedded
and at the same time insulated from the society, especially in democratic societies. 89
However, civilian control of the military is often limited to the relations between elected
civilians and generals. As discussed above, this relationship is often viewed mostly through
the formal institutional mechanisms and informal relations that influence the manner in
which policy makers make use of the military.90 Civil control of the military, including the
way civilians and the general public views and monitors the military is an important factor
in fostering healthy civil-military relations. The relationship between military and society is
perhaps one of the most significant issues in most democracies. This is because it involves
a myriad of conditions that affect militaries, the citizenry at large, and their relationships
with each other and other countries. 91 Schiff notes that while some nations and their
citizenry have agreed on the institutional separation between civilian elites and the armed
forces, other societies have not.92 In this regard, some have argued that, those nations that
do not espouse institutional separation are not necessarily in conformity with the normal
condition of civil–military relations.93 Schiff argues that, these viewpoints lack nuanced
understanding of the need for cultural and institutional sensitivity especially in developing
nations where the dominant Western civil–military separations may or may not be regarded
as indigenously appropriate.94 Concordance theory, however, considers the citizenry as an
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important partner, even though, Schiff did not elaborate how the relationship between the
military and society plays out in practical terms and its likely effects on maintaining a
stable civil-military relationship or otherwise.
In the case of African societies, Naison Ngoma observes that since time immemorial the
relationship between the military and civil society has been both problematic and complex
often without a clear distinction between soldiers and the rest of the society. However, the
contemporary era has seen the military evolving into a professional and full-time
establishment that is distinct from civil society.95 In Ghana, as in other societies with
histories of colonial repressive and post-independence coup-prone militaries, the relations
between two actors are characterized by mutual suspicion and mistrust. Particularly, the
military is generally feared by the civilian population partly due to the inherently violent
nature of their profession. The military have been used by both military regimes and
authoritarian civilian regimes to unleash a reign of terror and various forms of human rights
abuses against civilian population. Moreover, the abysmal records of past military regimes
also deflated the military’s claim of superior ability to rule. Civilians have a poor
perception of the military as legitimate political rulers.96 Since the beginning of the Fourth
Republic, the military has sought to redeem its battered image, re-professionalize and
develop a healthy relationship with the civilian population. The literature on civil-military
relations in Ghana has focused extensively on the power relations between the military and
political elites. The relationship between the citizenry and military is often not considered.
The general public is not factored into the decision making process on defence issues in
Ghana. The remaining section of this chapter looks at the relationship between the military
and the general society, including key societal actors such as the media and civil society
organizations.
During the PNDC era that ushered in the Fourth Republic military supremacy in Ghanaian
society was the order of the day even though the regime was quasi-military in nature. The
era was characterized by military presence in most aspects of public life. The advent of the
Fourth Republic came with the natural expectation of demilitarization of politics and
society as an important mechanism of nurturing and consolidating democracy. This process
included ad hoc processes to re-professionalize the armed forces some of which have been
discussed under themes of defence transformation. The critical question is how these
developments have contributed to improving civil-military relations within the context of
the relationship between the armed forces and general society. Previous surveys on civil-
military relations have pointed to a generally high appreciation of the role of the military in
protecting the territorial integrity of the state. The Ghanaian public also holds the military
in high esteem for their role in both external and internal peacekeeping, emergency rescue
and disaster relief, provision of civil support duties like road construction, bridges and
healthcare. The military is also admired as an important national symbol.97 Interestingly, all
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respondents sampled for this study attested to these factors and thus considered the military
as an important state institution and partner in the development process. Most respondents
justified their reasons within the intricate linkage between developments and security.98To
them, the military provides the peaceful environment for governance and development to
thrive.
The GAF is one of the most publicly trusted institutions in Ghana with regards to
performance of their core mandate. 99 For example, results of the 2015 Afrobarometer
survey on public perceptions on state institutions reveals that “the only public institution
that enjoys a substantial level of trust is the military. More than half of Ghanaians (56%)
say they trust the military.”100 Despite the appreciable level of trust in the military, public
perception towards the military is at best mixed. Initially, the public perception towards the
military has been a negative one as the military is often regarded as avenue for school drop-
outs and violent persons. This is partly attributed to the nature of the colonial army which
was mostly made up of enlisted illiterates used for the purpose of oppressing public
discontents against colonialism. The military was basically seen as an oppressive and
lawless institution. In the post-independence era the image persisted for a long while. The
military over the years have changed in terms of the human composition with educated
persons and professionals increasingly making careers in military service. Indeed, opinions
of the respondents varied on their general impression or perceptions about the armed forces.
For instance some respondents noted the following about the GAF: “they are bunch of
highly skilled personnel in various disciplines who are always ready to defend the nation on
call. They are very disciplined and respected. But there is a perception that they are scary
and should be feared.”101
The military is respected because it is regarded as more disciplined as compared to other
security services like the police. Most of the respondents across the three regions were very
appreciative of the corporate image of the military, particularly, the disciplined and strict
demeanour of military personnel. Generally, most Ghanaians are more confident of the
military as a reliable source of security than the police. However, some respondents noted
that, the military behave like secret organization and are not very open with information to
outside or external people.”102Another respondent added that “they are sometimes polite but
not friendly most of the times. Others observed that “they have recently moved from
bullying people. Now most Ghanaians can relate to them, but there is some element of fear
due to their past.”103
The above comments paint a picture of mixed perceptions among Ghanaian citizenry about
the armed forces. The military has over the years embarked on some measures to bridge the
gap and improve their image among the citizens. For instance, each year the gates of all
garrisons are opened to the general public as part of activities marking the country's
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Independence Day celebrations. This event known as the Open Day allows citizens, mostly
school pupils to visit military installations and be educated on the activities of the
military.104 For example, people get to enjoy free rides on the air force planes, and naval
ships. Moreover, military personnel are increasingly being educated through workshops,
academic courses and seminars on the tenets of civil and civilian control of the armed
forces.105 For instance, curricular at institutions like the Ghana Armed Forces Command
and Staff College (GAFCSC) include modules on good governance.106 In this regard, there
have been some improvements in the previously tensed relations between public and the
military. As observed from the respondents, the average person in Ghana may have visited
a military barracks for varied reasons across the three regions studied. For example, one
respondent noted that “the military people are just like us civilians but only in uniform.”107
Indeed, almost all respondents indicated that they felt secure in military environments.
However, some of them pointed out their initial uneasiness in the environment which were
later watered-down following friendly interaction with the military. These views from the
ordinary Ghanaians point to improving relations as compared to the pre-1992 era when
people would prefer to keep away from the military barracks due to fear of being harassed
by the military.
The culture of impunity, which characterized the rule of the PNDC, has largely ended, and
the state and its security apparatus are no longer perceived by the general public as agents
of insecurity or fear.108 This notwithstanding there is some room for improvement. As
noted in chapter five, the negative culture of the military has not changed completely even
though their evolving missions bring them into regular contact with society. Essentially, the
image of the brute soldier is still prevalent among some members of GAF. Some of the
military officers interviewed acknowledged this fact, and argued the rank and file
especially, need reorientation on the appropriate way of dealing with civilians in a
democracy. Indeed some members of officer corps need some further reorientation to
improve their attitude towards the civilian population. Issues of military brutality continue
to surface in the media. These have been detailed in chapter five. It is however noteworthy
that in April 2016, a story was reported about a teenager who was tied to tree and tortured
by some soldiers on a suspicion of mobile phone theft. This story provoked public
sentiment especially when it coincided with the release of an alleged report of a military
inquiry into an earlier shooting incident in Accra that claimed one civilian life. The military
later discredited the media report of exonerating the 23 soldiers while explaining that the
soldiers fired in response to mob action by the residents during a demolition exercise by a
private real estate developer. 109 As noted previously, the GAF abhors any act of
unprofessionalism by its personnel, the military authorities accordingly responded to the
media reports on the tortured teenager and the soldiers involved were arrested and
subjected to civil and internal disciplinary procedures.110 Several acts of indiscipline by
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military personnel are subjected to internal disciplinary measures and court martial, and
those bothering on criminality are then forwarded to the civil courts.111
In spite of the mixed relationship between the military and ordinary people within the
society, almost all the respondents interviewed opined that Ghana needs an armed force and
this institution is an important partner in the governance process. The prevalent view
among the respondents is that the armed forces exist to provide security for development to
take place. For example, a respondent noted that “the armed forces and other security
agencies in the country maintain peace and security in the country and ensure that there is
peace and stability within our borders”. Another adds that, “I believe that when peace
prevails in a country, its citizen’s work effectively and efficiently for tremendous prosperity
and growth.”112 The role of the armed forces in projecting Ghana’s image abroad through
peacekeeping was widely noted by most of the respondents. One respondent noted that,
“personnel who go on peacekeeping mission bring foreign exchange into the economy.”113
As such the military is an important partner in the governance and development process.
These views find resonance in the linkage between development and security. For instance,
a respondent from Accra aptly captured this that “without their role in safeguarding internal
security, meaningful development cannot take place.”114 This is precisely so because, the
front line institution responsible for internal security, the police is largely perceived as
corrupt and ineffective.
Others note that, “the armed forces undertake developmental assignment and therefore
contribute to civil infrastructure construction”. Some respondents argue for inclusion of the
military in developmental projects. To them, “the military should be given more
opportunity to contribute to the development as they possess the requisite skills.” 115
Nevertheless, some respondents in the informal sector, seem to lack a clear understanding
of the role of the armed forces in the democracy. For example, one respondent noted that
“they ensure peace in the country and also provide assistance in times of accidents and
disasters. But he also adds that since they are part of the executive government they ensure
the protection of basic human rights of citizens.” 116 Another respondent notes that, “the
armed forces consist of the police who help administer peace.”117 A fisherman in Central
Region also remarked that, “soldiers, police are all part of the armed forces.”118 These
views were very prevalent among respondents from the Central Region. This region is one
of the four regions where there is no visible military presence. It appears some ordinary
Ghanaians are confused over what constitutes the armed forces and other security services
and their respective roles. Ordinarily, people perceive all uniform personnel as security
providers. This can be attributed to the use of the armed forces for internal security and the
presence and influence of the military in the society in the days of military rule and the
early days of the Rawlings-led NDC.119
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6.2.1 Civil Society and the Military
It is a given that civil society organizations play important role in a democracy. Civil and
democratic control of the armed forces involves the participation of a wide range of social
actors including civil society and media who can provide oversight and inputs.120 Schiff’s
concordance theory did not elucidate the relationship between the military and these core
elements of the society. However, it is important for one to delve into how these actors also
matter in the civil-military relations discourse in Ghana. There is no universally acceptable
definition of the term “civil society.” Generally, it refers to the realm of organized social
life that is voluntary, self-generating, mostly self-supporting, and autonomous from the
state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.121 This realm of public space often
includes networks of institutions through which citizens can voluntarily represent
themselves in cultural, ideological, and political senses.122 This is separate from general
“society” in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their
interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands
on the state, and hold state officials accountable.123 There is also contention on the nature or
appropriate relations between civil society and state: whether state-civil society relations
are cordial or hostile.124 Civil society provides a check on the power of the state.125 This
may often strain relationships between civil society actors and government elites.
Nonetheless, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are essential as they may help promote
institutionalized social trust that helps deepen the democratic process. 126 For instance,
Helge Rønning argues that the relationship between state and civil society in an African
context is one of tension between a weak state and a weak civil society.127
The return to democratic rule in Africa also came with some significant changes in the
relationship between the state and CSOs. In Ghana, for instance, the relationship has moved
from mutual suspicion and exclusion, to one of greater engagement and accommodation of
CSOs in development policy dialogue, in particular, and public policymaking in general. 128
Under the platform of the Movement for Freedom and Justice, civil society groups like the
Ghana Bar Association, Trades Union Congress, National Union of Ghanaian Students,
Christian Council, Catholic Bishops Conference, as well as the media played an
instrumental role in communicating the local demands for return to democratic rule in the
country. Under the current democratic dispensation, a number of CSOs have played crucial
roles in shaping and sustaining the democratic process in the country.129 Prior to 1992,
governments, especially in the days of Structural Adjustment Programme under the PNDC,
civil society organizations were seen as obstacles in the process of governance. The
government therefore resorted to harsh legal measures to curb their participation in the
decision making processes. The current political dispensation has witnessed increasing
involvement of civil society actors, despite their challenges, in formulation and
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implementation of policy decisions such as poverty reduction strategies, domestic violence
law, and political transition laws, among others.130
With particular reference to the defence and security sector, civil society actors have an
important role to play from political decisions and planning (defining policies or a reform
agenda), to the effective provision of security services (supporting and monitoring the
delivery of public security services), and finally in the evaluation of security and defence
policies.131 Civil society working outside the formal institutions, mainly through social
movements and interest groups, can influence institutional policy making through lobbying,
protests, court appeals, and the media.132 It was observed sometime back that African CSOs
were generally disinterested in these areas and also had weak capacity to effectively engage
the actors of the sector to influence policy and oversight.133 While this have changed
considerably, other persisting challenges including lack of trust and/or transparency
between CSOs and the security and defence sectors, lack of independence of CSOs and
fragmented CSOs tend to affect advocacy on issues related to security and defence sector
oversight.134
Partly due to history of poor civil-military relations, civil society, especially the epistemic
communities and the media until recently shied away from venturing on defence and
security issues in Ghana. The relationship between the military and civil society
organization is one of uneasiness. As noted by chair of the Civic Forum Initiative Ghana,
135“they (the military) try to accommodate civil society, but do so with suspicions and from
a position of perceived superiority. The military by its very nature, composition and ethos
is based on a disciplined and process approach to doing business. However, this does not
exist in civil society which has a different approach to business.”136 The involvement of
civil society in security and defence sector governance, in general, emerged after the late
1990s.137 For example, Aning and Lartey, note that this was not possible in the past due to
two reasons. “First, the political sensitivities of the PNDC regime and its overriding
penchant for “securitizing” issues that it did not want publicly scrutinized resulted in an
unofficial embargo on closer civil society engagement and supervision. Second, there was a
dearth of civilian expertise on matters of security.”138 There has been a resurgence of civil
society and media with expanded scope and self-confidence in their determination to
preserve freedom and ensure good governance. Despite the relative changes in civil society
engagement in the governance process, defence and security remain a highly specialized
area in Ghana. As a result, there is a limited circle of experts and non-governmental
research organizations in this area.139
Moreover, the traditional secrecy surrounding issues of defence and security has not
changed significantly. It was observed some time back that the strategies of CSOs towards
the security sector often lacked political astuteness. This is because of the tendency of pro-
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democracy actors or advocates to generally demonizing the security sector, and the military
in particular. 140 The lack of appropriate strategies by CSOs to effectively engage the
military contributed to heightening the hostility between the two rather than ameliorating
it.141 The changing nature of the African security and governance landscape in recent years
provides opportunities for African states and civil society organizations to engage in
comprehensive study and application of civil-military relations beyond the prevailing
theoretical approaches.142 There have been some modest shifts in the engagement of civil
society on defence issues. For example, think tanks such as the African Security Research
and Dialogue (ASDR), Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, (CDD-Ghana), Imani-
Ghana, undertake research and policy dialogue on defence and security issues. Such CSOs
have been able to engage and actually provided training and capacity building programmes
for both political and military officers. Some others also facilitate dialogue with
representatives of the security and defence establishments and to encourage public debate
on the sector.
Despite the opening up of the civil society space in the field of defence and security, there
remains a vacuum for effective dialogue with both the armed forces and the political
authorities on a range of issues including defence policy, defence budgeting, roles and
missions of the armed forces, recruitment, training, force deployment and equipment.143
Through effective partnership, civil society can bring their comparative advantage to bear
in the defence management process directly through formal dialogues and indirectly
through research and analysis to inform policy. This could help improve transparency in the
defence process and engender public trust and support through the work of the media.
6.2.2 Media-Military Relations
Free and interdependent media is a cardinal element of democracy, especially where they
can play a vital role in keeping government and people aware of each other. To this end, the
media provides a transmission link between the political system and the public sphere. The
media thus play a dual role in representing and forming political opinion. Therefore, the
media constitute a fundamental linkage between society and the government,
communicating information, intentions, concerns, priorities and reactions to policies.144 The
media facilitates the democratic process by upholding accountability, transparency and
good governance in the public sector.145In most established democracies, the media and
civil society and interest groups may help to educate the citizenry on specialized areas of
defence and security, in order to enable deeper policy debates and informed discussion on
policy options.146 The media and civil society can play key roles in monitoring defence and
security sector institutions to ensure that they are effective and accountable. However, this
has been very challenging even in advanced democracies due to several factors including
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the lack of transparency and restrictions placed on reporting defence and security activities
such as budgeting and expenditures.147
The armed forces, like any public institution is a national asset and must therefore account
for its actions and identify its relevance and contribution to the public interest. 148
Accountability is required of military operations as well as the conduct of individual
service personnel. This can be best done through effective communication and response to
media enquiries without necessarily compromising the security of the state. Many
militaries often use their public relations outfits as well as the independent media to
continually inform the public about the role and relevance of the armed forces in order to
engender public support. 149 The interest of the media in the military is necessary and
healthy for any democracy.150 The media plays an important role in shaping perceptions of
the society on the military. It also helps to influence the perceptions of the military in the
policy process and military professionalism.151 It is argued that both the military and media
seek to serve the public good. The military does this through the defence of national
security. While the media ensure that civilians back home are fully informed of the nation’s
foreign policy and wartime commitments. To this end, tensions can arise between the two
due to competing requirements. For instance, successful military operations require the
element of surprise and entails secrecy. The media in contrast, generally seeks transparency
in their reportage.152 In essence, the balance between censorship and free press has been has
been the source of tension between the military and the media in most democracies
especially in times of war or crisis. Most militaries around the world have established
media or public relations offices in order to constructively manage their relationships and
communications with journalists. However, the interaction between the media and security
and defence policy makers and practitioners remains with tensions.153
The Ghanaian media landscape before 1992 was very restricted. The national broadcaster,
Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), and only two state-owned newspapers, the
People’s Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times dominated. Their contents were mostly a
collation of government press releases and speeches of state officials. 154 Since
independence, GBC which is a public service institution has been used traditionally to carry
out a political propagandist and developmental role to the interest of competing political
elites.155 The activities of private media were largely curtailed by the Criminal Libel Law.
Indeed, daring practitioners who stood up to the excesses of the PNDC regime were
harassed with frequent arrests and detention. This development stifled press freedom. The
media in Ghana, especially the private media, have been one of the drivers for democratic
change.156 The return to constitutional rule brought about change in the media landscape.
The 1992 Constitution under chapter 12 guarantees a free and independent media. Since the
lift of the newspaper licensing law, (PNDCL 211) in July 1992, there had been the re-
emergence of private press. 157 Private media expanded quickly with when the NPP
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government repealed the Criminal Libel Law with the passage of Criminal Libel and
Seditious Libel Laws (Amendment) Act 2001 (Act 602) in July 2001. 158
As at 2015, there are over 100 newspapers and print media with diverse focus.159 With
regards to the electronic media, about 412 Frequency Modulation (FM) and 63 Television
stations have been registered by the National Communication Authority to operate
throughout the country.160 The National Media Commission was established in 1993 under
Act 449 to regulate the media landscape. The media as the fourth estate of the realm has
since become instrumental in safeguarding the country’s democratic principles by
performing its watchdog and monitoring functions. 161 The media, in particular, have
provided enormous information on public affairs and helped the general population in
setting the agenda, disseminate political information, expose corrupt practices in
government, and general developments in the country including the activities of the armed
forces.162 The role of the media in identifying key issues and their ability to influence
public agenda and opinions cannot be underestimated.163 Particularly, the emergence of
private owned media has added some value to the democratization process. For example,
they help probe government policies and behaviour; foster a discursive public where issues
of national concern can be openly articulated.164
With the return to democratic governance in Ghana, both the media and the military have
undergone some changes with regards to their roles in society. The relationship between the
media and the military was marked by mutual distrust and suspicion. 165 This is not
remarkably different from the relationship between military and the general society. The
lack of understanding of each other’s role in the society is seen as the principal cause of the
tension between the media the military.166 Typically, the media see itself as neutral and
powerful voice of the public and often see the military and the way it operates as an
impediment to accessing uncensored information.167 In the same vein, the military is also
wary of the media, partly due to the latter's tendency to misrepresent information without
due regard to security imperatives and the future role and effectiveness of the military.168
For example, Section 16 of the Armed Forces Act (1962) and other institutional regulations
puts restrictions on disclosure of military information. Specifically article (b) states that
“every person subject to the Code of Service Discipline who without authority discloses in
any manner whatsoever any information relating to the numbers, position, material,
movements, preparations for operations of any of the Armed Forces or of any forces co-
operating therewith.”169 Another article (c) also states that “without authority discloses in
any manner whatsoever any information relating to a cryptographic system, aid, process,
procedure, publication or document of any of the Armed Forces or of any forces co-
operating therewith”.
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These provisions notwithstanding, the media often perceive of military officials attempting
to prevent any coverage with the potential to put the armed forces in a bad light. The
military in turn see the media as a group of self-aggrandized journalists driven mainly by
market pressures, and job security.170 Most often, media reports in Ghana on the military
tend to focus on violent misconducts of soldiers such as brutalities against civilians. These
portray the military as harsh and oppressive institution. There are only a few reports that
point to professionalism of the institution and the courage of individual soldiers in
peacekeeping and other functions of the military in society. This can be attributed to the
reason that the media thrive on sensationalism to capture the attention of their audience.171
These developments have a remarkable effect on public consciousness often leading to
generally accepted stereotypes about the military, some of which may be misleading,
simplistic, and sometimes the cause of irritation and distress to the people in the
institution. 172 Moreover, the cultural differences between the two institutions also
contribute to the seeming conflict. Typically, the military is conservative, corporatist and
secretive while the media is liberal, open and public oriented.173While the military expect
public support in the performance of their legitimate task, the media is not only interested
in informing the public about military policy and activities, but also to bring out the
political, ethical and legal issues relating to military activities.174 Furthermore, differences
in modes of operations of the two may add to the tension. For example, the military's
bureaucratic processes, restrictions, attention to detail and reliance on official sources may
delay the access and release of information. On the contrast, the media are often quick to go
to press at the earliest possible time with whatever they perceive to be news.175
In addition, as mentioned in chapter four, Ghana's current political dispensation has become
excessively politicized. Partisanship has become a major component of most public
discourse in the country. The media, especially privately owned media, have also been
polarized along party lines. Indeed, some politicians own media establishments to pursue
business and political interests, at times creating tensions in the country. The media
landscape has some shortcomings such as unprofessional practices and ethical breaches like
biased reportage, publication of untruth, libellous and sensational stories and political
propaganda. 176 For instance, some media personnel often lack deeper understanding of
issues, and use their platforms to attack personalities who are perceived as opponents of
their agenda.177 As noted, the military as an institution is not completely immune from
politicization of public discourse in Ghana. The noted challenge or danger is the tendency
of political elites to use the media and possibly recruit agents in the military to circulate real
and imagined sensational information about the military to the public domain. For example,
there have been some headlines with potential polarizing effects on the military.178 As noted
in chapter five, several newspaper and online publications often touch on some issues
within the armed forces such as ethnicity and politicization of recruitment and promotions.
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For example, during the Kuffour-led NPP administration some news headline that emerged
included “NPP recruiting supporters into military – JJ.” These stories attributed to former
President Rawlings allege an orchestrated attempt to fill up vacancies in the military with
supporters of the NPP. 179 There have been similar publications under the NDC
administrations of Atta-Mills and Mahama respectively. Examples include: “Kokofu
Appointments and Promotions in Armed Forces”; “Agbadza and Batakari Promotions.”180
These stories allege politicization of promotions to favour Ewe and Northern officers.
While such publications may not be entirely accurate, one cannot discount their effects on
the general happenings within the military and public perceptions about the military. This is
because the sources of such media publication may be found from the internal audience of
the armed forces.181
Cordial relationship between the media and the military is essential for smoothing civil-
military relations in Ghana. However, this has been a challenge in Ghana. The apparent
conflict between the military and media arises out of the lack of understanding of the
relevance of each other’s roles. In this regard, the military needs to understand the
principles of effective communication in both peace and crisis. The media also needs
deeper understanding of military operations in order to report accurately on their activities
in order to shape public opinion and possibly policy. The military must appreciate that
media scrutiny is part and parcel of the governance process. In this light, Kennedy Williams
argues that, every time a society permitted its military establishment to insulate itself from
effective public scrutiny, that military establishment ended up destroying the very people it
was supposed to protect. 182 The link between the military and society is even more
important presently than before, and this link is best established through the media.183Most
especially, the evolving roles of the military are increasingly bringing soldiers into direct
contact with the local population. A key feature of the post-modern military has been the
increasing interpenetration of civilian and military spheres, in terms of structure and
culture.184 This has also impacted on media-military relations. So it is imperative for the
military to be adept in dealing with the media who would always inquire about issues
involving the military and report to the general public.185
Technological advancement in information and communication has dramatically altered the
way media operates and how information could easily get into the public domain.
Therefore, it is important for the military to learn how to adapt to the spread and impact of
modern communication. 186 It is argued elsewhere that the growth and rapid flow of
information has democratized and fragmented media-military relations especially in
advanced democracies.187 For example, in an era of social media, stories can be rapidly
disseminated as soon as they break. This often makes it impossible for the high command
to conceal certain information they perceive may cause some discomfort within the
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institution. 188 For instance, a respondent argued that the internal audience military
personnel (including their families or relations) are essential source of information that
could contribute to enhancing military-community relations especially where the general
public have confidence in the armed forces. At the same, the actions of the internal
audience can undermine this relationship because people can use media as a conduit to
share inaccurate information.189
In sum, there is growing recognition that the media can play a vital role in informing the
general public about the military. To this end, some have argued that military–media
relations are now oriented to cooperation (rather than censorship) and open information
policies.190 As noted earlier, a major shift in the postmodern military thinking is from a
position of hostile censorship to one of public relations.191The nature of media-military
relations in Ghana is mixed. It has been marked by mutual suspicion and mistrust. There
has been some shift in the relation to some level of openness towards the media. In one
breadth, the military appears co-operative in terms of the military working with journalists
in both peacetimes and times of crises on issues pertaining to the role of the military in
Ghanaian society. Now it is very common to hear public relations officers of GAF resorting
to local radio and television stations to respond to some pertinent issues relating the
military. Press releases are also issued when needed to clarify issues in the public domain.
Nonetheless, the flow of information from the military could be improved. The reticence on
the part of military is yet to change completely due to the traditional sensitivities that
inhibit open discussion on defence and national security issues. This is compounded by the
fact that the even though the country has a very vibrant media landscape, and Article 21 of
the Constitution guarantees the right to information, Ghana is yet to adopt the Right to
Information Law to provide principled ways backed by law for citizens and others to obtain
information from government agencies including the military.192
6.3 Summary
Civil-military relations are essential measures of democratic consolidation. As argued in
this chapter, the nature of civil-military relations in Ghana’s Fourth Republic points to a
state of concordance among the political and military elites on the social composition of the
officer corps, political decision making process, recruitment and military style. While there
have been shifts in how these agreements are being reached and implemented in practice,
there are notable challenges. The current democratic dispensation of the Fourth Republic
has survived 25 years of stability. Essentially, the nature of political turnover in Ghana has
been fairly orderly and peaceful, taking place in accordance with democratic rules provided
under the Fourth Republican constitution that puts the country on the path of democratic
consolidation. There is concordance among the political and military class that their mutual
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interests could be best served in a democracy. However, current development in other
countries in the West African region, where countries like Mali, which were largely seen to
be on the path to democratic consolidation, unexpectedly witnessed a democratic reversal
in terms of a coup in 2012, makes it difficult to entirely rule out the phenomenon of
military interventions in politics across the region. In this regard, discourse on civil-military
relations in Ghana has mainly focused on the relationship between these two actors. The
third partner, the citizenry, even though important, is often not directly involved in the
process or part of the interaction. Indeed, the armed forces must be seen to be legitimate,
efficient and effective in the eyes of the public. The nature of the military and societal
relations as argued above has been mixed. It has been characterized by frostiness and
mutual suspicion. There have been some changes as revealed from interactions with some
selected civilians. Notably, the public perception towards the military is changing, while
the military is also making an effort to enhance its professional ethos and open up to the
society through institutional engagements and the media. Besides the general society, the
relationship between the military and key societal actors such as civil society groupings and
the media, remains under studied. As discussed, civil society until the 1990s largely kept
away from defence and security issues due to various reasons identified above. The media
as the Fourth estate of the realm has seen increasing role in the governance process and
public discourse.
However, the relationship between the media and the military could at best be described as
problematic. This situation is not peculiar to emerging democracies such as Ghana. Even
the most advanced democracies of the West are often confronted with this challenge.
Several reasons including lack of understanding of each other’s roles, differences in
organizational cultures, professional ethos and procedures often compound the situation. As
discussed the proliferation of advanced communication channels make it almost impossible
for the military to keep to its traditional approach to communication. In the same vein, the
media must understand their roles and limit in dissemination of public information to
inform public opinion and policy. Essentially, there is limited public discourse on defence
issues in the Ghanaian media. The media is often interested in reports of misconduct by
individual military personnel. Such stories are obviously sensationalist, agitate public
sentiments, and go a long way to inform or reinforce the existing public perception about
the military. Going forward, one would wish to see when the media with the help of
epistemic civil society grouping could lead the crusade for open and informed discussions
on defence issues such as defence policies, budgets, doctrines, deployment, and their
expected political and policy implications.
The ad hoc approaches used in the Fourth Republic have brought about some relative
changes to Ghana’s defence sector. As examined within chapter five, some things have
changed in terms of the human composition, political setting, cultural and organizational
227
transformation. Even though the changes have not been across-the-board or systematic as
done in some post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings, they have directly and indirectly
impacted on building a healthy-civil military relationship in the country. Currently, the
country is witnessing increasing professionalism in the way the military and government
deal with each other. This indicates improved relations between civilian political authority
and the military. However, it is imperative for the country to pursue a comprehensive and
nationally-owned process at transformation and modernization its defence sector to enhance
civil and democratic civilian control. The various mechanisms of civilian control have been
outlined in the 1992 constitution. However, it appears the element of civil control with
regards to allegiance of the armed forces to the larger civil society other than government
begs improvement. As noted, Ghanaians generally trust the military institution in terms of
their astuteness in execution of the mission at home and abroad. Even though state and its
security apparatus are no longer perceived by the general public as agents of insecurity or
fear, some Ghanaians still fear the military. Actions or behaviour of elements within the
military institution also corroborate this through their high handedness in dealing with
civilians. The approach of the military in relating to civilians is largely influenced by the
organizational culture and a perceived superiority of the military to both civilian authorities
and the general society.193 There is the need to deal with the prevalent militaristic psyche in
addition changing societal mind-set in order to make defence transformation more
successful. 194 For country which is in a process of democratic consolidation, civilian
control alone is not enough. There is the need to move further to control of militarization
which deals with controlling the mechanisms that legitimize the use of military force, in
particular, and the military, in general.195 This can be achieved through political discourse
that ensures that the use of the military is based on a thorough, open, and deliberative
process of decision making in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role in
addressing the legitimacy to use the military.196 This could serve as an entry point to
enhance the involvement of citizenry and relevant civil society actors and media in defence
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Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
7.0 Introduction
This thesis examines the changes in Ghana’s defence sector since the return to
constitutional democracy in 1992. It answers the research question- has Ghana’s processes
of defence transformation contributed to healthier civil-military relations and consolidation
of democracy in the Fourth Republic? The supporting research objectives included: 1) to
investigate Ghana’s process at transforming her defence sector in line with democratic
principles; 2) relate the theories and principles of civil-military relations and defence
transformation to the Ghanaian case; and 3) identify the lessons other countries in the sub-
region and the continent could draw from Ghana. These objectives were achieved based on
qualitative analysis of available date. This final chapter therefore puts forward the key
findings and conclusions of the thesis. It also offers some recommendations and identifies
some areas for future research on defence transformation and civil-military relations in
Ghana.
7.1 Summary of Findings
Ghana witnessed what was termed as “musical chairs” between military and civilian
political elites for most part of the post-independence period. Ghana’s defence sector has an
authoritarian past, and thus requires some level of changes to ensure that it conforms to the
democratic principles that Ghana has acceded to since 1992. Defence transformation
processes have been organically driven by the peculiar external and internal political,
economic and social factors of the country since the late 1980s. The resultant changes in the
defence sector and therefore provides the basis to examine the transformations that have
occurred in the sector thus far using Chuter’s conceptual framework in terms of cultural,
human, organizational and political transformation.
This thesis narrowed the theoretical debates on civil-military relations to the African
context in order to understand the motivations for military interventions in the region and
the challenges of disengaging the military from the political realm. This provides the
opportunity to move the debate beyond the piecemeal approach of security sector reform to
a more holistic approach of security and defence sector transformation. Having noted the
theoretical and conceptual gaps in the literature, the third chapter outlined the research
methodology employed to address both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the study.
In doing so, a single-case study approach was adopted as the research design by relying on
primary data extracted from semi-structured and structured interviews as well as secondary
data. The multiple data sourced were analysed qualitatively based on the chosen conceptual
and theoretical frameworks. The intention was not to generate theory out of the rich data,
but rather, to use the data to explain the chosen theoretical and conceptual frameworks
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based on a case study of Ghana. To do this, a deeper historical account of the Ghanaian
democratic transition process was done in order to clearly contextualize the place of the
armed forces in the contemporary democratic process. This panoramic analysis showed
how the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) has evolved and what has been done to situate it in
the contemporary discourse on defence transformation and civil-military relations.
Having provided the historical context, chapter five examined the current developments in
the Ghana Armed Forces within the framework of David Chuter’s Guide to Defence
Transformation. The chapter specifically highlighted some of reforms carried out by the
two main political administrations under the Fourth Republic. This was followed by in-
depth examination of changes in terms of the cultural, human, organization and political
environment of the GAF. The study found that there have been some transformational
changes in the GAF with respect to the culture, gender and regional composition of
personnel, organizational and parliamentary oversight of the defence sector. The changes
have occurred organically in response to the changing environment in which the armed
forces finds itself. The chapter then identified some of the catalysts for change in the GAF.
These have been largely centred on post-Cold War era democratization and socio-economic
realities of Ghana. In addition, the use of the armed forces in certain international
engagements like peacekeeping also necessitated a departure from a male-dominated
institution to include more women. Furthermore, developments at the domestic level such
as the impact of the declining Ghanaian economy and its effect on defence expenditure also
propelled organizational transformation to bring about effectiveness and efficiency.
In terms of cultural transformation, the thesis argued that, the extent of change is mixed.
GAF has both domestic and international reputation for their professionalism especially in
the areas of peacekeeping. At the same time, GAF had a negative image among the
Ghanaian public stemming from its history of coups d’état and the associated issues of
human rights abuses. In this regard, there is an institutional desire for cultural change. The
GAF seems to be making efforts to change the negative perception. These have been
notable in the pronouncement and actions of the military hierarchy. These have yielded
some results and point to changing institutional culture. There is the emergence of a
generation of senior officers who have better appreciation of the tenets of democracy and
civil-military relations. The critical concern is the sustainability of these values in the GAF
and whether all soldiers have imbibed the tenets of civil-military relations. For instance,
there are difficulties partly stemming from perceived feeling of superiority by the military.
The attitude of some soldiers towards civilians raises several questions. The use of soldiers
for the purpose of internal security often presents some challenges in dealing with violent
behaviour of military personnel. Some soldiers in dealing with civilians still exhibit
aggression. Several examples of military brutality continue to surface in the media. This
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notwithstanding, there is some relative change in the institutional outlook. For instance, the
culture of impunity for excesses of soldiers that was prevalent during certain periods in the
country’s political history is no more. In recent times, the military as an institution or
individual soldiers cannot entirely be absorbed of aberrations of norms of civility especially
if they do brutalise civilians. Through the work of the media and civil society organizations,
cases of abuse by military personnel are often publicized. However, the military often
enjoys the leeway to conduct and apply its internal disciplinary procedures against soldiers
found to have manhandled civilians. The results of such internal measures are often not
released to the general public. This is cause for concern. There have been cases where
apologies have been issued at the institutional level. Now, independent state institutions
such as the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice are getting involved
(albeit minimally) in the conduct independent investigations in cases of purported human
rights abuses by the military as they are constitutionally mandated to do so. This
development is in the right direction and could be improved. There is need for victims of
abuses to be adequately educated about their rights to petition such institutions to enable
them initiate investigations into infractions of their human rights by the military.
With respect to human transformation, the study specifically dealt with issues of
representativeness of the armed forces in terms of regional balance and gender. As
discussed in chapters five and six, issues of ethnicity were partly attributable to the
chequered history of civil-military relations in Ghana. Therefore, as a way of dealing with
regional balance in public sector employment and government appointments in the current
political dispensation, the 1992 constitution has provision that seeks to ensure non-
discrimination and regional balance in public sector appointments. The GAF as a public
institution is ideally expected to be a fair representation of the entire population with
respect to certain attributes such as ethnic or regional composition and gender. It was
generally noted that, the calibre of persons that get into the armed forces has changed from
the colonial and immediate post-independence era when people with little or no educational
qualification sought refuge in soldering. Currently, the GAF is an employer of choice,
whom, thousands of school graduates turn to for employment.
The issue of regional balance remains a sensitive issue in the GAF. The note of concern is
whether perceptions and sensitivities around the issues of regional balance is a time-bomb
in the armed forces, to explode if not adequately addressed. While respondents were able to
share some views on the subject, securing exact data on the current situation was not
possible. So the views expressed remain speculative that the GAF is relatively balanced
regionally. Indeed, the recruitment policies and programmes are structured in ways that
seem to give equal opportunity to able bodied Ghanaians to join the armed forces. In this
regard, people are recruited based on their regions of residence and not regions of origin.
Considering, the cosmopolitan nature of most Ghanaian urban cities and issues of inter-
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ethnic marriages, it may be challenging to squarely place people within a particular ethnic
group. Existing socio-cultural factors also make people from certain parts of the country
more inclined to military service than others. Moreover, since recruitment is voluntary in
nature, it is seemingly impossible to restrict entry from certain regions or particular ethnic
groups who are mostly interested in military service. Nonetheless, recruitment processes
over the years have been characterised by certain practices as ‘protocol’ recruitment and
alleged involvement of ethnic and political considerations. Similarly, promotions to some
ranks in the GAF are done on merit based on laid down regulations in the Armed Forces
Regulations on Administration. The involvement of political authorities, the President,
Cabinet and the Armed Forces Council, in promotions especially to senior officer ranks
from Colonel and above often give rise to issues of real or imagined political and ethnically
based promotions. While the GAF is arguably fairly balanced, perceptions of ethnic based
recruitment and promotions in the GAF remain. Therefore, regional balance remains a
thorny issue in GAF, even though the human composition has changed to some extent with
regard to geographic origins of personnel. This calls for concern and thus requires urgent
means to address the situation.
On gender, the military is veritably synonymous with the socio-cultural construction of
masculinity, and thus not sensitive to the different genders in the institution. For instance,
the institutional language is not gender sensitive. Nonetheless, there have been some
modest changes brought about by some international and regional imperatives on equal
representation of demographic makeup of the society and new requirements of
peacekeeping for integration of females in peacekeeping contingents to enhance mission
effectiveness. As shown in chapter five, female representation in the GAF has been low
since independence. Despite the existence of an unofficial 10% quota for women in all
recruitments, women remain underrepresented. There have been some policy reforms over
the years to increase female representation in the GAF. For instance, issues of equal pay for
all forces, regulations on marriage, pregnancy and maternity leave regulations have been
revised. Nonetheless, the implementation of gender integration measures in GAF appears
very cosmetic and not backed by comprehensive policies. For example, the GAF has no
gender policy to guide its practice of gender integration. Moreover, certain institutional
norms and regulations on promotion have not been modified to take into account specific
needs of women. The involvement of women in GAF operation was explored. The study
found that there is a high concentration of females in certain units like support services.
Even though all units in GAF are technically open to women, they are not allowed in
combat roles. This excludes women from serving in positions which come with more
prestige, rewards and possibilities of faster advancement in ranks. Multiple challenges have
been identified as affecting efforts at enhancing career prospects for women in armed
forces. Since 2016, the absence of women at the strategic decision-making levels of the
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armed forces changed with the appointment of Ghana’s first female brigadier-general. This
development presents hope for women progression in GAF.
With regards to organizational transformation, the thesis examined the technocratic
processes through which the institution is rightsized and the general management of
defence in Ghana to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces. Of critical
concern is the policy framework to guide the practice of defence sector management in
Ghana. The country does not have a comprehensive national security strategy to define its
defence policy. Officials interviewed alluded to ongoing process to develop a national
security policy. The issue of the existence or otherwise of national security and national
defence policies remains contested. While all respondents in the study acknowledge the
absence of comprehensive national security strategy, there is a defence policy signed by
late President Atta-Mills in 2012. Nonetheless, this document did not emanate from a
holistic national process including parliamentary approval. Therefore, it lacks a general
acceptance by the actors expected to implement it. Successive governments under the
Fourth Republic have been concerned about regime security, but have given low priority to
the issues of defence as compared to policies and initiatives that seek to address socio-
economic development of the country. Likewise, the Ghanaian public and civil society have
not pressed upon government to develop one.
In the absence of comprehensive national security strategy and defence policy, the GAF,
over the years have operated based on national laws such as the 1992 constitution of Ghana,
Ghana Armed Forces Act 105(1962) and its amendments, Security Services and
Intelligence Act 526 (1996), and various Armed Forces Regulations (Administration,
Finance, and Discipline), and other institutional documents such as the OptraLog. These
documents clearly provide the basis for civilian oversight of the defence sector, but, they do
not clearly provide guidelines for transforming the armed forces organization. The
Ghanaian economy has been a major determinant of the strength of the armed forces both
in terms of force levels and capabilities. Defence spending has been inconsistent because
the relative economic growth recorded under the Fourth Republic has not necessarily
impacted on defence spending, with that spending hovering around less than 1% of GDP.
The defence sector has suffered most as the economic situation of the country declined over
the years. In spite of the budgetary constraints, emolument of personnel of the GAF is
always catered for in the defence budget. Unlike other public sector employees, military
personnel are always paid on time, giving credence to the argument that, this appears as a
strategy employed by political authority to keep the armed forces financially happy to
confine them to the barracks. Despite the fact that, the general conditions of service of the
armed forces beg improvement, mutinies over pay are rare in Ghana.
241
Budgetary constraints have been the key reason behind restructuring of the overall size and
strength of the armed forces. There exists a formula arguably used for the calculation of
force strength, based on population density, but the reality is that, like most public sector
institutions in Ghana recruitment figures are determined based on what the political
authority thinks the economy can support. Indeed, the GAF always requires financial
clearance from Ministry Finance and Economic Planning before it can embark on yearly
recruitment.1 The strength of the GAF fluctuated over the years, providing the basis for
some respondents to argue that, the armed forces has operated below the expected capacity.
The processes involved in arriving at these figures remain largely understudied. Two
strands of opinions emerged from this study on the right size of the GAF. One strand,
shared by a majority of respondents from GAF, is that, currently the institution is not
rightly sized and operating at 40-50% of the required strength. This point of view calls for
more personnel while cognizant of the fact that defence budgetary constraints makes it
impossible in the short to medium timeframe. Another point of view, shared by the
interviewees is that, the current personnel numbers are appropriate considering the
population size and the economic imperatives of maintaining effective and efficient armed
forces. One can argue that, Ghana is not at war or faced by eminent geostrategic threats, so
does not require additional strength. Nonetheless, there is a need for the existing force level
to be adequately resourced in terms of training and advanced military capabilities to
enhance their effectiveness.
The thesis also sought to examine the role of the ministry of defence in the management of
defence. Previously, the MOD basically served as a “clearing house” between the military
and political authority. This was attributed to some noted challenges in defence
management in Ghana. For instance, as a civil service institution, the ministry is supposed
to lead the defence management process. However, the reality with the ministry is that its
corps of technocrats and other civilian staff is skeletal. Some reform measures instituted by
the NPP government in 2003 have contributed to some modest changes. Notably, the MOD
is no longer located in Burma Camp, as it has new office complex and a modest number of
civilian experts. The ministry appears to be asserting its role in defence management issues
such as the budgeting and procurement processes which before 1999 were dominated by
the armed forces. Moreover, modifications brought about by the national budgetary reform
processes, specifically, the introduction of the MTEF, (Medium to long term expenditure
framework), has contributed to an increased role for the MOD and relative transparency in
the process.
With regards to political transformation, the 1992 constitution clearly establishes civilian
control of the military. The armed forces now appear to have to terms with the principles of
civil-military relations. In this regard Ghana’s armed forces have become more
professionalized over time and thus it would appear that objective control is being
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exercised. However, as illustrated in chapter five, there remains arrears in which political
interferences are felt. The study focused on parliamentary oversight of the defence sector
under the Fourth Republic. The 1992 constitution explicitly states that an armed force
cannot be established in Ghana without parliamentary approval. However, parliamentary
oversight is not explicitly provided for in the constitution. Even though the constitution
refers to the investigative and inquiry functions of committees, it does not make specific
reference to oversight of the security sector. Also, the Armed forces Act of 1962, although
amended several times over the years does not make any provision for parliamentary
oversight. Other acts of parliament such as the Security Services and Intelligence Act 526
of 1996, was seen as an attempt to prescribe in-depth national security architecture for the
state. The act also seeks to address the vacuum on parliamentary oversight and civilian
control of the security sector and strips the security actors of their hitherto perceived
opacity. For example, Act 526 requires the executive to report to parliament annually
through the minister of national security. However, the oversight does not go beyond
submission of report by the executive. The reality is that, this requirement is hardly adhered
to by the executive as the post of a minister for national security does not often exist
especially under NDC administrations. Parliament too does not demand for the report. Even
in cases where such position is occupied as in the early years of the first NPP
administration (2001-2009), the minister brought little or no change to the status quo.
Generally, the institutionalization of parliamentary oversight in Ghana's democratization
process has been severely hampered by the sporadic coups d’états and the dissolution of
parliament at every military takeover of political power. The first parliament under the
Fourth Republic (1993-1996) was basically seen as a rubber stamp of the executive because
it was dominated by the NDC and allied political parties. Successive parliaments since
1996 have made some modest improvements in the performance of core functions such as
representation, law making and oversight despite the existence of an overly powerful
executive arm of government. It is noteworthy that, the armed forces appears to have
accepted civilian control of the military, yet, past experiences in civil-military relations still
impact on the present dispensation. To this end, there is still mutual suspicion on the part of
civilian leadership and military to the extent that, issues concerning the military are often
handled tactfully by civilian authorities. As shown in earlier chapters, democratic control of
the armed forces is vested in parliamentary committees like the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC), Finance Committee and the Parliamentary Select Committee on
Defence and Interior (PSCD&I). These committees perform different oversight functions.
Challenges to effective exercise of parliamentary control include the nature of political
system, lack of technical knowledge by parliamentarians and the capacity of parliament as
an institution (staff strength and resources).
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The lack of transparency in Ghana’s defence spending makes the sector susceptible to
corruption. Formerly, issues of defence were often not discussed on the floor of parliament.
There have been some relative changes in parliamentary scrutiny into defence budgetary
allocations. Nonetheless, successive parliaments under the Fourth Republic have not yet
come to terms with how far they can delve into issues of defence sector including the
military budget. Issues of defence budget are often discussed in camera at parliamentary
committee levels. In instances, where such issues are presented for parliamentary plenary
discussions, they are often characterized by self-censorship and excessive partisanship
making it impossible for due diligence to be done before matters are put to vote on the floor
of parliament.
Moreover, the relative powers of parliament in relation to the executive on the armed forces
are clearly manifested in the area of deployment of Ghanaian military to peacekeeping
operations. Ghana’s engagements in either regional or UN-mandated peacekeeping
operations are not adequately guided by parliamentary oversight. There is the need for the
country to allow parliamentary oversight to impact on the totality of executive decisions in
relation to military operations both for national defence purposes and peacekeeping
missions abroad as such decisions have larger implications for the country. For instance,
successive governments and leadership of the armed forces have not been very transparent
on issues relating to peacekeeping funds accruing to the country. Giving parliament an
effective oversight function could contribute to transparency and enhance public confidence
in the operations of the armed forces.
In chapter six, the current state of civil-military relations in the Fourth Republic was
examined through the Concordance Theory of civil-military relations. The theory postulates
that to prevent military intervention in politics there should be agreement among three
partners-the military elite, political authority and citizenry on four parameters namely:
social composition of the officer corps, recruitment, political decision making and military
style. In applying this proposition to gauge the civil-military relations, the study found out
that, there is some level of concordance in the Ghanaian case which has contributed to
keeping the military in the barracks since the last coup d’état in 1981. This is also
attributable to the changes or developments within the armed forces with regards to the
human, cultural, organizational and political environment.
The thesis contends that concordance in Ghana exists between two partners as opposed to
the three proposed by Schiff. Here, the military elite and political authority are seen to be in
agreement over the four areas proffered by Schiff. There is mutual agreement between
these two actors that their interests are best served in a democracy. However, the third
partner, the citizenry seem disinterested and not factored into the decision making process.
Indeed, interviews among ordinary citizens in three selected regions of Ghana point to a
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general appreciation of the role of the military as providers of both homeland security and
regional/international security through peacekeeping. The stability provided by the military
is needed for democracy and development to thrive. Nonetheless, there is some amount of
fear or apprehension towards the military. This became evident in the responses from
different sub-groups in the sample size about their general impression about the military.
Notably some military officers and the rank and file have not completely moved away from
the culture of violence associated with the military. A cause for worry for sustainability of
healthy civil-military relations is that, the increasing appreciation of tenets of democracy
and principles of civilian and democratic control of the armed forces exist among the
current generation of the officer corps as opposed to the rank and rank. The rank and file,
though not factored in the concordance theory, is a critical mass that needs to be oriented
on the contemporary discourse of civil-military relations.
The chapter also explored the nature of the relationship between the armed forces and other
important sub groups such as the media and civil society. For instance, the media play
diverse roles in keeping both the military and civilian society aware of each other. Partly
due to history of civil-military relations, civil society, especially the epistemic communities
and the media have until recently shied away from venturing into defence and security
issues. The relationship between the military and civil society organization has been one of
uneasiness. There has been a resurgence of civil society and media with expanded scope
and self-confidence in their determination to preserve freedom and ensure good
governance. To this end, there have been some changes in CSO engagements in the
governance process, in general, and the defence sector, in particular. However, defence and
security remain a highly specialized area in Ghana. As a result, there is a limited circle of
experts and non-governmental research organizations in this area.
With the return to democratic governance in Ghana, both the media and the military have
undergone some changes with regards to their roles in society. The relationship between the
media and the military is marked by mutual distrust and suspicion. Typically, the media see
itself as neutral and powerful voice of the public and often see the military and the way it
operates as an impediment to accessing uncensored information. In the same vein, the
military is also wary of the media, partly due to the latter's tendency to misrepresent
information without due regard to security imperatives and the future role and effectiveness
of the military. There have been some shifts in the relations to some level of openness. The
military appears co-operative in terms of the military working with journalists in both peace
and crises on issues pertaining to the role of the military in the Ghanaian society. However,
there is yet to complete change from the traditional sensitivities that hinder open discussion
on defence and national security issues.
1See, The Finder, (2017), “GAF To Recruit 1,200-Accommodation In 2017 Budget”, March 14.
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The research question was premised on a desire for a deeper enquiry into the processes of
transforming Ghana’s defence sector. The GAF has since independence been the primary
source of political instability in Ghana. The review of literature on defence and security
sector has shown that there exist only a few analyses in the area of defence transformation
on stable but post-authoritarian countries like Ghana. In line with the research objectives,
the novelty of this research is the ability to explore in-depth a relatively understudied topic
of defence transformation and civil-military relations by using the dual lens of Chuter’s
conceptual framework to defence transformation and Schiff’s Concordance theory of civil-
military relations. The thesis therefore argues on the strength of its findings that some
changes have taken place in Ghana’s defence sector, in terms of cultural, human,
organizational and political transformations. However, unlike other post-conflict setting
where defence reforms are prescribed as part of peace settlements, the reforms in Ghana
have been organically driven by the peculiar political, social and economic realities of the
country. They have therefore happened in a piecemeal fashion and largely undocumented,
making it difficult to study. The processes have come with some inherent challenges which
could be surmounted to make the changes holistic.
Ghana is now seen to be on the path of democratic consolidation having succeeded in
managing three political turnovers since 1992. The country now ranks high in most
democratic governance index in Africa. Notably, Ghana ranked seventh in the Ibrahim
Index of African Governance 2016 on overall performance in governance in African.1 The
country also scored above regional average across all the categories, such as safety and rule
of law, participation and human rights, and human development.2Similarly, the Freedom
House index for 2016 ranked Ghana among the freest countries in the world with an
aggregate score of 83.3 While there are indications of challenges in the governance process,
the Fourth Republic is undoubtedly the longest surviving political dispensation. This thesis
argues that the changes in the defence sector have contributed to improving civil-military
relations in the country which hitherto was marked by coup d’états. Since the inception of
the Fourth Republican constitution in 1992, there have been various constitutional
arrangements to bring the armed forces to conform to the characters of the democratic
dispensation it finds itself. Using Schiff’s concordance theory, the thesis has been able to
demonstrate how partnership has been fostered between key actors of the concordance
theory, namely political authority and military on some variables such as political decision
process on defence, social composition of the officer corps, recruitment and military style.
There is mutual respect by political authority and military as both have come to a
realization that their collective interests are best served under a democracy.4 For instance,
human transformation in the armed forces, especially at the officer corps have led to the
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emergence of a critical mass of officers who have a deeper appreciation of the tenet of
civil-military relations and civilian supremacy and oversight of the defence sector. There
have been some deliberate efforts to transform the social composition of the officer corps to
ensure regional balance. This does not however, fully address the real or imagined
perceptions of political meddling in the armed forces along ethnic and regional lines.
Moreover, the study argues that, the partnership essentially exists among two actors, which
are the military and political elites. The third partner, the citizenry and by extension, civil
society remains a passive actor, due to diverse reasons highlighted in earlier chapters.
Typically, peoples’ experiences with the military since the colonial era through to the post-
independence era of military rules have generated fear and apprehension towards the
military. Based on responses from Ghanaians sampled from three regions, the study found
mixed perceptions among Ghanaian citizenry about the armed forces. The military has over
the years embarked on some measures to bridge the gap and improve their battered image
among the citizens. To this end, peoples’ perceptions of the military are gradually changing
as most Ghanaians appreciate the role of the armed forces in the development process. The
GAF is the only public institution that enjoys a substantial level of trust among Ghanaians.5
Nonetheless, there is yet to be complete behavioural change across the military as soldiers
continue to abuse civilians giving credence to peoples’ apprehension of the military as a
trusted partner in society.
The thesis sought to extend the partnership further to explore the relations between the
military and other core actors as civil society and the media. Civil society has found its
place in the governance process and making modest contribution in diverse ways to help
promote institutionalised social trust which contributes to deepening the democratic
process. Yet, civil society groups are yet to fully explore their role in contributing to the
public discourse on defence issues. The relationship between the military and civil society
organization is one of mutual suspicion due to difference in institutional cultures. The
military tries to accommodate civil society, but does so with suspicions and from a position
of perceived superiority. There have been some changes in CSO engagement in defence
and security issues. Nevertheless, defence and security remain a highly specialized area in
Ghana, therefore limiting the circle of experts and non-governmental research organizations
in this area. Only a few think thank engages the military on ad hoc basis, in diverse
capacity building and dialogue fora.
The relationship between the media and military is no different from the rest of the society.
It is marked by mutual distrust and suspicion. The armed forces, like any public institution,
is a national asset and must therefore account for its actions and identify its relevance and
contribution to the public interest. This is often done through activities of the media in
shaping perceptions of the society about the military. The military in Ghana has not been
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media friendly. There is lack of free flow of information from the military due to the
traditional sensitivities that inhibit open discussion on defence and national security issues.
Besides, the lack of understanding of each other’s role and differences in operation
procedure are the principal cause of tensions between the media and the military. There
have been some shifts in terms of openness towards the media. Now, the military appears
co-operative in terms of working with journalists on issues pertaining to the role of the
military in the Ghanaian society. As media thrives on sensationalism to capture the
attention of their audience, news about the military, often focus on violent misconducts of
soldiers such as brutalities against civilians. Only a few reports capture, heroic stories and
professionalism of the institution and individual soldiers in peacekeeping and other
functions of the military in society. So there is the need to smoothen relations between the
media and the military to deepen efforts at improving civil-military relations in Ghana.
As noted earlier, an effective, efficient, accountable and affordable defence sector could
essentially contribute to consolidation of democracy in West Africa generally. Recent
developments in the region especially in countries that have been touted as being on the
path to democratic consolidation, point to the fact that, the region is still coup prone, most
countries are yet to effectively transform their post-authoritarian defence sectors. The
process of defence transformation seeks comprehensive change that can radically alter the
status quo of power relations in the provision, management and oversight of defence
sector.6 This multifaceted approach, which seeks to achieve an optimal force design and
improved effectiveness and efficiency, and at the same time, developing and maintaining a
professional and modern national defence force, that is representative of all groupings
within a country in terms of regional distribution and gender.7 These go a long way to give
effect to national defence policies and principles of civil-military relations. In addition,
defence transformation could bring about fundamental changes in the armed forces by
moving them through their authoritarian past to align them the current defence and security
needs.8 This can help improve both national and international respect and trust in West
African military institutions.
As shown in this study, Ghana has seen some changes in the armed forces, although the
changes have not been comprehensive. The country’s growing democratic credentials can
be attributed to the gradual acceptance of the principle of civil-military relations by both the
armed forces and civilian authority. The case study of Ghana does not provide enough basis
for generalization and wholesale application in other countries in West Africa. Nevertheless
as mentioned earlier, the processes and challenges provide useful lessons for other




Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, the following recommendations are
therefore offered to guide future policy and practice of transforming the defence sector and
improving civil-military relations in Ghana.
1. Towards National Security and Defence Policies
Comprehensive defence transformation processes often take place over a long period of
time and require multiple resources. 9 There is ongoing process to develop a national
security strategy and defence policy for Ghana. There is need for the government of Ghana
to expedite the process and initiate a national consultative process that includes relevant
stakeholders such as civil society and the citizenry. The policy once developed and adopted
should be revised periodically to respond to the security and defence needs of the country.
This can be started with a comprehensive review of the country’s internal and external
security environment. Such a process will help the country to determine the appropriate
roles of the GAF and how much the country wants to spend to prepare the armed forces to
meet the strategic defence objectives. A detailed elaboration of the mission, doctrine, force
design, and human resource needs of the GAF can be made based on consensus among the
relevant stakeholders like government, Armed Forces Council, parliament, ministries of
defence, finance, interior, military hierarchy and civil society. The national security
framework will set the tone for a defence policy that could clearly spell out strategic
defence goals of the country and how the armed forces can be transformed and structured to
contribute to the realization of policy objective.
2. Fostering Cultural Change
There is a need for complete change in military culture from the traditional aggressive and
violent behaviour to a culture of respect for rule of law and human rights. There is the need
to address the psychology of militarism at the level of individual soldiers. Soldiers must be
carefully selected and professionally trained to acquire nuanced understanding of
contemporary norms of civil-military relations. Professionalism can be both technical and
normative, including respect for the rule of law and accountability to civil authorities and
civil society in general. It is important for recruited soldiers to be trained to appreciate the
importance of human rights and understand that violent behavoir is not conterminous with
virtues of effective soldiering. For instance, Basic Education Certificate Examination
(BECE) as minimum entry requirement to the enlisted ranks should be upgraded to Senior
High School Certificate and post-secondary diplomas as higher qualifications could
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contribute to the overall professional outlook of the individual soldier, and enhance the
general appreciation of the institutional culture and civil-military relations.
Training alone may not bring about attitudinal change, hence, soldiers must be reoriented to
avoid violent behaviour in their interaction with the civilian population, especially their
involvement in civil law enforcement duties.This can be done through reorientation and
change of mind-set from the perceived superiority of the military that often contributes to
violent behaviour of soldiers towards civilian population. There is the need for the country
to reduce the military’s role in domestic law enforcement and internal security.
GAF has a responsiblity to institutionalize ethical and accountable culture in order to build
trust of the general society. Measures should be taken to enhance rank and file and officer
accountability for their actions by improving the transparency of the military justice
system. Civilian justice system must be strengthened to ensure accountability for crimes
against civilians by the military. There should be a clear and enforceable code of conduct
whose provisions must be made easily accessible to all including the public.
3. Enhancing Regional Balance in GAF
As an institution responsible for defence of the nation, the GAF must be apolitical and
national in character. Perceptions of regional or ethnic and political biases in the GAF
undermine the credibility of the military in the eyes of the general population it seeks to
defend. It also has dire consequences on cohesiveness and effectiveness of the institution in
particular and civil-military relations, in general. To overcome this challenge, GAF must
learn to manage the diversity of its personnel in terms of their ethnic or regional disposition
to create a more dynamic and competitive organizational culture to achieve the general
organizational goals.10
At the national level, deep-seated social, cultural and political differences that underlie
existing tensions on regional balance and gender in the armed forces must be addressed
even though this appears daunting. Particularly, civilian political authority must endeavour
to depoliticize the military environment by keeping the military truly professional and
eschew partisanship in its decision-making in relating to promotions and appointments in
the armed forces. The practice merit-based promotion based on the existing point-system
must be strengthened.
The GAF must improve the level of transparency about its recruitment and promotion
practices to ensure credibility in the eyes of general public regarding representativeness of
personnel. For instance, as part of the yearly recruitment exercises, the general public
should be informed about the figures of personnel chosen across the regions of Ghana by
detailing out the processes involved in arriving at the figures. The issue of protocol
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recruitment practices must be critically examined. The practice may have its merits,
however the demerits seems to undermine the fairness of recruitment processes. Standards
must not be lowered for people coming through channels. They must be subjected to the
rigorous screening associated with the enlistment process.
4. Towards a “Re-gendered” Armed Forces
At the national level, there is the need to actively promote gender mainstreaming in
Ghana’s defence sector. This must backed by a clear national mandate, derived from the
highest political level, which is in line with overall strategic defence and security policies
of the country. Gender integration in GAF should be approached from a transformative
angle that seeks to address the outdated institutional cultures, practices and policies to
respond to the needs of all in society. The GAF should develop an inclusive gender policy
and equal opportunity policies to enable females to explore their full potentials in military
service. This can be done through the provision of relevant educational and professional
advancement opportunities. Specific strategies can be devised to recruit and retain women
in the GAF. For example, affirmative action policy could be used to allocate 30%
recruitment figures for women and set targets for the number to be developed and promoted
within a particular timeframe through adequate training.
Gender sensitive policies could contribute to attracting and retaining highly qualified
women in the armed forces. The Ministry of Defence should work in tandem with the high
command of the GAF, to critically review and revise some outdated institutional
regulations to enable females to explore their career potential in the military. Regulations
prohibiting women from participating in combat related examinations should be reviewed.
The GAF should consider providing alternative support facilities for families and possibly
use other criteria for promotion for those who turn down foreign deployment for family
reasons. Women in the GAF must be provided with work place friendly policies, gender-
sensitive facilities and adequate urinal facilities. Again, providing nursing and day-care
facilities, flexible work schedules for parents could boast women’s interest in military
service.
In addition, there is a need to discourage and end stereotyping of women’s roles in the
armed forces. Women must be encouraged to explore their full potential and not limit their
deployment to support roles. Qualified women should be promoted to increase the number
of women at the strategic decision making positions in GAF. They could take on a broad
range of tasks, including operational and combat functions which have prospects for
advancement to higher level of their careers. Ghana must make policy declaration to open
combat roles to women. The few women at the senior officer levels in the GAF, through
their networks should take it upon themselves to mentor other women. Such forums can be
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used to address peculiar challenges of women, both individual and career-related
opportunities.
5. Investing in Defence to bring about Organizational Transformation
The Government of Ghana has a vital role to play in bringing about organizational
transformation of the armed forces to ensure effectiveness and efficiency. There is the need
for massive investment in the armed forces to enhance training and professionalism of
personnel, logistic and materiel. The armed forces contribute significantly to providing a
stable environment for development to thrive, and bring in revenue through their
participation in international peacekeeping. Defence expenditure must be made to have
positive impact on citizens in general, and the armed forces, in particular. With regards to
budgetary allocation for national development it is essential for government to maintain a
balance between the defence sector and other sectors of the society such as education,
health, social infrastructure and human development.
Sound defence budgeting processes and practices could improve accountability and ensure
that the defence budget is aligned to the priorities of the armed forces, as determined
through a holistic defence policy-making process. To promote efficiency of the sector, there
is the need to strengthen the skills and capacities of civilian authorities in order to transform
them into effective and credible managers of the defence sector. Specifically, the MOD
needs to improve their overall management practices to enhance democratic and civilian
control of the armed forces. The country should put in place a coherent national defence
planning process to produce a policy that could enable the MOD to attract and retain high
calibre professionals for both policy formulation and implementation as well as in
technical fields like research and development in security and defence sector. Notably,
transparency in the defence budgetary process and procurement could be improved by
engaging relevant stakeholders to engender public understanding about defence
expenditure.
It essential for the country to consider undertaking a defence review process to determine
an appropriate force structure, in line with strategic defence direction of the country and
strength of the economy. Further, the processes in arriving at recruitment quotas must be
made much clearer to the public and relevant stakeholders to help curb out the perception
of favouritism of certain groups of people in recruitment.
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6. Strengthening Parliamentary Oversight of the Defence Sector
Parliamentary oversight of the defence sector should be strengthened. This can be done by
providing members of parliament and parliamentary staff with practical knowledge, skills,
resources and techniques needed for effectve parliamentary oversight of the security and
defence sector. Parliament may have to consider an institutionalized approach to building
capacity of members in certain technical issues like defence and security as there is low
level of expertise in these areas in Ghana. For instance, the country can explore the options
of setting up defence and security liaison office permanently attached to PSCD & I that can
be consulted by parliamentarians and parliamentary staff to provide research and technical
advice to the committee on defence/security issues. In the absence of such a body, the
capacity of parliamentary staff must be enhanced through the provision of adequate training
and archival resources to provide members of parliament with necessary background
research on issues under consideration.
There is the need to demystify defence and security issues in Ghana. This requires a shift
from the traditional secrecy surrounding issues of defence and security to improve
transparency and accountability in defence budgetary and spending processes. This can
contribute to ensuring that outcomes of decisions are consistent with public intentions and
policy objectives. The parliament of Ghana is not a perfect instituion, yet, members of
parliament must have the political will and do away with excessive partisanship, and use
the tools and mechanisms at their disposal to objectively perform their oversight functions
on the armed forces. Members of parliaments could effectively use their powers in open
and frank manners, without undue censorship, to enhance transparency and provide
information to a larger audience, including the media, non-governmental organisation and
civil society as a whole on defence issues.
The parliament of Ghana must as a matter of urgency pass the right to information law.
This law could empower relevant actors and civil society to demand information in the
relatively opaque security and defence environment. Issues of defence and security
especially budgeting are often too technical for the average members of parliament to
follow and scrutinize effectively. In this regard, parliament can collaborate with civil
society to draw the latter’s experience in the review and monitoring of the budgetary
process.
Moreover, women participation in parliamentary oversight of the defence sector must be
reconsidered. Parliamentary committees can use their monitoring and oversight functions to
draw the attention of the executive to gender issues in the armed forces.
In order to boost the democratic legitimacy of Ghana participation peacekeeping
participations, the country has to consider involving parliamentary approval either a piriori
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or posteriori in peacekeeping deployment. Such decisions have both direct and indirect
implication on the public purse. Therefore, the country should adopt specific legislation
and use existing parliamentary procedures and practices to empower parliament to debate
and approve decisions of the president. Parliamentary debates on such deployment go a
long way to inform the general public and enhance the legitimacy of the ensuing
deployments. There must be an explicit constitutional provision for parliamentary oversight
to ensure that defence and security committees are adequately empowered and trained to
carry out their functions effectively and avoid partisanship that often characterized the
decision-making process.
7. Sustaining Concordance Civil-Military Relations
The current crop of senior officers has deeper appreciation of tenets of civil-military
relations and this has contributed to improve civil-military relations. There is the need to
encourage inter-generational and peer learning among personnel in order to transfer this
core features to the next generation of officers to sustain the status quo. Military officers
should be further trained to enhance their professionalism and the accountability and
transparency of the armed forces in general. In order to reduce the mutual suspicion that
often exists between civil authorities and members of the armed forces, often reinforced by
the military’s perceived superiority over civilians, efforts should be made to strengthen
channels of communication to enhance the confidence of civil authorities in dealing with
the military.
Active civil society engagement is necessary through sustained civil-military dialogues.
Currently, the political environment is conducive for civil society and media to play active
roles. But there is need for civil society to adopt the appropriate approach to engage the
armed forces. For instance, they should approach the military with an open mind in order to
engage them constructively. Through the work of a professional and objective media and
civil soceity organizations, the public could be educated on their rights and the appropriate
institutions to channel their grievances in cases of abuse by military personnel. Essentially,
the armed forces must not be let alone to deal with their own people who commit violations
of peoples rights. Rather, other civil institutions like CHRAJ must be be resourced to
function effectively. Similarly, the media should endeavor to objectively publicize the
positive contribution of the military to the governance process and at the same exercise
their societal watchdog role, by bringing to light excesses of the military.
Moreover, civil society organizations and media must pursue defence issues with keen
interest. This could help enhance public knowledge and perception about the armed forces
and invariably contribute to improving transparency in the area. The citizenry is affected by
the activities of the armed forces, therefore, the passiveness of the citizenry to issues
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concerning the armed forces must end. Local CSOs should expand their capacity building
and advocacy initiatives to develop a network of experts who can engage publicly to whip
up societal interest in defence issues and contribute to the defence policy making and
implementation processes to enhance democractic and civilian control and oversight of
defence in Ghana.
Last but not the least, in order to overcome the weak or limited expertise among civil
society on defence issues, civils ociety groups collaborate with existing epistemic networks
such to the Global Facilitation Network on SSR and the African SSR Network. Through
experience sharing with other experts, local civil society organizations could enhance their
knowledge and build their capacity to effectively engagement in public discourse on
defence-related issues.
7.3.1 Proposals for Future Research
This study has sought answers to the research question, and at the same time, it has
raised some pertinent questions that are beyond the scope of this work. Further study
could therefore be conducted to answer the following questions:
 To what extent has Ghana’s effective performance in peacekeeping contributed
to changing the traditional military culture?
 How can Ghana make optimum use of the armed forces beyond peacekeeping?
 The issue of corruption in defence remains under researched in Ghana. What
practical measures can be adopted to strenghthen roles of oversight institutions
to help deal with corruption in the defence sector, partcularly in procurment,
selection for peacekeeping operations, and the use of peacekeeping revenues.
 What measures can be adopted by civil society to increase interest of the
Ghainaian public in defence sector discourses?
 Explore how the mandates of institutions can be reconfigured to ensure
independent investigations in cases of excesses by members of GAF, as cases
of military brutality are not likely to go away any time soon because soldiers
are yet to be to complete behavioural change across the GAF.
Final Thoughts
The overall aim of the research is an enquiry into the process of defence transformation in
Ghana. Securing in-depth data for a research of this nature is challenging because issues
pertaining to the armed forces are often treated with confidentiality. The researcher has
been able to navigate through these sensitivities to generate rich data through primary
interviews and secondary literature. The findings of this research are therefore based on the
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researcher’s interpretation of the available data. The thesis has established how the
transformation has contributed to sustaining democratic stability in Ghana. As noted earlier,
the processes in Ghana was not borne out of peace settlement where there are prescriptions
to follow religiously. The changes in Ghana defence sector since 1992 have taken place as
part of the democratization process and have been driven by the country’s political,
economic and social peculiarities. To this end, Ghana has made some significant progress
in bringing the defence sector in line with the ongoing democratic process. The general
impression of the researcher on the progress made so far is satisfactory. Yet, the country
needs to do more to holistically transform the colonial and authoritarian defence sector to
adequately respond to the need current needs of the country. The thesis has highlighted
some of the key developments in cultural, human, organizational and political
transformation of the defence sector in general, and GAF in particular. These have
contributed to improving civil-military relations which has helped sustain the Fourth
Republic as the longest in the country’s political history. As it is widely held that
democracy is a process not an event, there are challenges that need urgent attention. This
provides opportunities for political leadership and policy makers to show more
commitment in transforming the defence establishment to respond to the needs of the
current democratic establishment. This should be done in a more inclusive and consultative
process taking into account the views of all relevant stakeholders. The findings of this
research provide some useful point of reference for both policy and future research on
transforming the defence sector in Ghana. Lessons learnt in the Ghana process could also
serve as guides for other West African countries who share similar histories of civil-
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Retired and Active Military Personnel and Civilians
1. Can you tell me more about role of armed forces in Ghana’s contemporary
democratic dispensation?
2. What is the strategic defence direction of Ghana?
3. What measures have been taken to bring about cultural transformation in the Ghana
Armed Forces?
4. How has the Ghana Armed Forces transformed its human resources with regards to
ethnic and regional composition?
5. What measures have been taken to ensure gender balance in the armed forces?
6. What are some of the operational factors that impact on female representation in the
armed forces?
7. How does the Ghana Armed Forces ensure that the conducts and character of the
institution conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is
located?
8. Can you throw some light on the organizational or technocratic processes taken to
transform the Ghana Armed Forces with regard to size and capability?
9. Can shed some light on the recruitment process of the Ghana Armed Forces?
10. Is the armed forces rightly sized, trained and equipped to carry out its internal and
external functions effectively?
11. How is the procurement process in the Ghana Armed Forces implemented?
12. How efficient is the operational process of the Ghana Armed Forces?
13. Civil-military relations envisage partnership with between the armed forces, and
civilian authority, and the armed forces and the general society. What is the nature
of the relationship between the armed forces and civilian authority?
14. To what extent is the direction and administration of the armed forces
demilitarized?
15. Should civilian technocrats be given more responsibility with regards to the
administration, financial administration, and procurement process and resource
development of the armed forces?
16. How is the relationship between the armed force and the general society?
17. How people friendly is the Ghana Armed Forces?
18. How has the growth and diversification of Ghana’s economy impacted on the
military?
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19. To what extent has support by international development partners contribute to
enhancing professionalism among the officers and other ranks of the Ghana Armed
Forces?
20. To what extent is the transformation process in the Ghana Armed Forces locally
driven?
Members of parliamentary committee on defence and interior
1. For how long have you served on this committee?
2. Do you have previous military experience?
3. What is the role of armed forces in the contemporary democratic dispensation?
4. As a member of parliament, what is your understanding of parliamentary oversight
of the military?
5. How does parliament perform is oversight role over the military?
6. Are members of parliament adequately prepared and equipped with the technical
knowledge on management of defence in Ghana?
7. How transparent is the process of defence budgeting in Ghana?
8. Does parliament scrutinize the defence budget submitted by the ministry of
defence?
9. Do you think the Ghana Armed Forces in its current state is rightly sized and
equipped carry out its internal and external functions?
10. In your opinion, has anything changed in the Ghana Armed Forces with regards to
organizational culture?
11. Does parliament have any oversight role on the appointments and promotions in the
armed forces?
12. As a member of parliament have you ever seen the country’s defence policy?
13. How has the growth and diversification of Ghana’s economy impacted on the
military?
14. Is the Ghana armed force efficiently managed?
15. Does parliament have any role in the reform process of the Ghana Armed Forces?
Ministers of Defence
1. Can you please shed some light on your experience as a minister of defence?
2. Does the political culture of the country support civilian oversight of the military?
3. How does the military accept civilian control?
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4. What were some initiatives you introduced during your tenure to bring about change
in the management and operation of the armed forces?
5. How has the growth and diversification of Ghana’s economy impacted on the
military?
6. During your tenure did you see any changes in the outlook of the military toward
civilian authority?
7. In your opinion, has anything changed in the Ghana Armed Forces with regards to
organizational culture?
8. In your opinion how effective are the Ghana armed forces in carry out internal and
external security functions?
9. Is the Ghana Armed Forces efficiently managed?
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ANNEX C
Questionnaire for Civilians in Accra, Kumasi, Cape Coast
You are kindly being invited to participate in a research project in Defence and Security
being conducted by a PhD student of Cranfield University, UK. The overall aim of the
research is to undertake an enquiry into the process of defence transformation in Ghana
since 1992, and the implications for civil-military relations and democratic consolidation.
Your responses are voluntary and will be confidential. Responses will not be identified by
individual. All responses will be compiled together and analysed as a group.
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Age:



















9. Have you ever interacted with military personnel? A. Yes B. No.



































































































18. Would you encourage any member of your family to join the military?





Centre for International Security & Resilience
Cranfield University
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Shrivenham, Swindon
SN6 8LA
You are kindly being invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Naila
Salihu, a PhD student of Cranfield University. Before you decide to participate in this
study, you should read the information provided on this consent form and ask questions
about anything that you do not understand.
I agree to participate in this research project entitled Defence Transformation in West
Africa: Perspectives from Ghana, which is being conducted by the researcher.
I agree that the following points have been explained to me:
1. The Purpose of the Research: The overall aim of the study is to undertake an enquiry
into the process of defence transformation in Ghana. Specifically, the study seeks to
achieve the following objectives:
a) Investigate and examine Ghana’s process at transforming her defence sector in line
with the democratic principles;
b) Relate the theories and principles of civil-military relations and defence
transformation to the Ghanaian case
c) Examine the contribution of Ghana’s defence sector towards consolidation of
democracy; and
d) Identify the lessons other countries in the sub-region and the continent could draw
from Ghana.
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2. Explanation of Procedures: In this study, you will be asked a number questions to
solicit your responses and perspectives on a number of questions relating to Defence
Transformation and Civil-Military Relations in Ghana.
3. Answering the Questions: While you are encouraged to answer all the questions to the
best of your knowledge, you do not have to answer any question you do not feel inclined to
answer.
4. Time Required: The expected for answering the questions is estimated at 30-40
minutes.
5. Risk or Discomfort: There are no risks or discomforts anticipated in participating in this
study. So kindly relax and provide your candid responses to the questions.
6. Benefits: There are no financial incentives for participating in this study
7. Confidentiality: Any views expressed in this study will be treated as confidential, and
no identifying information will be released to others unless required by law or with your
consent. Responses from subjects will NOT fed directly back to the ‘Gatekeepers’ and will
not be attributed to individuals but will be analysed as a group.
8. Inclusion Criteria for Participation: To participate in this study, you must be 18 years
old or more and you must be affiliated to either defence sector in Ghana or citizen of
Ghana.
9. Subjects have the right to withdraw their data for one week and after which it will not be
possible as the data will be anonymized in the data pool
I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project. I understand that
participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty.
Signature of Participant or Legally Authorized Representative, Date
Verbal consent was given by the participant via the email/phone on…………….
_______________________________________________________________ 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Signature of Investigator, Date
_________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
PLEASE SIGN BOTH COPIES, KEEP ONE AND RETURN THE OTHER TO THE
RESEARCHER.
Research at Cranfield University that involves human participants is carried out under the
oversight of the Management Research Ethics Committee (MREC). Questions or
problems regarding these activities should be addressed to Management Research Ethics
Committee (MREC) of the Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield University
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Shrivenham, Swindon SN6 8LA
Naila Salihu
Student
Ph.D. Programme in International Defence and Security
Cranfield University
E-mail: n.salihu@cranfield.ac.uk/ naila.salihu@kaiptc.org
Phone: +233 244 99 3363
Dr. Laura Cleary
Supervisor
Head of the Centre for International Security & Resilience
Cranfield University
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom
Shrivenham, Swindon
SN6 8LA
Email: l.cleary@cranfield.ac.uk
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